KOREA MAY 1980
Peoples' Uprising in Kwangju
In May, 1980, we were all struck by the spontaneous and righteous armed uprising of the citizens of Kwangju, a beautiful city of 800,000 located in the southwestern region of the country. Though some kind of popular protest in the struggle for democratic rights had been anticipated for May, no one, probably not even the people who took up arms themselves, could have imagined that the confrontation would be as sharp, bloodshed as widespread and the display of courage as heroic as they were at Kwangju for the eight days between May 19 and 26. Faced by this dramatic development, AMPO had to revamp the contents of Vol. 12, No. 2 to produce this special review of the Kwangju People’s Uprising. To assess the significance of this struggle, PARC held a three-day workshop on the revolt in June. This issue summarizes the results of these discussions. Aside from eyewitness reports and interpretative articles, young Korean radical researcher KIM Chang Soo, known to our readers as the author of “Marginalization, Development and the Korean Workers’ Movement.” (AMPO Vol.9, No.3), gives a general, preliminary evaluation of what happened in Kwangju and draws some lessons from the struggle that claimed the lives of so many Korean patriots and opened a new stage in the Korean democratization struggle.

The Korean crisis of May was preceded by the buildup of a potentially explosive situation in Taiwan. A powerful and popular protest against the KMT dictatorship that rules the island effectively challenged Taiwan’s harsh, totalitarian regime and brought to light new trends in the movement for democratization, including the flight led by the magazine Melitao (Formosa) to win basic human rights. The Taiwanese authorities cracked down hard on Melitao, terrorizing activists and arresting many of them. But increased government repression only shows, as OHASHI Seiko reports, that the current reign of terror cannot last for very long there either.

This number covers two areas of conflict in the Philippines in which the economic invasion by Japanese capitalism figures prominently: the Bataan Export Processing Zone at Mariveles, Luzon and the PHIVIDEC industrial estate in Cagayan de Oro, Mindanao, where the Kawasaki Steel Corp. has been operating a sintering plant for the past three years. AMPO in previous issues exposed these anti-people projects. We are now sad to report that, as was earlier warned, the exploitation of local workers, the destruction of nature and distorted “development,” which wastes the environment and indigenous culture, are well on their way. It is the task of the Japanese solidarity movement to expose and fight against the self-centered and avaricious economic and cultural aggression of Japanese capital in the Philippines. AMPO staff writer SASAHARA Kyoko, who visited Mariveles recently, reports on the life of young woman workers employed by Japanese firms operating there. Fr. Noel YAMADA who writes on Kawasaki Steel in Mindanao, is known as an unyielding activist in the fight against the export of pollution/exploitation by this giant of the Japanese steel industry.

Our correspondent in Bangkok, Pracha NAKHAO, analyses the nature of the new regime in Thailand that replaced the Kriangsak government in March this year. Gen. Prem Tinsulanond, the new prime minister, seems to represent a fresh alliance between the military and the bourgeoisie headed by Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs, Boonchu Rojanasathen, whose aim is to “industrialize” rapidly by opening the country to foreign multinational corporations. Whether this plan can succeed or not in light of the internal contradictions besetting Thailand and give the strained circumstances of world capitalism remains to be seen, however.

The Indochina debate initiated by AMPO (see Vol.11 No.1) has been joined by two more discussants — Michael MORROW a radical Hongkong-based journalist and researcher, and Pierre ROUSSET of Paris, the author of several books on Indochina. Both have introduced new viewpoints to the discussion. Contributions by Asian militants and thinkers are eagerly awaited.

This issue is dedicated to the Kwangju patriots who fell in May at the hand of the grotesque military dictatorship whose brutal conduct has earned it the implacable hatred of the Korean People and world condemnation.
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Unless we can drive out "Mad Dog" Chun Doo Hwan and his bandits, we will have only lasting oppression and exploitation to leave to our next generation. Having this in our hearts, let us rise up together, fight together, and march together, singing our national anthem, as long as we can breathe!
A New Phase of the Struggle for Democratization in South Korea

by Kim Chang Soo

On the morning of May 27th, the ten-day struggle for democratization by the citizens and students of Kwangju city was suppressed by a most brutal use of military force. Despite being at the cost of a great tragedy — the massacre, beating and detention of free citizens by the military, their struggle opened a completely new phase of the people's movement in the modern history of South Korea, and took the 19-year-long struggle against dictatorship and for the democratization of the country several strides into a new phase of struggle, with a different character.

Controlling my rising anger and deep sorrow, I wish to make a personal evaluation of the enormous impact that events in Kwangju had on the people's struggle, and show how the various factors in the "incident" convey what it means.

Needless to say, the "Kwangju incident" is not something which can be sufficiently evaluated by one individual, as its popular and nationalistic nature requires that the South Korean people as a whole grasp what it signified, and accomplish through collective practice what they see as its mandate. Since the domestic news was completely controlled by the Martial Law Command, and as even foreign correspondents were not allowed to discuss the deeper significance of "the incident," it is the reports and appeals of Kwangju citizens, and the testimonies of eyewitnesses transmitted one after another as time passes, that are spreading the shock waves generated by the tragedy wider and wider.

The truth of the incident has not been fully revealed as yet. But judging even from the facts revealed thus far, the brutality and violence demonstrated by the remnants of the Yushin regime — including Chun Doo Hwan — are beyond the imagination of

Text: Leaflet, Committee for Democratic Struggle, Chosun University
any human being who has common sense. The Martial Law Command defined the Kwangju citizens and students as “rioters” and “mobs” when they armed themselves, but wasn’t it the military, particularly the paratroopers, who shot the innocent people? It was the indiscriminate massacre of citizens and students and the shooting by the military which took place on May 18th and 19th that served as background to the process by which citizens joined the students’ peaceful demonstrations, resisted the military and were finally forced into armed struggle. During the large-scale student demonstrations held in Seoul on May 14th and 15th, military agents who hid among the demonstrators conducted various provocative actions, throwing molotov cocktails, hijacking a bus and ramming it into a police barricade, and killing and injuring policemen. In the same manner in Kwangju, the military assaulted peaceful demonstrators and killed students indiscriminately, thereby provoking the citizens of Kwangju.

Prelude to Revolt

What was the nature of the student demonstrations in Kwangju before May 18th, i.e., before the extension of Martial Law over the entire country, the mass arrest of democratic figures and students by the military, and the indiscriminate massacre of Kwangju citizens? On May 16th, more than 20,000 students of nine Kwangju-area universities and technical schools – including Chonnam, Chosun and the Kwangju University of Education – gathered at the square in front of the Cholla-namdo Provincial Building after peacefully marching, and held “a rally for national democratization” where they adopted a resolution. Following the rally, they marched peacefully again from 7:30 p.m. The May 18th Dong-A Ilbo reports: “Hoisting 400 torches, they marched in line through the streets in orderly fashion while more than 50,000 citizens watched. Some students cleaned the streets of cigarette butts, waste paper and other rubbish after the demonstrators passed through. The police walked in the front and rear of the demonstrators, on hand in case of an emergency, but they did not suppress the demonstration.”

The students, peaceful and orderly demonstrations continued on May 17th, but the situation changed completely when Martial Law was extended throughout the country on May 18th. The whole country was filled with fear from that dawn on as more than 1,000 persons active in the democratization movement, including democratic students and professors in Seoul and other places, were arrested. All the universities throughout the country were closed; the parliament was also closed; censorship of the mass media was increased; and military troops were mobilized and stationed in major cities including Seoul.

In Kwangju a number of students and professors were also arrested at dawn. Some of the Chosun University professors were taken away spitting blood after being assaulted by the military in front of their families. There was a report that Chonnam University had been seized by the military, so students protesting the military move gathered in front of the school gate. The military suddenly raided the rally being held by these students at about 10 a.m., stabbed a student leading the rally to death with a bayonet, and beat to death on the spot a professor who protested against the killing of the student. By this time 3,000 paratroopers were already mobilized in Kwangju,
Kwangju youth in a commandeered army jeep. Banner: “Chun Doo Hwan, resign!”

May 26: "We Oppose Military Rule": 40,000 Kwangju citizens demonstrate in city streets.
arresting students trying to hold demonstrations, beating up and killing those who resisted.

Very rapidly the indiscriminate injuring and killing of citizens and students by the troops spread to the whole city, and the screams of the citizens and students watching the scenes could be heard everywhere. Some women fainted at seeing the brutal acts engaged in by the troops. Meanwhile, the troops employed helicopters to fly over places where people were assembled, spraying the student demonstrators with tear gas and pepper fog. In this way the military unilaterally forced a war upon the non-resisting, unarmed citizens and students of Kwangju, and thereby turned it into a city of terror.

Since the troops did not fire on the 18th and 19th, but killed and injured citizens mainly with their rifle butts and bayonets, their brutality was extreme. Three students of Kwangju Girls High School, though not actively resisting, were stabbed by bayonets and killed. A 70-year old woman, protesting against this brutal act by saying to the troops, “Are you really human beings?” was beaten to death. Five girl students of Kwangju Central High School were stripped naked, and after having their breasts gouged out, were killed for the simple reason that they had carried stones to the student demonstrators. The Martial Law troops conducted house-to-house searches, dragging out young people before kicking, beating, detaining or killing them. Stopping a passing bus, the troops dragged young people out of the bus, violently beating them, and killing some of them. Four taxi drivers who had helped carry students in their cars were also killed. In response to this, all the other taxi drivers who had helped carry students in their cars were also killed. In response to this, all the other taxi drivers and members of the drivers’ union rose up.

The Special Forces paratroopers, specially trained to attack an enemy in the rear, madly ran through the streets of the city, shouting “We can kill 70 per cent of the Kwangju population,” “How many dogs did you get?” or “Kill any young people you see!” The sadistic acts of these men of violence continued and reached unbelievable proportions. A mother trying to run away carrying her baby was stabbed from behind, killing both herself and the baby.

The written testimony of a Kwangju citizen who witnessed these horrible scenes, entitled “A Torn and Tattered Flag,” describes three particularly cruel to throw the wounded down to death from a two-story roof top in Chungjang Street. At about the same time near Jecheung Bank my mother witnessed that a young demonstrator was battered on the head with the butt, with his cerebral tissue exposed. And these were the rather mild cases among their cruel actions. I wonder if any one had the courage to take the picture of the cruel scenes, as the atmosphere was so deadly. As they were so inhumanly brutal during the three days, we know no other way to interpret their deeds except that they had been on purpose brain-washed for a considerable time and starved for a few days, given only alcohol beverage and hallucinating medicine. I guess that the comments of elders, “There were no such cruelties as these even during the War in 1950” stirred the public sentiment deeply. We believe that the “vampire units” (the paratroopers are now passing as the title) hid or burned away a lot of the dead bodies they killed.

The decisive momentum of the present takeover of the city by the student and citizen force was triggered by the car attacks on the part of the united career drivers, who became furious at their four comrades’ being killed because they were charged with transporting the student demonstrators.

My eyes had been able to witness some resistance near the Provincial Hall on the night of 20th and the following days. . . . Around at 13:00 on the 21st, another blind firing began, which was so indiscriminately that a child aged 10 was shot to death (I witnessed it in the alley to the Police Station) and a cook of the Hotel Kim-nam was killed at his work.

I participated in the rally of Citizen Convention

DEAR MR. FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT

The text of the letter reproduced here, dated May 23, 1980, was received by a foreign correspondent in Korea during the weekend of May 24-25, and became available in Tokyo early in the week of May 26. It was originally handwritten, and has been typed from the original with no corrections. The writer’s signature, and several items which would help the authorities identify her, have been deleted for her safety.

Dear Mr. Foreign Correspondent,

I beg you to read my rough sentences on the present crisis in Kwangju City. I am afraid you foreign reporters did miss the key scenes of the tragedy in our city. Are you reporting on us so vividly as on the situation such as in El Salvador, Uganda, etc.?

I am a female citizen of Kwangju City. . . . I am determined to run the risk that the Martial Law authorities may identify and arrest me. But please regard my safety.

First of all, I’d like to stress that none of my family have ever been harmed by the late President Park’s regime and his successor’s. Thus believe in the truth and objectivity of my words, please. I am convinced you cannot help but believe me if it were for the so-called telepathy, the interworking of human hearts, although I cannot offer no material evidence here. Please believe in this letter to the letter!

The brutal deeds of the airparatroopers during May 18th, 19th, 20th were far greater than the authorities enumerate only to deny. On the morning of 19th my father ( . . . ) witnessed some of them
deaths. A woman almost nine months' pregnant was caught by the troopers, her stomach cut open, the unborn baby killed. An old man in his 70s was beaten arbitrarily, and died as blood flowed out of his mouth and nose. Three girl students were stripped naked, stabbed in the back and killed instantly. Other citizens who had been beaten up or stabbed by the troopers were thrown out of second floor windows and died as a result. It is said that the number of persons killed on the 18th and 19th amounted to several hundred, and those injured and detained numbered in the thousands. The elderly people were heard to say repeatedly that the north Korean army during the Korean War had not been as brutal as the Martial Law troops.

The bodies of those killed by the troops were either put into garbage trucks or left alone in gutters or basements. According to the testimony of an eyewitness, the Martial Law troops loaded citizens' bodies on five pick-up trucks, and at certain places set fire to piles of bodies and burned them. Such brutality on the part of the military towards its own people is inconceivable for people with common sense, and one citizen said that the soldiers may have been made to take some kind of hallucinogenic drug with liquor. But considering the unlikelihood that Chun Doo Hwan — who issued the orders for the soldiers to kill people — himself took drugs, and instead ordered the killing with his "sane" judgement, his cruelty is truly beyond description. In these circumstances the Kwangju citizens must have grown desperate with anxiety, fear, and intense anger.

Everyone Rose Up

However, they could not just stand idle. If the situation were allowed to continue as it was, the whole population of Kwangju might be massacred. Kwangju citizens have described how they rose up as follows: "Who would resist willingly if you knew you would be killed? But after seeing people here murdered without resistance, everyone — men and women, young and old — rose up. A rebellion broke out. No human being could watch idly." (Those words were spoken by an old man.) One woman said, "They beat anyone indiscriminately with clubs as if they were beating dogs. They bound the students like dried fish, and tied the students' hands behind

in Provincial Plaza until 19:10 yesterday, 22nd. I was shocked by the unalloyed purity of the student leaders. I am proud of the prime incarnations of freedom and democracy. The general leader Kim urged us citizens to try to suspect even himself as a spy from North Korea, not to listen to American, Japanese broadcasting, and to talk only what we saw, not what we just heard of. The students say that we should never fight in favor of a special person, Kim Dae Jung; the items of their demand to the authorities don't include one letter concerning him.

The main force of the resistance have been fully rational throughout; for instance, the City Central Police Station escaped attacks at least three times amid the extreme excitaments, thanks to the nearby residents' persuasion; When MBC Broadcasting Station caught fire due to the unidentified process, the students strove to extinguish it, my sister witnessed it.

Now we citizens of Kwangju feel so proud, but at the same time we feel isolated so awfully; the righteous students look so lonely when the darkness begins to creep. This is mostly because the mass-com reporting abroad has been so weak and superficial, far from our expectation; radio reporting from Seoul only makes us aghast because of the falsity and insincerity. I guarantee that if it were not for the abhorrent, thorough censorship, our resistance would have already bore fruit. Our situation is uncomparably worse than in April 19 Revolution in 1960. I hardly remember any public resistance for survival and freedom which should meet this unfavorable situation; We must and are detecting the fifth columns from north Korea even at this crucial moment. We feel so shorthanded — and isolated.

General Chun Doo Hwan is quite different from the late President Park. Many of Koreans wept for Park in spite of his faults, but as to Chun we will be relieved at his throwdown like the Ugandans relieved from Amin; he may be a sort of vampire or at least possessors of abnormal character — if not, how can he order such "vampire units"? We know that now the only way for Chun to save his life is either to refuse abroad or to intensify iron-fisting government, daring to massacre the citizens in and around Kwangju area.

Is it unreasonable that if we analyze that the Commander of U.S.-Korea Combined Forces is eventually responsible for our tragedy, since as you know, he has the ultimate right of commanding in this Republic. If the unstable peace and order is regained in this area, the whole citizens will lead a life with fury and anger, with sense of disgrace and guilt to the dead, so long as they are under Chun's control. Then the R.O.K., most faithful ally of the U.S.A., may begin to collapse. Such an outlook is so horrible.

Particularly I ask Time and Newsweek to offer pages as many as possible; as the two magazines have many Korean readers that people will catch the size of our tragedy by the crossed-out space by the censorship. We are so needy in making our tragedy and present crisis known.

We know our freedom is up to ourselves. But we pray S.O.S. one thousand times for our fighting youths. Many students from Seoul and other regions, trying to break through the military force which are besieging Kwangju area, are reportedly being shot continuously. And we don't forget that the dying military soldiers are also our brethren.

What a tragedy being done by a few traitors!

Thank you, Mr. Reporter. Good luck!

[signed]

May 23, 1980, 18:00 p.m.
their backs. The paratroopers searched for students and youths even in the buses passing by, and dragged them out to beat and kick them. Citizens watching these scenes could not help but get incensed, because the students are their sons and daughters. So we citizens all rose up."

A middle-aged man described the scene as follows: "They took the young away as if they were butchers bringing pigs in for slaughter. The dead people were treated like processed meat. For the next two days, people were randomly killed without reason, and nobody knows where the bodies were taken. Therefore the citizens could not help but rise up and confront them." (This interview was taken from Japanese television coverage of the Kwangju uprising.)

Of Kwangju's population of 800,000, 200,000 went into the streets on the 19th to demonstrate and confront the military. Four policemen were run over by a bus citizens were riding, but on the whole the citizens did not show hostility to the police. As soon as the citizens rose up, the situation began to change. When all the members of the taxi drivers' union joined them after four taxi drivers were cruelly beaten to death, the citizens' mobility and power to attack the troops' lines increased, and their "weapons" of sticks, steel pipes, sickles, kitchen knives, and such were supplemented by vehicles. With this combination of weapons, they forced the troops into defensive positions.

A Dong-A Ilbo reporter reported the following from the scene of the uprising: "The situation was reversed at noon on the 19th. In the morning the demonstrators were singing the students' favorite resistance song and rousing songs like 'Pioneers,' but in the afternoon they sang songs like 'Arirang,' 'Pongsunwha' ('Touch-me-not') and the National Anthem." This shift in songs was probably an indication that the victory of the citizens seemed near, and the songs they sang changed to those of a more nationalistic and traditional folk-song type; in other words, songs popular among the ordinary people.

The killing of citizens by the Martial Law troops as the latter were driven into a corner became much more widespread and brutal, but the citizens continued forward without retreat. On the evening of the 19th, all the public buildings, government buildings, and police stations — except the Cholla-namdo Provincial Building — were occupied by citizens, and all means of transportation including buses and taxis were taken over and run by citizens. Gasoline stations supplied free fuel for citizens' cars. Managers of bus and taxi companies voluntarily offered their vehicles with drivers, and delivered cooked rice for the demonstrators. An old woman, owner of a small shop, provided all the food she had — mostly bread and juice — to the young people, and students' caps for collecting contributions for struggle funds were soon filled with money.

**CITIZENS OF SEOUL!
LISTEN TO THE TRUTH!**

This leaflet, dated May 23, is one of tens of thousands of underground newsletters and broadsides distributed in and around Seoul during the recent uprisings in the southwest. Hundreds of people, mostly students, have been arrested for distributing them. The clandestine publication appeared in response to the initial total news blackout imposed by the government on the Kwangju revolt, and they have since proved to be the only reliable source of news concerning events there and elsewhere during the state of emergency.

Compatriots! Look at Weeping Kwangju! Look, people! Look at the reality of Kwangju. See how the unbending lust for power of the bloodthirty cut-throat, Chun Doo Hwan, is driving the 700,000 people of Kwangju to their death.

Fellow patriots! Citizens of Seoul! Listen to the truth!

Listen to the mortified screaming of Kwangju citizens who have been slaughtered in cold blood by the starving and shooting of paratroopers who were made to drink liqueur which contained hallucinogens, by the order of Chun Doo Hwan.

All newspapers, including the Tonga, Chosun, Choong Ang, Hankook, Kyung-hyang and all television and radio stations are being forced to publish and broadcast by Chun Doo Hwan's forces despite the fact that all reporters are refusing to work. The papers are reporting nothing but the fraudulent script prepared by Chun Doo Hwan and lying to the people about the reality of Kwangju while treating it as if it were the events of a city in distant Africa.

Thirty million fellow citizens! Listen to this truth whose tears are screaming. If it weren't for the slaughter of four of our daughters at the Choong Ang Girls Junior High School, stabbed brutally with bayonets at 2 p.m. on May 19th, if it hadn't been for the demonic act by which young women were stripped down and their breasts cut off in front of the fountain outside the railroad station at 5 p.m. on the 19th, why else do you think that even elementary school children carried stones to fight? If it hadn't been for the dead body of a pregnant woman with a bayonet still sticking in her stomach, amidst a long row of dead bodies, on the plaza in front of the Provincial Administration Building, why else do you think that woman and girls rushed out into the streets with knives and hammers?

If it hadn't been for the dead bodies being draped over the barrel of a tank, of two taxi drivers who had tried to help citizens and students escape from the danger of being stabbed to death, why else do you think that 700 taxi drivers gathered in front of the Provincial Administration Building and attacked the paratroopers shouting, "Let's crush the rabid dog, Chun Doo Hwan, to death under our cars!"
Sharing the Same Fate

The primary force behind the uprising of the entire citizenry of Kwangju seems to have been a consciousness that the entire community shared the same fate and was forced to face the danger of death together. The mood was of a collective consciousness and action, with a pure feeling among the citizens as they faced their own deaths. This bond shared by the people was not limited to Kwangju. Because most of the police forces in Cholla-namdo, with the exception of Mokpo and Yosu were concentrated in Kwangju, the security in other cities became weak, and the citizens' uprising spread into 16 cities and countries in the province, including Mokpo, Naju, Hwa-soon, Tamyang, Ryong-am, Chang-sung, Hae-nam, Chang-heung, Kwang-san and Soonchon.

At about six o'clock on the morning of the 20th, after the body of Kim An-pu was found sliced into pieces in the city, people gathered near the Provincial Building – which the troops were attempting to defend — shouting slogans like “We are all of one mind and spirit.” Three more bodies were found in front of the Kwangju Railway Station. As soon as the citizens gathered in front of the station, the troops began firing. It is said that the sound of the guns was like that of roasting beans. Over ten were shot to death in this one incident. All junior and senior high schools were closed during the height of these events.

If it hadn't been for the indiscriminate firing into crowds from 9 p.m. on the 20th of May, why else do you think that citizens occupied police stations and started to take guns?

If it hadn't been for the brutal house to house search with clubs and bayonets that left so many young people in a pool of blood, why else do you think that old people, our grandmothers and grandfathers charged and died at the hands of paratroopers bayonets crying, “We have never seen such a slaughter as this even during the Korean War,” “Kill me.”

Alas, look at the lies of the hateful cut-throats, Chun Doo Hwan and his robots!

They are talking about “troop movements in the North” even though they seized power by secretly taking army divisions away from the demilitarized zone. They are blaming the holocaust on “some rebellious elements” and “resident spies” when they ordered the holocaust themselves.

Brothers! Sisters!

Let's declare that Chun is not one of our kind.

Our silence and simply watching will result in the death of 700,000 of our fellow citizens, and those deaths will lead to the death of 30 million more of us.

Long live the citizens of Pusan and Masan who struck a deadly blow to the Yushin dictatorship.

We, all people, demand the death of the cut-throat, Chun Doo Hwan, and oppose the murder of the 700,000 people of Kwangju!

May 23 Seoul.
and high school students also clashed directly with the troops, resulting in the death and injury of many.

Meanwhile, the Martial Law troops were reinforced by the mobilization of more paratroopers from Seoul. Personnel were also mobilized from the local 31st army reserve division, but some reports say that soldiers of this division refused to participate in the killing of the citizens, and after some had deserted, the entire division was disarmed. Another report says that one paratrooper was upset by the military's violence against the citizens and after killing five of his comrades he then killed himself. Because of the uncooperative attitude of the local police towards the Martial Law troops, and the disorder of soldiers within the military itself, the troops had to be concentrated at this stage in order to defend the Provincial Building.

Even with the mobilization of as many as several thousand paratroopers, it was obvious that the Martial Law troops were inferior to the task of suppressing the whole population. This was especially the case on the 20th, when all the taxi drivers in Kwangju city assembled at a public playground, and after holding a rally, joined a demonstration and led the citizens in their cars. The six roads leading to the Provincial Building were filled with lines of vehicles followed by demonstrators. In the areas around the city, however, the troops constantly kept firing tracer bullets and signal flares. The square in front of the Provincial Building became a tumultuous scene filled with the screams of the citizens clashing with the Special Forces and the shouts of policemen, with bodies lying here and there on the ground. The whole city was filled with the sound of guns and screams as clashes continued between citizens and newly mobilized troops. Citizens, led by a line of buses, taxis and trucks, chased the troops with pickaxes and wooden staffs, or ran away from them.

At about 11 p.m. on May 20th, outnumbered troops fired M-16 rifles indiscriminately, killing and injuring a number of citizens. Two battalions of Special Forces troops (about 1,500 men) were committed to securing the final blockade to defend the Provincial Building. From this point on the Martial Law troops began firing at citizens on a full scale.

Although they bested the troops in terms of sheer numbers and will to fight, the citizens were weaker in terms of "arms." As these events progressed, and as the troops fired indiscriminately at the citizens, it became even more obvious that they regarded the people of Kwangju not as free citizens but as their "enemies." At about one o'clock on the 21st the Martial Law troops set up automatic weapons such as light machine guns (LMGs) atop the 12-story Chon-II Building and two other places and began firing on the demonstrators at random. Forty persons were immediately felled. At 3 p.m., several dozen were hit and killed. Citizens began arming themselves. Weapons were taken from various police stations, and an armory of the local reserve forces was opened, from which M1 carbines and other arms were taken. A group of young people raided the Hwa-soon police station and took two LMGs and brought them to Kwangju. At 6:30 p.m., setting the two LMGs on the roof of the Chunnam University Medical School building, they began firing on the Martial Law troops.

The fleeing troops set the MBC broadcasting building on fire and burned important documents in the provincial government offices. The Provincial Police Chief fled in a helicopter. At this point, the
citizens took over the Provincial Building and the MBC, CBS and KBS broadcasting stations. The police station was emptied of all arms. More than 600 vehicles — including military vehicles — were taken from the nearby Asia Motor Co., and these were used in the confrontation with the Martial Law troops. By getting the cooperation of workers at the motor company, inspection and repair of vehicles was also carried out.

This was the point from which foreign correspondents began covering the events in Kwangju for the first time. During this last battle several hundred citizens were shot to death and several thousand were injured. A number of soldiers were also killed or injured by citizens. Due to the armed resistance on the part of the citizens, the Martial Law troops gave up Kwangju and retreated to the outskirts of the city. The arms acquired by the citizens were 5,400 rifles, 290,000 rounds of ammunition, 600 boxes of dynamite, 552 grenades and 318 military vehicles. (Source: "The Process, Truth and Settlement of the Kwangju Incident": report by the Martial Law Command).

Fighting in this manner against the Martial Law troops’ genocidal operation, the Kwangju citizens were finally able to kick the hated troops out of the city through a process of throwing stones, attacking with sticks and steel pipes, and then through armed resistance.

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**A Temporary Peace**

On the 22nd, peace temporarily returned to the city, but the traces remaining from the battle were dreadful. Every hospital was so flooded with the dead and injured that there was hardly any space to stand. There were not enough beds to accommodate the injured persons carried in one after another, so beds had to be placed in the entrance halls of hospitals. Rubbish was scattered everywhere on the streets, including stones and fragments of glass. Rumors were flying around the city, and the city’s administration was paralyzed. False rumors were spread and incendiary fires were frequently set by persons who are suspected of having been smuggled in by the military, so a big problem arose in trying to control information.

As early as May 22nd, a citizens’ rally was held in front of the Provincial Building. The “Committee for Struggle for Democratization” of Chosun University described in a statement it circulated the situation in Kwangju city after the Martial Law troops had been expelled, and called for a renewed citizens’ uprising with the following words:

“At the time of this writing, those paratroop forces have been driven out by the citizens’ uprising. All government buildings in the city are now burning, and all transportation and communication lines have out peaceful demonstrations in Kwangju, Chollanamdo. But Chun Doo Hwan’s group mobilized more than 30,000 riot police, surrounded the demonstrators, narrowed the encircling net by discharging pepper-fog and cut off the people’s retreat. And more than 3,000 paratroopers hastily sent from Seoul brandished bayonets like mad dogs, stabbing people randomly as if they were sticking pumping and carrying the bleeding bodies away on army trucks. Not stopping there, the paratroopers broke through university gates, swept down on the people there, killing citizens and young girl students with their bayonets.

This barbarous killing provoked the wrath of the citizens, leading them to rise up in resistance. But their empty-handed protests were only an invitation for them, too, to be killed. A 70-year old woman grabbed one paratrooper by the collar when she saw a girl student as young as her own granddaughter, killed in front of her. The old woman was also killed on the spot for her protest.

Another girl student, whose name is unknown but her name is known, was murdered by the soldiers at the Kwangju massacre. When she went to the police station to report the incident, she was murdered by the soldiers.

The students of Chosun University, Chosun University, junior colleges and high schools and democratic citizens were stung to fury and carried

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**AN URGENT CRY FOR HELP**

**Chun Doo Hwan’s Genocidal Operation in Kwangju**

The following leaflet, printed in Kwangju at the height of the people’s resistance to government troops, was circulated widely in Seoul as well. The “Notes” at the end were added by printers of successive copies of the leaflet, as its distribution spread wider and wider.

Ah, it is a great tragedy in the history of our people!

Why is Heaven so unmerciful?

The military, which has the solemn obligation to defend our land for the people is carrying out a second Kochang Massacre.* What is this but a national tragedy which should have all the nation lamenting and beating breasts.

On the night of May 17, Chun Doo Hwan and his party extended Martial Law to cover the entire country and either arrested or detained all those from among the politicians and the citizens and the masses whom they found disagreeable and thus crushed the faint hope of our people for democracy.

The students of Chosun University, Chosun University, junior colleges and high schools and democratic citizens were stung to fury and carried

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*Kochang, a city in North Kyongsang Province, south Korea, was the scene of the killing by South Korean troops of approximately 900 citizens on February 5, 1951 after they had been branded as having been influenced by communism during North Korea’s occupation of the area.
been cut. Meanwhile, citizens destroyed a railway at Songiunghi as well, to stop the military from moving into the city.

“The citizens are vowing solidarity to each other, saying ‘We will die together!’ ‘Let them kill us!’ . . .

“Unless we can drive out ‘Mad Dog’ Chun Doo Hwan and his bandits, we will have only lasting oppression and exploitation to leave to our next generation. Having this in our hearts, let us rise up together, fight together, and march together, singing our national anthem, as long as we can breathe!

“Long live the Republic of Korea! Long live democracy!

“The 800,000 citizens of Kwangju are witnesses to the unbelievable situation described above, and will fight to the very late one.” (See p.99)

One eyewitness also reported that student leaders appealed to the citizens to be careful about false rumors, telling them “Don’t listen to American or Japanese radio programs. Let us talk about what we have really seen, not what we have heard.” The witness also said that, in an attempt to deny the false rumor spread by the Martial Law Command that the Kwangju Incident was caused by local supporters of Kim Dae Jung, who had been arrested on May 18th, the students told the citizens that “We should not fight for a particular person, like Kim Dae Jung.” The same witness said that the that MBC building in

Kwangju was set fire by undetermined causes and that students were trying to extinguish the fire.

Having chased the military to the outskirts of the city, the citizens of Kwangju felt relieved for the time being. Yet when night fell, the defense mounted by the citizens appeared insufficient, and people were scared. Thus the city was filled with a mixture of a sense of liberation and one of fear, as well as a deep hatred toward the military. Furthermore, there were many urgent problems to be tackled: the city had been defended from the military; the thousands of dead and wounded had to be buried or cared for; peacekeeping and administrative functions of the city had to be restored; the littered streets had to be cleaned; and information had to be properly gathered, arranged and disseminated.

The people were now able to enjoy the freedom to stage demonstrations and rallies day after day — a freedom they had won on their own through their resistance to the troops — and at the same time they now shoulder the responsibility for autonomous control of their city. The city of Kwangju, from which the military had been driven out, was in a state of uneasiness, horror and chaos, to be sure, but there certainly existed no less strongly a sense of freedom and “liberation.” Describing this “liberated” Kwangju, an Agence France-Press (AFP) dispatch observed as follows:

arrested young people inside them, kicking and trampling on them at random with their combat boots. In the waiting room of a bus terminal, many bodies were found of young people who had been bayonetted during a clash between resisting citizens and paratroopers. Many other bodies were left on the street corners until late at night. Young people who had survived were forced to lie down in rows like sardines on the street. The bandits were shouting to each other “kill all the young people you see.”

The wretchedness of the Kwangju people who were mercilessly murdered by Chun Doo Hwan’s bodyguards is impossible to describe. The older people who saw this barbarous massacre say that the soldiers are worse, more cruel, than the People’s Army in the June 25 incident of the Korean War.

Now in the city of Kwangju, merely being young is itself a crime, and the sentence for this crime is to be maimed or killed. “We can kill 70 per cent of the citizens of Kwangju,” and “How many dogs have you got?” were the slogans of the bandits. What is even more unforgivable is that the families of police officers were provided refuge prior to the outbreak of the massacre. And when people brought wounded, bleeding girl students to the nearby hospital for treatment, paratroopers forced their way into the hospital, beat up the nurses and destroyed the instruments to prevent the students from being treated. They once slaughtered the good people of Vietnam; now they re-enact those same atrocities in front of their own people.

The patriotic citizens of Kwangju rose up in anger at one of the most barbarous massacres in world history. They confronted with their bare hands fully armed and well-trained paratroop forces. They set fire to the building of the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC) in protest against the mass media which had been sending completely false reports despite the fact that the reporters themselves saw what had happened. The citizens also set fire to several police boxes, army trucks and vehicles equipped to emit pepper fog. A public bus terminal caught fire when the citizens resisted the military with Molotov-cocktails.

Although these were acts of resistance by the citizens, Chun Doo Hwan has distorted the story, asserting that the incident was a result of the citizens’ destructive actions.

By the night of the 20th, all communication channels within Cholla-namdo province had been cut off, and the troops’ genocidal operation moved into the last stage. Even highschool students are now beaten until they can only creep on their hands and knees, and the whole city is filled with moaning.

So far more than 200 people have been killed by Chun Doo Hwan’s special order of genocide, and almost 11,000 have been wounded. Nevertheless, the mass media responsible for reporting this wretched sight spoke not a word of truth between May 18 and 21. They only parroted the manuscripts handed out by Chun Doo Hwan, saying that the Kwangju incident had been instigated by a group of “impure elements” coming from outside.

Ah! Darkness has settled around us and our hearts are ready to break. We cannot even go on writing this any longer.
"After the bloody encounter was over, there were scenes reminiscent of festivities. Schoolgirls in their school uniforms and sometimes even children were seen to ride on tanks. Demonstrators were waving the ROK flag."

By as early as May 23rd, a Struggle Committee was organized together with a total of ten subcommittees (e.g., public administration, foreign affairs, planning, situation analysis, strike task force, security, public information, etc.) under the leadership of college students. With major posts held not by students but by office workers, leaders of the YWCA and industrial workers, the make-up of the organization was that of a broad-based, autonomous citizens' coalition. Under this organization, citizens' weapons were collected, street broadcasting corps toured through the city enlisting citizens' support for the committee, and a newspaper was published (from May 18 till 26).

One Japanese who happened to be in the city of Kwangju at the time describes the situation as follows:

"After May 22nd, there was not a soldier or policeman to be seen in the city of Kwangju. Under the control of students and citizens in charge of public peace, the city seems to be more or less in order, and appears to be in a state of what may be called 'citizens' autonomy.' At present, the Provincial Building is occupied by students, and there are no city employees to be seen in the City Hall. Official public administration is totally nonexistent. Traffic of ordinary automobiles is banned; only bicycles and motorbikes are allowed on main streets... Telephone services with the outside are still suspended. Although streets are neatly cleaned, there are the remains of police boxes attacked by fire and at every crossroads there are skeletons of scorched buses and cars..."  
(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 25, 1980)

A Kyodo News Agency dispatch from Seoul on May 23rd notes:

"Students are mounting guard at the Provincial Building and Provincial Police Headquarters. People entering these buildings are given 'passes' by the students. The students are organized into two groups, one responsible for collection of firearms and the other for controlling traffic, and they are in the streets wearing armbands on which are written 'University Student.'"

A UPI dispatch from Kwangju on May 24th describes the "autonomous control" by students as follows:

"As of May 24th, in the city of Kwangju, where an anti-government riot has been going on, students headquartered in the Cholla-namdo Office which they occupied are energetically working at autonomous control of the city by collecting wea-

And yet, the entire country is rising up in tears and anger directed at the sky over Kwangju which is stained with the blood of resistance that has broken the chains of the dictatorship. We want to offer several testimonies concerning the version of the Kwangju incident offered by Chun Doo Hwan on May 21. Although the bandits label them "groundless rumors," all are plain facts.

For instance, (1) that at least 40 people died on the first day is doubtlessly true, and they were killed in bright daylight by the bayonets of the paratroopers. (2) The description of what happened to the girl student should read that she was stripped and tied to the fountain in front of the Kwangju railway station, and that her breasts were cut off before she was killed.

At the time of this writing, those paratroop forces have been driven out by the citizens' uprising. All government buildings in the city are now burning, and all transportation and communication lines have been cut. Meanwhile, citizens destroyed a railway at Songju and as well to stop the military from moving into the city.

The citizens are vowsing solidarity to each other, saying "We will die together!" "Let them kill us!"

During the Pusan-Masan uprising (October 1979), the military sent soldiers originally from the Cholla area to put down the people. In their present genocidal operation they have deployed paratroopers originally from Kyong-sang province to exploit provincialism in their manipulation of the people. Bandit Chun Doo Hwan is dividing the people to remain in power, a clear betrayal of our nation's aspirations. We will not sit quietly and watch such things take place.

Unless we can drive out "Mad Dog" Chun Doo Hwan and his bandits, we will have only lasting oppression and exploitation to leave to our next generation. Having this in our hearts, let us rise up together, fight together, and march together, singing our national anthem, as long as we can breathe!

Long live the Republic of Korea! Long live democracy!

The 800,000 citizens of Kwangju are witnesses to the unbelievable situation described above and will fight to the very last one.

Committee for Democratic Struggle of Chosun University

Kwangju, Korea – May 22, 1980

Notes—Whoever has seen this statement, please duplicate it and disseminate it further. This is our only means of reporting the situation, as the newspapers have been silenced.

—Those professors of Chosun University who signed statements for the liberalization of the universities were beaten up in front of their families at noon on the 17th. Many were vomiting blood before being taken away. Their whereabouts and whether they are still alive are unknown at the time of this writing.

—The citizens are in charge of maintaining order throughout Cholla-namdo province. We cannot leave this task to the police and soldiers who are killing their own people.
pons, laying the deceased in state and protecting them. In the Provincial Building where until two days ago public administration on behalf of the four million residents of Cholla-namdo was carried out, several dozen students sit at desks, expeditiously giving instructions concerning detachment of teams to patrol the blockaded city, and collecting the rifles, carbines, machine guns and hand grenade launchers which the citizens took away from the military and the police."

Negotiations and Demonstrations

Apart from the Struggle Committee organized under the leadership of students, a Settlement Committee was established on May 22nd made up of citizens' representatives, and it began negotiations with the Martial Law Command. The Committee, composed of religious leaders, professors and lawyers, as well as students, insisted that six demands be met by the military as a prerequisite for disarmament of the citizens: that 1) there should be no more deployment of combat forces; 2) the military should admit that their suppressive actions on May 18th and thereafter were excessive; 3) the students and citizens arrested should be released; 4) the deceased and wounded should be properly compensated; 5) the military should not retaliate once the situation is settled; and 6) all these demands should be communicated to the entire nation by means of broadcast. Although the Committee held negotiations with the military daily from May 23 till 26, it was unable to receive any sincere response from the military. The fact that 2,500 firearms were collected in response to the appeal of this Committee seems to suggest that it gained the citizens' trust to a certain extent.

While citizens' autonomy in such matters as public peace, public administration and defense of the city was being maintained and negotiations with the military were being carried out, citizens and students showed their spirit by holding demonstrations day after day. On May 24th, 50,000 demonstrators gathered to burn a straw figure of Chun Doo Hwan. On May 26th, one day before the takeover of Kwangju by the military, 40,000 citizens gathered demanding Chun's resignation and the abolition of Martial Law. The other demands raised by the citizens of Kwangju basically stemmed either from these two demands or from their antagonism toward the expansion of Martial Law and the massacre of Kwangju citizens after May 18th. There was nothing new in the demands for Chun's resignation and abolition of Martial Law, since these were based on a national consensus and had been raised repeatedly in other areas since early May in the form of student demonstrations in Seoul and in the joint declaration made by intel-

"The Asian Wall Street Journal," in an article written just before the Kwangju uprising was crushed (May 27), threw new light on the extent of popular dissent in Korea's southwestern provinces. Mokpo, a port city of 220,000 and birthplace of Kim Chi Ha and Kim Dae Jung, located 50 miles south of Kwangju, is one of several cities in south Cholla to which protest against Martial Law and government brutality spread.

In contrast to Kwangju where students and citizens seized weapons and liberated the city, in Mokpo, after a period of initial conflict when students captured rifles and attacked police stations, calm returned quickly. Subsequent demonstrations were peaceful, and police, under strict orders from Seoul to avoid any action that might further spread the insurrection, acted mainly as traffic monitors. The Mokpo protests were not organized by students (although students joined in) but by local notables including representatives of the local branch of Amnesty International, the opposition New Democratic Party, church groups and a city college.

However, it would be a mistake to conclude from the peaceful nature of the Mokpo demonstrations that the anger and resentment accumulated during 20 years of totalitarian rule is not deep and abiding here as elsewhere. "My heart is heavy because of Martial Law," commented a local sales-

man. "It is dictatorship. Do you understand?" Said another, "My son is out there. If I didn't have to mind the store, I'd be out in the street too."

The list of demands put forward by protesters in Mokpo is revealing of the deep tensions that grip the entire country. The people want the government to admit responsibility for the atrocities its troops committed in Kwangju; they want an end to Martial Law; they want Kim Dae Jung freed; they want to be rid of General Chun and they want democracy and basic human rights. And there is every reason to believe that until these fundamental changes are made, they will continue to take their anger into the streets and impose their own justice.
KWANGJU: A COST ESTIMATE

How great a price did the Korean people have to pay during their uprising in and around Kwangju? Even now, there is no way for us to know the exact number of the killed, injured, and detained. Arrests still continue. Various data, however, help us to estimate the number of people who died. First of all, the Martial Law Command announced that the total number of the dead in 16 cities including Kwangju reached 178, among whom 141 were civilians, 22 were military personnel and 4 were police. But this Martial Law Command report, called The Process, Truth and Settlement of the Kwangju Incident, was confined to the seven days from May 20 to 27; people who were killed in the military's indiscriminate slaughter during the two days of May 18 and 19 are not included. Also, the report says that 28 died fighting with the military, 33 died of traffic accidents, 15 were shot by misfiring of guns, 29 died in internal conflicts, and 17 were shot when the military put down the uprising on May 27. This is a completely false statement. Even if we don't count those who died during the last fight, 400-600 were killed in the previous days according to UPI (Mainichi Daily News, May 27). An eyewitness report, The Torn and Tattered Flag, says that 475 bodies were left in the basement of the provincial headquarters building on May 24. Another reliable source reported that more than 600 bodies were confirmed. And these estimates by citizens and students of Kwangju are only for the inside of Kwangju City, and the number of those who died at the outskirts and in other cities is still unknown.

The military took many bodies away between May 18 and 20, and citizens could not learn how many were killed during those three days. Many reports indicate that many of the dead and the heavily injured were carried away by the military or secretly buried. Those who died on May 18 and 19, in particular, were either stabbed or clubbed to death by paratroopers, and many of their bodies were apparently taken away by the military. "Although most of the dead were stabbed by bayonets, their bodies were not found. The Martial Law Command only publicized those who were shot to death. Thus, the stabbed bodies have disappeared." (Document publicized by the Catholic Justice and Peace Committee, Japan, June 26).

According to the same document, over 900 people had disappeared during May among whom many of those killed and taken away must have been included. Besides, there are people who disappeared on their way to Kwangju. Voices from Korea No.4 (see p.99), May 29, reported that around 700 students left Seoul for Kwangju on May 24, but only 30 arrived. It is believed that most of them were killed on their way.

An eyewitness saw five military trucks carrying full loads of bodies away, and one foreign military source in Seoul estimates the number of bodies taken away by the military at over 200. Another eyewitness saw soldiers set fire to piled bodies. It has also been reported that on the mountain road at the border of Kwangju there were many bodies of people who had been shot to death by soldiers, as they tried to enter or escape from the city. The same source that counted 600 bodies estimates more than 1,000 were killed. One Maryknoll missionary living in Kwangju reports that the number of bodies has reached 1,500, which is believed closer to the truth than any government or newspaper report.

The Rumor Newsletter distributed in Seoul estimates between 1,000 and 2,000 were killed during the uprising. Quite a number of soldiers also died. According to Henry Scott Stokes in the New York Times (May 28), around 50 paratroopers were killed in one crash. All in all, we may estimate that over 1000 civilians were killed.

The other slogans raised by the Kwangju citizens included: wholesale resignation of the Choi Kyu-ha government and transfer of government to the democratic forces; release of the arrested students and democratic people in detention; immediate reopening of universities; accurate reporting on the situation in Kwangju by the mass media; immediate termination of shooting; and termination of distorted reports on public sentiment in Cholla-namdo and Kyongsangdo by the government and mass media.

While the citizens' autonomy continued, the military kept reinforcing itself on the city's periphery, and grew by the time of the military's takeover of the city on the morning of May 27th to 17,000. At the same time, the military continued to send guerrilla units into the city's center, killing many students and citizens. During the night of May 24th, 24 students were shot to death, and innumerable armed citizens who attempted to escape the city were also killed. On the same day, only 30 out of 700 students from Seoul who tried to enter the city were able to smuggle themselves in; many of the rest appear to have been killed by the military.

The Final Assault

The military began to close its encircling net from May 26th and before dawn of the following day made a fierce assault on the Cholla-namdo Office, the Chun-Il Building, the YWCA, and Kwangju Park which had been occupied by students.

At 2:00 a.m., the time when citizens and students were ordered to surrender, the military began to march toward the city's center, and by around 3:00 a.m. -- much earlier than the announced 4:00 a.m. time limit for surrender -- it started shooting. College students first persuaded some 50 high school students to go home, and prepared for the final encounter by advising the citizens about the military's assault.
After about two hours’ fierce battle, young citizens and students defied the military’s order to surrender and fought to their last. As a result more than 100 were killed, and approximately 300 were arrested. According to an account reported by Shim Jae Hoon in the Far Eastern Economic Review (May 30, 1980), the last moments of the encounter were as follows: ‘Following the crackle of gunfire and the heavy thud of mortar shells, the troops took control of the centre of the rebellion. As the assault began, a young woman militant grabbed a loudspeaker and repeatedly shouted into the night: ‘All citizens and students of Kwangju, let’s stand up and protect our lives and property.’ There was a crackle of M16 fire and her voice was stilled. That ended the 10-day rebellion of Kwangju.’

So far, I have briefly outlined the ten-day struggle of citizens and students in Kwangju. I have not been able to touch upon the struggles in Mokpo, Naju and Hwa-soon. In Mokpo, a Citizens’ Committee was organized from the outset, and under the Committee’s leadership demonstrations were held day after day and the citizens controlled the entire city. What is more, even after Kwangju fell to the military on May 27th, tens of thousands of citizens in Mokpo demonstrated for two days, on May 28th and 29th, shouting “Pay the price of the blood shed in Kwangju!”

The sacrifice borne by students and citizens during the 10-day long struggles in Kwangju and these other areas was tremendous. The figures announced by the Martial Law Command, which put the number of dead civilians as 148 and wounded civilians as a little over 300, are ludicrously wide of the mark. More than 1,000 dead and more than 3,000 wounded seem to be much closer to the truth (see page 99). The breakdown of the number of dead and arrested announced by the Martial Law Command, in spite of their fallaciousness, eloquently reveals how broadly based the struggles were in Kwangju and other areas. Of the 730 who were reported to have been arrested, a predominant majority, 625, are in their 20’s or younger. In terms of occupational breakdown, 162 are workers, 153 are students, 126 are jobless, 55 are drivers, 47 are drivers, 47 are merchants, 44 are store clerks, 37 are office workers and 59 are in other occupations. As for the occupational breakdown of the 148 dead, 30 are manufacturing and other workers, 15 are primary, junior high, or senior high school students, 12 are college students and high school graduates preparing for college entrance exams, 13 are office workers, 7 are drivers, 9 are merchants, 9 are jobless and 3 are farmers or in other job categories.

As citizens of Kwangju city testified, the entire city — men and women of all ages — rose up. Wealthy people like company owners collaborated with the demonstrators, and even the police, which are an essential component of the state’s machinery of violence, sided with the citizens in revolt. There are indications that the students and citizens, in the process of arming themselves, were helped by the police. The police were inspired to join hands with them when the policemen who assisted the students and citizens were brutally killed by the military. Not only did the police side with the revolt; there are reports that even among the military stationed in the city, fire fights took a heavy toll of lives. The most important factor, the one that directly urged the entire city of Kwangju to rise and confront the military, was the indiscriminate massacre of citizens and students by the military.

It should be pointed out, however, that the well-disciplined behavior of the students and their convincing assertions, which had become something of a national consensus, were equally important factors that led the ordinary citizens to join them. Abolition of Martial Law, the resignation of Chun Doo Hwan, release of the democratic fighters in detention — these were the demands that the students had been pressing for since early May on the basis of national consensus. The students were well aware that their movement, if it were to be successful, had to win the support of the masses. The sense of unity shared by the students and citizens had its origin in this sort of sympathy and the people’s common suffering. The pain and anger which the citizens felt when they witnessed innocent students and citizens being massacred by the military are a universal, human feeling over and above any immediate secular interests.

The process given shape to by such a sense of sympathy and common suffering was a joint struggle by

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**THE CLASS COMPOSITION OF THOSE ARRESTED IN KWANGJU**

According to the Martial Law Command, 1,740 people were arrested during the Kwangju uprising; 1,010 have reportedly been released (although, as usual, this information cannot be confirmed). An additional 525 people were arrested after May 27, and 730 are now being interrogated. The Martial Law Command has published a profile of those arrested by age and occupation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school and university students</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other industrial workers</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salespeople</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office workers</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Workers, including the unemployed, account for 387, or 53 per cent, of the total arrested. This is an indication of the working-class base of the Kwangju uprising. 315 (43 per cent) of those arrested were under 20 years of age; 310 (42 per cent) in their twenties, 77 (11 per cent) in their thirties and 28 (4 per cent) were 40 years old or over.
THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY: On the Verge of Collapse

This is not our comment but the reason given by the Martial Law Command in an official statement issued to justify the extension of Martial Law throughout the country. Though Chun Doo Hwan’s government is quick to plead in the wildest, most far fetched manner that the “collapse” is due to the recent student demonstrations and workers’ strikes, this statement comes as an admission of defeat for a government whose only real source of pride was Korea’s “miracle growth.”

The Korean economy began its steep descent in the latter half of last year—the last months in fact of the rule of the assassinated president Park Chung Hee. The GNP growth rate, which stood at 13.1 per cent in the first quarter of last year, dropped to 10.3 per cent in the second quarter, to 5.0 per cent in the fourth quarter and finally hit minus 1.7 per cent in the first quarter of this year—the first year of what could have been a promising decade. The Korean economy has registered negative growth for the first time in 16 years.

Negative growth actually began in the third quarter of last year if we use figures adjusted for seasonal factors. (minus 1.5 per cent in the third quarter and minus six per cent in the fourth quarter of last year (Dong-A Ilbo, June 6).)

On January 12, the Korean government cut the exchange value of the won by 19.8 per cent and drastically raised the interest rate in order to promote exports and tighten the supply of money. But this failed to curb inflation as the price of oil and utility charges were increased by large margins. The Dong-A Ilbo estimated that the wholesale price index for January-May of this year was 27 per cent higher than in the same period last year and that the rate of inflation this year would be well over 50 per cent. In the same period, the consumer price index rose 17 per cent according to government statistics, but the actual rate of increase was believed to be more than 50 per cent. The average worker's wage in the January-May period was only up 22 per cent from the same period last year. While the government claimed that the cost of living for working families was more than 200,000 won, their average income remained at 114,100 won. The average wage for industrial workers was as low as 83,500 won (approximately $40).

Galloping inflation accompanied by diminishing consumer demand has caused many business enterprises to go bankrupt or slow down production. This has generated 100,000 jobless workers each month. Total unemployment as of the end of March came to 830,000 persons (5.6 per cent of the active work force). The sales of major department stores in Seoul dropped 20-30 per cent in the first five months of this year, but retail businesses in other parts of the country have been hit even harder, their sales falling to 1977 levels in absolute terms.

Demand for consumer durables in particular diminished drastically. Demand for passenger cars, refrigerators and air conditioning equipment in the first quarter of this year was down 41.3 per cent, 40.5 per cent and 7.78 per cent, from a year before, respectively. The automotive industry, once lauded as the rising star of the Korean heavy and chemical industrial branch, now suffers from a ridiculously low production rate, operating at 26 per cent capacity, and is plagued with a staggering inventory worth 150,000 million won. Output has dropped 58 per cent from a year before.

 Dishonored bills totaled 400 million won per day in January, but this figure climbed to 500 million in March, 700 million in April and 1,000 million in May. On June 10 alone, 4,800 million bills went unpaid.

The fiscal soundness of business enterprises has generally deteriorated. Their annual interest payments now total more than 4,000,000 million won, which is about equal to the total “institutional” credit balance (excepting personal credit). This means that all the money pumped in the form of loans will disappear in payments of interests. No wonder bankruptcy statistics are skyrocketing.

What about exports, the major driving force behind Korean economic growth? Despite the 20 per cent devaluation of the won on Jan. 12, the export growth rate between January and May was only up 18.2 per cent from the same period of the previous year. The rate fell to nine per cent in May. This means that in material terms Korean exports have begun to dwindle.

Stagnating exports necessarily bring in their wake a deterioration of the international payments situation. In fact, the balance of payments is the most serious factor tormenting Korean policy makers.

As of March this year, south Korea had external liabilities of $21,800 million, up $7 billion from the $14,800 million listed at the end of 1978. Last year, $6 billion in foreign loans were absorbed, but this entire sum was appropriated to fill the international payments gap ($4.2 billion) and to repay previous foreign borrowings ($1.8 billion).

This year, Korea has to expect another $6 billion trade deficit, and an additional $7.9 billion from foreign sources is vital if the south Korean economy is to survive. Even if the coveted loans are obtained, south Korea will suffer from a foreign debt of about $30 million at the end of this year. It should be noted that Korea’s foreign exchange holdings of $5.5 billion are composed entirely of foreign debts.

In June, the Brandt Commission, an international body set up to deal with the problem of Third World indebtedness, warned that since Korea, Brazil and Mexico had lost their debt servicing capabilities, they might create havoc in the world’s financial systems in 1981. The impending bankruptcy of this former “miracle country” may well affect the whole world.
the entire citizenry, and this joint struggle gave rise to an utterly new kind of space as its concrete, physical domain — i.e., Kwangju after the ejection of the military. Just as the citizens took to arms not by design but utterly unexpectedly, the seizure of this new space, too, took place by coincidence. As Wada Haruki (a noted activist in Japan) remarks, “the space of freedom thus created was the prototype of a new order to be realized throughout the country in the event of the victory of the revolution” (Sekai, July 1980). The profound experience of autonomous control which the citizens of Kwangju underwent by coincidence puts the state’s legitimacy squarely into question. Both the students and citizens shared a clear awareness that “Kwangju is what the Republic of Korea should be like.” They waved the national flag, honored the dead among them by covering them with the national flag, and sang themselves hoarse with such popular or patriotic songs as “Pongunhwâ” (“Touch me not”) and “Airâng.” The citizens and students of Kwangju thus identified themselves with the legitimate Korean nation.

Citizens’ Autonomy

The realization of citizens’ autonomy in Kwangju on the one hand laid bare the illegitimacy of the existing regime, and on the other portrayed in bold relief the democratic Republic of Korea yet to be established. The mere fact that the existing regime blockaded the sea, deployed paratroopers trained to attack the enemy’s rear lines, and engaged in the barbarous massacre of its own people, is itself enough to disqualify its rule over the nation. The last days of the Park regime, which remained insecure despite the hundreds of thousands of soldiers, tens of thousands of policemen and thousands of intelligence men it mobilized, clearly revealed what state power lacking both legitimacy and the ability to govern is like.

In the case of the Kwangju uprising, too, parts of the military and police, which are supposed to be the core of the state’s machinery of violence, were not only paralyzed but found it imperative to side with the rebelling citizens. On May 24th all the police in Seoul were disarmed. Faced with this type of situation, Chun Doo Hwan continues to suppress the nation by relying upon a segment of the special forces paratroopers under his own control.

What was citizens’ autonomy in Kwangju — the extreme opposite of the existing regime’s power — like? With their minimal organization, almost negligible compared with the gigantic bureaucratic structure and the machinery of violence maintained by the existing regime, the citizens and students were able to keep the city in order and ensure a whole range of freedoms including freedom of demonstration, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. There was no military, no police, no bureaucracy to keep the citizens under control. Yet the citizens spontaneously collaborated with the leadership of the Struggle Committee and the Settlement Committee.

Indeed, the “power” that emerged there was nothing but the citizens’ power. That is why the relationship of ruler and ruled disappeared: there was no need to coerce people to participate by resorting to threats or terror. No wonder that during this period Kwangju was free from such crimes as looting rapes and assaults. Moreover, not a few policemen — who were supposed to be serving the regime — returned to their duties to collaborate with the citizens’ self-rule. This is exactly what the police, as servants of people, should be like.

The shocking experience of the citizens of Kwangju was an event unprecedented in the modern history of the Republic of Korea. This experience will be expanded and developed into an experience of the entire nation. The new order that emerged in Kwangju was based on the sympathy and sense of common suffering which the entire citizenry shared in the course of their struggle.

It was precisely because of this sympathy, a sense of being united in “one mind,” that the citizens of Kwangju were determined to defend Free Kwangju with a minimum of organization and weapons. If physical might alone was all that mattered, their confrontation with a military furnished with the most advanced weaponry would have been a hopeless venture from the outset. However, the power of the
united citizens outweighed the state's war machine. History reveals time and again that physical might without moral justification is unable to give full play to its capabilities. The military, unsupported by the nation, threatened by disintegration from within, and forced to be conscious of the world's attention, stood completely isolated.

Despite this, Chun Doo Hwan and his cronies dared to make preparations for a military suppression. On May 22nd, Chun summoned the chief representatives of the press in Seoul, and told them bombastically that the military would bring Kwangju under control on May 24th. Why was it that the military takeover of Kwangju was postponed until May 27th? One rumor has it that some of the generals demanded that Chun submit his resignation. It also seems highly probable that he was intimidated by the citizens of Kwangju, who were banded solidly together.

It is my contention that Chun and his cronies, who were stalled by discord within the military and the determined resistance of the citizens of Kwangju, were able to get out of the mire only when the American government helped through a series of measures to tip the balance of power between the military and the citizens to the former's advantage.

**American Connivance**

The armed forces of the Republic of Korea, except for the Capital City Garrison Command and a part of the paratroops under the direct control of the president, are placed under the Joint U.S.-ROK Command, which is in turn under the Commander of the U.S. Forces in the ROK. Most of the armed forces of the ROK cannot be mobilized without permission from the Commander of the U.S. Forces. At the time of the Kwangju uprising in May, the Capital City Garrison Command was assigned to maintain public peace and order in Seoul, and the paratroop units were dispatched to Kwangju. Had there been uprisings of a similar or larger scale in other areas, the government, without any additional soldiers under its command, would have been unable to counter such uprisings.

However, the U.S. government, in response to a request by the ROK government, promptly agreed to release part of the forces under the Joint U.S.-ROK

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House, the Presidential residence, with the recommendation of Lee Hu Rak, then director of the President's secretarial section.

In 1969, one of the influential people in the Military, Yun Pil Yong, then Commander of the Metropolitan Brigade, recommended Chun as chief aide to So Chong Chol, Commander-in-chief of the Army. Thus Chun gained rapid promotion as a member of the mainstream within the Military.

In 1970 Chun was the 29th troop commander of White Horse Troop (Paratroops), which was widely known for their “dauntlessness” during the Vietnam war. By 1972 Chun became a battalion commander of special forces of the 1st Air Transport Brigade (Paratroops).

Although Yun lost power in 1973 because of a scandal, Chun could survive thanks to Cha Chi Chol and Lee Hu Rak.

In 1977 he was promoted to Major General, leading all his classmates at the Academy. Within one year, he became a Division Commander. Then in 1979 he obtained the position of Army Defense Security Commander. Cha strongly recommended him to the President.

In October, 1979 when Park and Cha were as-sassinated, Chun became director of the joint investigation headquarters set up by the Martial Law Command.

Finally Chun took complete power through the so-called “purging coup” on December 12, 1979, when he arrested more than 40 military leaders including the Martial Law Commander Chung Seung Hwa on the grounds that they "were involved with Park's assassination." Then he appointed some of his close classmates to the most important positions within the Military. On April 14, 1980, Chun was self-appointed as Acting Director of the KCIA.

Chun said that he completed "preparation" by the "purging coup" and "taxied out on the runaway" by obtaining control of the KCIA. Thus Chun has taken power over military, intelligence as well as Defense Security.

On April 29, Chun Doo Hwan said at a press conference, “Soon we will miss the great work of our late president.” In the same interview he had with Time magazine (May 12), he praised Park Chung Hee, calling him “the unrivaled leader in the history of our country,” and said of Kwangju: “It seems that they completely neglect reality and are blindly carried away with no object... What we need now is creative nationalism. It is the time for national construction.” He declared clearly “any criticism against late president Park will not be allowed.” It is likely that Chun will maintain “the Park system without Park” under the slogan of “continuation of the Yushin System,” and is determined to head toward the line of military dictatorship.

It is reported that Chun Doo Hwan has been staying at different places every night without going home. Chun, who ordered his own paratroopers to carry out the slaughter against the Kwangju people has made enemies not only of the Kwangju people but of all the people in the country.
If a big man stands behind a burglar who is holding a hostage and slips him a knife while declaring aloud “I don’t agree with you, I don’t support you,” what does this make him? Or what if the big man sends his armed aides to seal off the scene of the crime from possible intrusion by outsiders?

When General Chun Doo Hwan took over south Korea in his midnight coup of May 18 and sent his crack paratroopers into Kwangju to massacre citizens, the Carter administration declared the military takeover “deeply disturbing.” On May 22, the same Carter administration released Korean military units from the U.S. military command to be deployed freely by Chun in crushing Free Kwangju.

The Korean military is under the command of Gen. Wickham, and without Gen. Wickham’s permission, no units could have been mobilized by the Korean generals with the exception of a metropolitan guard division and paratroopers. The 20,000 soldiers at Gen. Chun’s disposal had already been mobilized to throw a tight cordon around Seoul and prevent the spread of anti-coup and anti-Martial Law demonstrations. Had Wickham not agreed to release additional Korean units, Chun would not have had extra troops with which to attack the Kwangju people.

When Chun usurped power by closing Parliament and arresting political leaders and activists, the Carter administration carried its first reaction was directed not against this military dictator but against north Korea. The State Department warned that it would “react strongly” to any north Korean attempt to exploit political turmoil in the south. Curiously, he added at once that there had been “no evidence of any unusual troop movements in north Korea since the outbreak of anti-government demonstrations in south Korea” in May. Despite the admitted absence of any real threat from the north, Mr. Hodding Carter, the department’s spokesman, expressed the same view as the new junta leader, i.e. that “north Korea remains committed to a revanchist policy and has never deviated from it.” This was the first response to come from the top-level White House meeting held on the Korean issue on May 23.

This statement was immediately backed up by military action. The Pentagon, while directly providing General Chun with the badly needed means of suppressing the citizens of Kwangju, dispatched the aircraft carrier Coral Sea from Subic Bay to Korean waters (May 22) and instructed another aircraft carrier, the Midway, homeported in Yokosuka, to join it (May 24). Three E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System planes (AWACS) were hurriedly sent to Okinawa ahead of schedule to conduct support operations for the carriers.

Command for the suppression of the Kwangju uprising. Deployment of the 31st Division on May 19th or thereabouts was made possible by this measure, and at the final moment of the military’s assault on Kwangju, a total of four regiments with 7,800 soldiers were released from the Joint U.S.-ROK Command to be dispatched to Kwangju. In addition, the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea, which was on its way from the Mid-East to the U.S., was ordered to rush toward ROK, and two E3A early warning reconnaissance planes were deployed to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa much earlier than scheduled, for use in reconstituting over the ROK. These measures were ostensibly to prevent invasion from the North, but it seems far more logical to conclude that they were meant to facilitate the military’s takeover of Kwangju, or were meant to be a tacit warning that should the Kwangju uprising spread to the entire nation, the U.S. was ready to directly intervene to suppress the people of the ROK. At any rate, these moves by the U.S. appear to have had significant implications more as moral support for Chun than by providing him with military arms.

Faced with these developments, the students in Kwangju, who were well aware of the contradictions inherent in the power structure of the ROK, pinned their last hopes on the American government on May 26th, asking it to mediate between the citizens of Kwangju and the military. The White House, however, while admitting it had received such a request, simply ignored it.

The Japanese government, like that of the U.S., sided with Chun and turned its back on the Korean people. The Japanese government in effect endorsed the Chun regime by dispatching former Japanese Minister to the ROK Maeda Toshikazu to Seoul as an ambassador extraordinary, who, during meetings with high government officials of the ROK, expressed Japan’s “deep concern about the security of the Korean Peninsula” and had a two-hour long discussion with Chun. A few days later, Foreign Affairs Asian Bureau Chief Kicchi visited the ROK to reassure the Chun regime that there would be no change in Japan’s policy toward the ROK. It is worth noting that ambassador Maeda had been temporarily recalled home from Afghanistan as a protest against the Soviet Union’s invasion of that country, but was now sent to the ROK, another scene of horrible massacres.

Encouraged by these signs of support from the governments of the U.S. and Japan, Chun and his cronies, trampling upon the will of the entire nation and overruling opposition within the military, managed to suppress the citizens and students of Kwangju.

Defying death, beatings and arrests, the students and citizens heroically resisted the assaulting troops. Was “Kwangju” really suppressed? Was the military’s
Carter's verbal "criticism," accompanied by these contradictory political pronouncements and military action but unaccompanied by any pressures on the Chun junta, obviously came as a sign of continuing U.S. support for the Chun regime. The Washington Post (May 21) reported from Seoul:

The United States does not plan to apply any significant pressures on South Korea's military rulers and is not considering any threat to withdraw U.S. troops as a retaliatory move. U.S. officials in Seoul and Washington are said to feel that security comes first and that any attempt to intervene in South Korea might further weaken an already divided nation. The best available indication is that no military, economic or diplomatic pressure is being planned.

When Kwangju students sent a desperate message to Carter to intervene to safeguard their human rights, the U.S. ignored it on the grounds that the appeal did not come through official channels. But what constitutes an "official channel" in a besieged city? In fact, the U.S. did not reply simply because human rights are not its concern. Don Oberdorfer reports that:

"It is not a human rights issue," said one of the senior U.S. planners. "It is a question of the national interest of the United States in achieving and maintaining stability in Northeast Asia." (Washington Post, June 1)

The U.S. of course is afraid that should Chun go too far and provoke further popular upheavals, South Korea may become another Iran. That explains why Carter was "deeply disturbed" by the Kwangju uprising. But as long as Chun's steel fist keeps South Koreans in line, whether by torture, arrests, Martial Law or "political development," Chun, Carter feels, should be supported. Asked by a reporter how long the U.S. planned to back a government which obviously lacks popular support, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield replied that the U.S. will continue to support the South Korean government "as long as necessary." (John Roderick, Asian Wall Street Journal, May 24)

The blood of Kwangju was not yet dry when the U.S. dispatched John L. Moore, Jr., Chairman of the United States Export-Import Bank, to Seoul on June 3 to discuss additional loans to the Chun regime. Reporter Henry Scott Stokes quoted Moore as saying that he had brought no political message to South Korea. But the economic message was enough for a country whose collapsing, externally-oriented economy (see p.33) is in vital need of at least $7,900 million in foreign loans within the year. "Since the Korean war," said Donald Ranard, the former head of the Korean desk in the State Department (1970-74), "the American record on the issue of human rights in Korea has been shameful. Washington regularly subordinated political progress to economic growth and to the protection of the tremendous investment that American banks and business maintain in Korea at enormous profit. Carter is now the latest of American presidents to sacrifice human dignity on the altar of misperceived geopolitical factors or domestic political and economic considerations." (Los Angeles Times, June 3).

physical might really able to suppress the glorious experience of "Kwangju"? Not by any means. For "Kwangju" marked the first big step toward the final victory of the movement for democratization of the ROK, a movement which had been battling dictatorship for 18 long years. "Kwangju" is now calling out for the entire nation to rise. On May 30th, Kim Uikee, student at Sogang University in Seoul, committed suicide after distributing a leaflet entitled "A Letter Dedicated to my Brethren" which reads in part: "The raving by the remnants of the Yushin regime has entered its last stage. We stand now at an important crossroads, and must choose which way to turn. The crossroads is a choice between the life of slaves and dogs, trembling from fear and uneasiness, or the life of free citizens, looking up to high and blue skies, breathing clean air as much as one wishes, and singing songs of joy and victory!" (See p.24).

Democratization Gains Momentum

The current political upheaval in the ROK began with the assassination on October 26, 1979 of Park Chung-hee, who held dictatorial power for 18 years. The dictator's death was primarily brought about by the struggle for democratization waged under his Yushin system. But the major events since October 26 were a manifestation of the fierce collision be-
tween the last ditch efforts by the remnants of the Yushin regime and the democratization forces. The death of the dictator created a power vacuum. After years of divide-and-conquer intrigues by the dictator, there was essentially no successor to his power. At the same time, the various organs of power which had been deformed for the sake of maintaining the dictator's personal power were now without the ultimate focus of their allegiance, and thereby became totally paralyzed. The various forces that had been suppressed and which were now freed from the yoke of repression, took advantage of this situation and began bursting forth all at once in various spheres of society.

After the president's death, efforts were made to reconsolidate the regime by promoting the prime minister to the post of president and the vice-prime minister to prime minister, but these were no more than tentative measures to facilitate a rearrangement of the hierarchy among the remnants of the Yushin regime. The atrocious suppression on November 24, 1979 by the military of a political rally called by the democratizing forces (now known as the "YWCA Incident") was a response on the part of the remnants of the Yushin regime in their dying struggle. The so-called "purging coup d'état" of December 12th was a process by which these same remnants attempted to reorganize their internal hierarchy, but even this move was unable to quell the ardent aspirations for democratization harbored by the majority of the population. Even some of the remnants of the Yushin regime, including Kim Jong-pil, had to talk about "political development" and an "era of democratization." Already the lower reaches of the power structure were eroding, and the KCIA as well as the police, having nothing to defend, were demoralized.

The Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), one of the key suppressive organs of the Yushin regime, was rendered impotent, with its president harshly denounced by the fired female workers of the Tong-il Textile Co. The labor unrest which had swept

**JAPAN'S QUIET COMPlicity**

Tokyo Welcomes the Return of "Law and Order" to South Korea

Where was the Japanese government all through the Korea crisis in May?

One conspicuous feature of the attitude of the Japanese government toward the Korean situation was that, unlike the United States, Japan never expressed regret or professed to feel disturbed over the extraordinary series of events in south Korea. It said nothing when Chun Doo Hwan took over the country on May 18 or when paratroopers set about murdering Kwangju citizens.

The Japanese government took three steps during this period, and three steps only, with respect to south Korea.

1. Two days after General Chun's takeover, Maeda Toshikazu, former ambassador to Afghanistan, was named ambassador-at-Large and sent off to Seoul. This man, recalled from Afghanistan in protest of the Soviet invasion there, remained in south Korea throughout the period of the Kwangju uprising and undertook consultations and talks with the new junta leaders in camera.

2. Maeda returned to Tokyo on June 5 after the Kwangju uprising was bloodily suppressed, and in his place, Kiuchi Akitane, the Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau chief, was dispatched to Seoul on June 9 to confer with Chun Doo Hwan on the post-Kwangju situation.

3. When the report reached Japan that demonstrators in Mokpo (a city near Kwangju — see p.44) had taken two buses from a Japanese factory located there, the Foreign Ministry promptly reacted to the allegation, officially requesting that the junta "control rioters more strictly." Three officials were dispatched to Mokpo to ensure the "protection of Japanese residents."

Despite the government's seemingly low profile, these actions carried an unmistakable message. It is now clear that the Japanese government is on the side of General Chun and backs all actions taken by him past, present and future.

The dispatch of ambassador plenipotentiary Maeda was a diplomatic action indicating in itself *de facto* Japanese recognition of the Chun Doo Hwan dictatorship. Instead of expressing its regret or recalling its ambassador from Seoul, Japan chose rather to send a new representative to Seoul to confer with the junta. Maeda in fact became the first foreign diplomat to hold talks with Chun after the takeover. These talks were held the day after the Kwangju uprising was suppressed.

This is not to say that the Japanese government avoided issuing statements. On May 21, when the massacre of Kwangju citizens was at its peak, the Foreign Ministry proclaimed Park Choon Hoon, appointed premier under the new puppet military regime, a new man who would contribute to the restoration and renewal of the people's will. The *Mainichi Shimbun* (May 21) quoted Foreign Ministry sources as saying that they had been informed of the change of government in Korea a few days before it occurred. This makes one suspect that the Japanese government may have had advance knowledge of the coup.

The late premier Ohira was more outspoken about legalizing the junta government. When the Korean parliament was shut down by the military and Chun's paratroopers had butchered hundreds of Kwangju citizens, the Japanese prime minister, speaking at a fund raising dinner, declared he was convinced that President Choi's handling of the Kwangju people was within the limits of the law. *Sankei Shimbun*, May 26). These statements obviously had the effect of condemning the General's every move from the May 18 coup to the Kwangju massacre.

We attach importance to the fact that armed extremists were removed from the Cholla-namdo provincial
of democratization were spreading throughout the nation.

As the democratization forces gained in popularity, the remnants of the Yushin regime began to feel all the more uneasy and impatient. Statements made by the president of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), Kim Jong-pil, at the beginning of 1980 were characterized by hysterical paranoia. At one point he disclosed his support for efforts for democratization, but at another he tried to entice the support of the military by insisting that the Yushin system be maintained. The military, for its own part, colluded with prime minister Shin Hyun-hwak and others, and secretly prepared to launch a new political party by raising funds through the devaluation of the won currency and by revising interest rates upward. Thus, the process of internal conflict and dissolution among the remnants of the Yushin regime which began in December 1979 was further aggravated. Furthermore, the military, on the occasion of the “purging coup

office and other government offices in Kwangju. These offices have now come back under government control. The first barrier to the restoration of order in Kwangju has been overcome. (Asahi Shimbun, June 27)

The Japanese government has long been hoping for an early settlement of the Kwangju situation and containment of the trouble. Therefore, General Chun’s action was a necessary step even though some blood may have been shed. (Sankyu Shimbun, May 27)

As these words indicate, the Japanese government, together with the Chun junta, heaved a sign of relief at the military victory of Chun’s troops. (One wonders how the south Korean people feel about this).

In the meantime, Ambassador Maeda, upon returning home, reported to Chief Cabinet Secretary Itoh on the Korean situation. In his summary, Mr. Maeda “emphasized that Japan should pay the keenest attention to how public security can best be maintained in south Korea.” (Asahi Shimbun, June 6). Is this the concern of a diplomat or an intelligence agent? Asia Bureau Director Kiuchi was informed of Chun’s military plans for Kwangju beforehand. Meeting with Premier Ohira on the morning of May 26, Kiuchi explained that military action against Kwangju would be taken between the night of May 26 and the morning of the next day (Yomiuri Shimbun, May 26). The attack occurred exactly as predicted. After the killing was over, Kiuchi, speaking for the Foreign Ministry, declared that Japan’s relationship with south Korea would remain unchanged. The Chun junta received such a clear declaration of support from no other country in the world.

On June 27, a delegation from the Japan-Korea Solidary Committee visited the Foreign Ministry and presented an eight-point recommendation for implementing basic changes in Japan’s policy toward the south Korean regime. In a two hour exchange of views, a high official of the Foreign Ministry, Miyake Kazusuke, appalled the visitors by replying in effect to every point they raised: “the Korean government has communicated such and such to us.” When the visitors insisted on hearing the Japanese view, Miyake said that the foreign office had its own position and was doing “something” about Korea but that this “something” could not be disclosed to the committee as it “might constitute interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country” and, he added, because “Korean issues are delicate for obvious historical reasons.”

What could that “something” be? In Seoul there are widespread rumors that Takashima, a high ranking Foreign Ministry official, handed over a memorandum to the south Korean government prior to the May 18 coup suggesting that Kim Dae Jung be prevented from running for president. The “interim interrogation report” on Kim, which contains a description of his activities in Japan and incriminates him as “pro-communist,” is believed to have been drawn up with the help of the Japanese intelligence police, as the information pertaining to his stay in Japan could not have been obtained otherwise.

By its refusal to censure a despotic and much despised regime in south Korea, by its quick public expression of official support for the brutal suppression there of popular protest and by its behind-the-scenes maneuvering to secure its own economic and “security” interests, the Japanese government has shown three things. First, it has laid bare the logic of the inner-workings of the Japan-Korea relationship and declared itself in the eyes of the world (along with Chun Doo Hwan) an enemy of the Korean people. Second, it has betrayed the broad popular sympathy felt by most Japanese for the aspirations sufferings of and of their neighbors. Finally, the government’s open declaration of support for repression in south Korea remains disturbingly consistent with its own domestic policies: this support goes hand-in-hand with the State's attempts to discourage and disorganize people's movements at home.
d’etat” in December 1980, mobilized and redeployed forces from the 38th parallel to Seoul, making itself the target of denunciations by the entire nation, arousing the anger of the United States, and effectively losing the confidence of the population.

**Military Threatened by Democracy**

As the latent period of political confrontation advanced, characterized by the internal conflict within the last vestiges of the Yushin regime and by the expansion of the democratization movement, the military found it imperative to grant on February 29th the restoration of civil rights to leading figures of the democratization forces (including Kim Dae-jung), permit reinstatement of dismissed university professors to their former positions, and allow expelled university students to resume their studies. These measures ushered in a real season of politics: there began a period of intermittent cooperation and conflict between Kim Dae-jung and the president of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), and yet, in spite of their different views on the situation, both were of the opinion that they should not give the military a convenient excuse for political intervention.

The university students, too, assumed a cautious attitude. With the reopening of the university campuses in March, they concentrated their efforts on resolution of problems on their respective campuses; they revived the student unions which had been banned, reorganized student organizations, and with a view to ridding their campuses of the remains of the Yushin system, raised demands for university reforms and the resignation of government-controlled professors and university administrators. The students also urged university administrations to drastically reform the on-campus military training, which had been introduced and misused as a means of suppressing students. In this way, they made progress in their on-campus activities from March through the end of April. The major features of this new student movement of 1980 were thoroughgoing openness, democratic and collective discussions, and united actions. Also, the students, realizing the need to be in close touch with the general population, carefully raised only those limited demands with which everyone could agree.

These activities on the part of the students were echoed by declarations by university professors, intellectuals and journalists to the effect that they, too, would respectively make a fresh start for democratization. At this stage, various sectors of society had thus begun to remove themselves from the old pool of blood last October. But the remnants of the old system employ even more cruel tactics of oppression. We, the people — except for a few who are wealthy and powerful — clearly see that the result of the false statistics and pseudo-economic theories, which have driven the people into the greatest misery, is a threat to the very right of the people to exist.

The raving by the remnants of the Yushin regime has entered its last stage. We stand now at an important crossroads, and must choose which way to turn. The crossroads is a choice between the life of slaves and dogs, trembling from fear and uneasiness, or the life of free citizens, looking up to high and blue skies, breathing clean air as much as one wishes, and singing songs of joy and victory! Should we carry on our shameful history as it is, or should we change our history and become proud and honorable forefathers for our descendants?

Brethren! Let us stand up! Let us stand up to the very last person! Let us join together our strength! Our struggle points the right direction history must go. We will win. We will definitely win. Brethren! Stand up and deal a decisive blow to the last breath of the Yushin remnants! Stand Up! Stand Up! Stand Up! My Brethren! Let us meet at the square in front of the Seoul Railway Station at noon tomorrow, and fight our present holy war, and sacrifice our lives to the war.

Brethren!

May 30, 1980
Kim Ui Kee
FARMERS’ MANIFESTO

We, 13 million farmers, looked down on as people and economically exploited, in order to punish the anti-national and anti-farmer devils and secure our legitimate rights as citizens of this nation, declare that:

1. We will take the lead in punishing anti-national and anti-farmer devils: from the unjust and corrupt politically powerful elites and financiers who have unlawfully accumulated wealth, to the local public officials at the town and village level, who are the smallest unit of the administrative organization that exploits farmers.

2. We will force the government to repay the difference between the producers’ rice price and the purchase price, retroactive to 1975, by setting the rice purchase price at more than 54,900 won (per 80 kilograms), the equivalent of 1979 production expenses.

3. We will confiscate farm land owned by the non-farming zaibatsu and power-holding money grubbers who are protected by state power, and divide the land equally among the farmers.

4. We will withdraw from the undemocratic and anti-farmer agricultural cooperative associations, and, as compensation for damages incurred, nullify all farmer debts financed through the associations.

5. Income tax exemption for farmers should be calculated on the basis of net income earned as is done for urban households. We will not be liable for taxes over and above this amount.

6. We will ban all imports of agri-products, such as pork and beef and insist that the government reimburse all profits earned through sales of imported agri-products.

7. We will not perform compulsory labor forced on us under the pretext of Saemaul activity.

8. We will nationalize the plants producing fertilizer, agricultural chemicals, farm machines, and other agricultural materials through which the farmers are exploited by unjustifiable price manipulation and inferior products.

9. We will participate proportionally in the process of the revision of the constitution and establishment of other laws, and realize farmers’ rights and interests by securing our rights to organize to collective bargaining and collective action.

10. We will develop a wide-scale farmers’ movement for revising harmful laws related to rural villages, including the Rural Villages Modernization Promotion Law.

We pledge that we will continue to develop a broad-based national farmers’ movement until we achieve all the above-mentioned goals, and that we will put all of our efforts into crushing anti-farmer actions.

May 14, 1980

(Farmers’ Association)
Kyungnam Arim Farmers’ Association
Shinki Farmers’ Association
National Council of Farmers’ Movement Activists
Chonnam Christian Farmers’ Association
Korea Catholic Farmers’ Association
Korea Catholic Rural Women’s Association

(University)
Kyungbuk National University
Kyemyong University
College of Agriculture, Korea University
Dongguk University
Myongji University
Sogang University
Seoul National University
Syung Kyun Kwan University
Sookmyung Women’s University
Soojong University
Shinku Technical Junior College
Ehwa Women’s University
Chonnam National University
Chonbuk National University
Chungju University
Choongnam National University
Choongbuk National University
Hankuk Theological Seminary

system. However, the growing expansion and strength of the democratization forces was viewed by the military with an increasingly acute sense of crisis. When, for instance, Kim Dae-jung spoke at the Hankuk Theological Seminary he drew an audience of approximately 50,000, and at another rally at Tongguk University as many as 100,000 thronged to hear him. Moreover, 2,800 students of Seoul University displayed their well-disciplined mobilizing capability on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Student Revolution of 1960 by paying a visit to the 19th of April Memorial Cemetery, without issuing any statements and without shouting any slogans.

Meanwhile in April, Chun took on a visible political role by appointing himself Acting Director of the KCIA, in addition to the posts of Defense Security Commander and Director of the Martial Law Joint Investigation Department which he already held. At his first press conference after his self-appointment as KCIA Acting Director, Chun openly declared that he would preserve the Yushin system and made ominous political remarks, including one about students which directly inspired the students to stage an all out uprising beginning May 1st.

Prior to May 1st, the students had been careful in handling political issues so as not to give the military an excuse to stage a coup d’etat. From May 1st on, however, the student movement began to take on new characteristics. Political demands for the abolition of Martial Law and the resignation of Chun Do Doo Hwan and Shin Hyun-hwak became the major objectives of their movement. A majority of the students
DECLARATION OF 134 INTELLECTUALS
CONCERNING THE PRESENT SITUATION

This declaration was issued at the peak of the struggle against Martial Law. It was distributed on May 15th during a demonstration in front of Seoul Station. Most of the intellectuals who signed it have gone underground in order to avoid arrest.

We 134 persons undersigned, united with the same aspiration, cannot sit idle any longer watching the incompetence and impotence of the government authority. We deplore the interim government's lack of commitment to democratic development and its inability to deal with the worsening economic crisis, responding only with repressive measures to the nation-wide demonstrations of students and workers shouting for democratization and the right to survive.

The crisis today is basically the product of anti-people economic policies and repressive politics of the dictatorial regime that lasted for nineteen years. This crisis has been aggravated by the prolongation of martial law that has been thwarting democratic development. If the interim government fails to take immediate constructive actions which the people can support, we are afraid that political instability on top of the economic crisis will lead to irreversible catastrophe. We therefore propose the following measures to cope with the present situation.

1. Emergency Martial Law should be lifted immediately. The present Martial Law was declared more to deal with internal conflict within the ruling elite which was triggered by the October 26 and December 12 incidents, rather than to ensure national security. Martial Law is obviously unconstitutional and is the largest factor obstructing political development.

2. Choi Kyu Hah's interim government should shorten the period of transition so that peaceful transfer of power may be realized within this year. Also the specific schedule for such a transfer of power should be made clear. The present interim government came into being under the protection of the Yushin Constitution, which no longer can claim any shred of legitimacy. In view of its nature and lack of legitimacy, it is too weak to overcome the present crisis. We oppose the participation of the present government in the rewriting of the Constitution, as there are no grounds on which the present government should be involved in the process. As the National Assembly prepares the Constitution, it should try to have reflected in it the aspirations of the people, and put an end to all greedy clinging to power.

3. University campuses should be guaranteed freedom of research and expression, and their use as military compounds be stopped. The autonomous democratic movement by university people for such freedom should be respected. Family control of private universities, the lack of a tenure system for faculty appointments, and all other evil elements in university operations that hinder the democratic development of the campus should be abolished.

4. The independence and freedom of the press are indispensable for democratic development and must be guaranteed absolutely. Journalists should repent their misdeeds of the past, and particularly Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo should take back the reporters who were unjustly expelled for their struggle for freedom of the press. Without their reinstatement, slogans for free speech remain a deceit to our people. We will launch a movement for their reinstatement using every possible means, such as public denunciation, refusal to write for the newspapers concerned, and a boycott movement if necessary.

5. Urgent measures should be taken for the numerous workers who either lost their jobs and are wandering in the streets, or are in the desperate situation of working at starvation wage level. The workers' basic, inalienable rights, including the right to collective bargaining, should be ensured. Medium-size industries which are being victimized by a policy of large-industry-first subsidies should receive urgent assistance and be kept from bankruptcy. Also policy changes must be made to assist peasants who have been discouraged from farming by low grain-price policy.

6. Many democratic people who have unduly suffered under the one-man dictatorial rule should be released from prison, have their civil rights restored, and be reinstated in their former positions without delay.

7. Our military who carry out the sacred duty of national defense should maintain strict political neutrality. One man's holding the positions of both chief of the Military Security Command and chief of the Central Intelligence Agency is an obvious violation of the law, and this must be corrected.

We are convinced that the present crisis can be overcome only with the people's consensus and through democratic procedures. If our just demands are turned down, and politics by force continues, the interim government will not be able to escape historical responsibility for leading the nation into catastrophe.

May 15, 1980

[Attached are the signatures of 134 academics, journalists, lawyers, religious and writers.]
insisted by way of on-campus demonstrations, rallies, discussions and sit-ins that their demands be met by May 14th. Simultaneously an inter-university coordination channel was established to stage joint actions. However, the military, as if in deliberate defiance of the students' demands, moved Army units into Seoul on May 12th to intimidate the students. From May 13th, students throughout the nation took to the streets, holding peaceful and disciplined demonstrations, and on May 14th and 15th, the largest of these demonstrations drew as many as 100,000 participants. In an effort to separate and isolate the students from ordinary citizens, the military had gangs of racketeers sneak into the ranks of student demonstrators, throw molotov cocktails, commandeer buses and kill or injure policemen. The students reshaped their strategy, and as a result decided to call off demonstrations from May 16th with a demand that the government meet their demands by May 22nd. On the evening of May 17th, however, Chun responded by staging his second coup d'état – i.e., by expanding Martial Law to cover the entire nation.

With the expansion of Martial Law, all forms of political activity were banned, entrance into the National Assembly Building prohibited, access to the offices of the opposition New Democratic Party and the Democratic Republican Party denied, all universities and colleges closed indefinitely, and censorship of the press reinforced. More than 2,000 were detained throughout the country, including Kim Dae-jung and most of the professors, students, labor activists and democratization movement activists who had been reinstated only a few weeks earlier, as well as Kim Jong-il and some other remnants of the Yushin regime. To borrow the words of Wada Haruki, “The 100,000 students of Seoul who are deprived of their leadership and a base of operations are in a sense held down while sitting and are unable to rise to their feet.”

This was immediately followed by a series of reckless measures by the military – the massacre of citizens in Kwangju, and the execution of Kim Jae-Kyu, who had played a role in ushering in the “era of democratization” by assassinating President Park Chung-hee.

Lessons for the Struggle.

The uprising of the Kwangju citizens was thus a further extension of the democratization struggle which had been waged throughout the country. It opened up new horizons for this struggle.

One thing the Kwangju uprising made clear was that the series of political events from October 26th, 1979 on constituted a process of breakdown of the Yushin regime’s remaining vestiges. As our analysis of the implications of the Kwangju Incident has clarified, this process of breakdown culminated with the incident itself. In this sense, the reckless deeds of Chun by no means constituted another May 16th [1961] Coup. Nor is Chun a little Park Chung-hee. Neither the objective conditions nor the unified struggle of the people of the ROK would allow the current situation to turn into another 16th of May or allow Chun to become another Park Chung-hee, and the military and the Yushin system’s remnants will mutually eliminate themselves through internal struggle.

Poet Kim Chi-ha, still detained in prison, has already vividly foretold the final process by which the holdovers of the old system will destroy them-
The following account is adapted from an interview with a Korean student in hiding from police since his participation in the massive demonstrations that swept South Korea in May when authorities declared Martial Law. The interview appeared in the “New York Times” (June 8).

Mr. “Kim” is one of thousands of students who have dispersed and gone underground to avoid arrest and probable torture since the South Korean government closed down the campuses and formally declared Martial Law on May 17. Before the occupation of the universities by the military, the campuses had been one of the principal strongholds of Korea’s burgeoning movement for the establishment of democratic rights. Student leaders at Seoul National University said that at that time they were capable of mobilizing up to 50,000 students at a few hours’ notice. An even better indicator of student influence are the large numbers who took to the streets to protest the closures. Government sources have put the number at 350,000. It is estimated that as of early June, 600 students had been arrested in Seoul alone and 2,000 nationwide.

Far from being crushed, however, the student movement has in a sense just begun. The Kwangju uprising, which grew out of the revolt, is the watershed. The students appear to have drawn from it two important lessons. The first is that the military, in brutally suppressing the peaceful demonstrations in Kwangju against the imposition of Martial Law, “showed its determination (…) to seize power at any cost, much earlier than we expected, though we took this to be their aim all along. They revealed their true character.” The lesson: non-violent tactics are no longer viable; the only way to deal with the generals is, in Kim’s words, “armed uprising.”

The Kwangju experience has also brought home to Koreans the real interests of the big powers in their country. Carter’s belated and pathetic response to the Kwangju massacre (“security first, democracy last”) has laid bare the mechanisms at work behind the U.S. government’s “human rights diplomacy” in the peninsula. There was no mistaking the message, and Koreans have been quick to draw the obvious parallels with recent history. Many students now speak of “another Iran.” “It is time to start shooting tourists,” one angry citizen is reported to have remarked, “if the United States government (pays) so little attention to Korean demands for democracy.”

[Image: Army troops lead arrested students away —tied together by rope— after march through the streets.]

selves: “Shooting at each other until holes pierce through their backs killing and being killed, destroying and being destroyed, liquidating and being liquidated, they have after all gone to ruin in a single scene.”

The Kwangju uprising has crossed over in a single leap at least two pitfalls in which the democratization movement of the ROK had previously found itself. For one thing, the Kwangju struggle clearly exposed the limits of the principle of non-violent struggle to which the Korean democratization movement had held fast. The students and citizens of Kwangju did not resort to armed struggle by design; rather, urged by the developing situation, they collectively leaped over the limitations of their non-violent struggle in one breath without any argument over whether this was good or bad. The idea of non-violence seems to be based on a notion that one’s opponents should be respected as human beings. But what if the opponents themselves are negating humanity? Is it not impossible to convey the meaning of non-violence to such opponents, and awaken them to the inviolability of humanity? Under the rule of Park Chung-hee, the Korean movement for democratization often revealed its limitations. With the Kwangju uprising, however, the inevitability of armed struggle struck its roots deep and wide among the general population, not as a matter of argument, but as an invaluable lesson learned through their own experience. Student leaders moving from
The army regained complete control of Kwangju on May 27.

one place to another within Seoul to escape arrest admit as one voice that armed struggle is the only means available to them from now on (as reported by Henry Scott Stokes in the New York Times, June 10, 1980).

The violence committed by the state, particularly in Kwangju, stripped the state of its mystique in an instant, and the students and citizens disclosed the deceptive nature of the state’s violence. In addition, the students of Kwangju, witnessing the barbarous killings committed by the paratroopers, recalled the massacre of innocent people during the Vietnam War in which the south Korean troops had a hand. In shedding their own blood, the students came to the realization that south Korea as a nation had not yet undergone self-criticism for its participation in the Vietnam War, and the students therefore tried to identify themselves with the peaceable people of Vietnam who suffered through the war. The Kwangju struggle, through the medium of armed struggle, thus acquired a new level of universality.

Another pitfall which the Kwangju uprising managed to overcome was the illusion people used to harbor about the relationship between their country and the United States. Previously Korean people felt very close to the U.S., but this sense of affinity was smashed by the “Kwangju Incident.” The democratic movement of south Korea had not been able to go beyond the structural limits set by the U.S. Despite the fact that the American government sided with the Park regime at every turn and turned its back on the democratic forces, the leadership of the democratization movement sought acceptance by the U.S. and worked toward democratization only to an extent understandable in U.S. terms but not further. The leaders were obsessed with the idea that the people were by and large very pro-American, as in fact they might have been in the ROK before the Kwangju uprising.

But if the leaders of the democratization movement were working only for the sake of acceptance by the U.S. while fully aware of the true intentions of the U.S. government, then they were acting against the true interests of the people. During the “Kwangju Incident,” the U.S. clearly stood by Chun Doo Hwan and his cronies who were opposed by the entire nation, thereby assisting in the genocidal massacre at Kwangju. And the people of the ROK are well aware of the role the U.S. government played in the suppression of the people of Kwangju. One American who recently came from Seoul recounts that the young people of Korea now look at Americans with eyes full of contempt, which makes him feel scared in a way he never felt before. One taxi driver in Seoul is reported to have burst out in English while carrying an American passenger: “The American government, President Choi Kyu-ha . . . God damn!” (Asian Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1980). Never before has there been such deep antagonism on the part of the general public toward the United States. Ever since the suppression of the Kwangju uprising, report after report from Seoul tells of the citizen’s new hatred of the U.S.

These changes in the attitudes of the people toward armed struggle and toward the U.S. are but a manifestation of the ongoing realization by the people that they themselves, and nobody else, must be the driving force shaping their own history. Indeed, the majority of people — who think and act under all sorts of restrictions and fetters — are extremely “rational.”

Finally, the citizens of Kwangju, while they were blockaded by the military, were reported to have heartily welcomed foreign correspondents and willingly helped them with their reporting activities. What did these citizens want to tell people the world over through these foreign correspondents, and what did they expect from the people of other countries? And what about the foreign correspondents? Did they really do justice to the ardent wishes of the Kwangju citizens? Unfortunately, not a few Japanese journalists either unduly belittled and distorted the uprising of students and citizens, or merely parroted what the Martial Law Command would have had the world believe.

I have forced myself out of the depression that nearly overwhelmed me in the aftermath of the Kwangju massacre, in order to convey to friends around the world the new message which “Kwangju” proclaimed the beginning of a new stage in the struggle for democratization of the Republic of Korea. I have attempted to do this as accurately as possible in order to counter the flood of distorted accounts and demagoguery circulated by the mass media.
Oh Kwangju! Oh Mt. Mudung!
Between death and death
Naught but tears of blood.
City of our eternal youth.

Where have our fathers gone?
Our mothers fallen?
Our sons?
Where dead? Where buried?
And our darling daughters
Where might they be lying now
Mouths agape?
And our souls?
Where shattered, scattered, the bits?

God and the flocks of birds
Have left you, Kwangju,
Blood-soaked city of ours where
Only the human beings, the people,
Always the people, remain.

Falling, falling again and again rising,
Driven out by death
Through death you move towards life
Oh phoenix of the southern province
Endlessly lamenting
Oh phoenix. Oh phoenix.

Sun and wind are falling headlong
And all the mountains of this age
Tower empty.
And yet — Oh, flag of freedom no one can
Rip you asunder
Rip you away from us.
Oh, flag of human kind,
Stiffened of flesh and bones.

Oh, city of ours,
Our song, our dream, our love.
Now battered by the billows,
Now buried in the grave.

Oh Kwangju, Kwangju.
Bearing this nation's cross
Over Mt. Mudung,
Over the hill of Golgotha
Oh, son of God.
Wound-covered body. Death.

Truly have we died.
But — with no greater love of our land than this,
No greater love of our children than this,
Have we died?
Have we truly died?
At Chungjang-ro, at Kumnam-ro,
At Hwa-jung-dong, at Sansu-dong,
At Yongbong-dong, at Chisan-dong, at Yang-dong,
at Kyerim-dong;
And, and . . .
Oh devouring wind consuming
Our flesh, our blood.
Oh heartless flow of time.

Is there nothing now for us
But to collapse in weeping?
Terror and life, how are we
To breathe?
Oh, the survivors
Like criminals all
Heads bowed

We who live on
All have lost our spirit,
Afraid, unable even to sit to meals
Terrified, for we can do nothing.

I was waiting for you, my husband
Outside the gates I was waiting, but
I died . . .
Why was my life taken?
Only a rented room
But how happy we were.
I wanted to be so good to you,
My dear husband!
And yet this body pregnant with child
Died. like this.
Forgive me.
Your child, your child.
Has it come to this, my husband,
Have I killed your child?
Oh Kwangju! Oh Mt. Mudung!
Passing through death after death
In rippling white robes
Oh city of our eternal youth
Oh phoenix, phoenix, phoenix.
Crossing the hill of Golgotha again
The cross of the land on your back
This nation’s son of God.
Jesus died once and
Rose again to live to this day
To live forever

But though we die a hundred times
This true love of ours,
Our fire, our glory, our pain
A hundred times will rise.
We live on now the more
Our strength now all the more
All the more we
Climb now the blue heavens
And kiss the sun and moon

Oh Kwangju! Oh Mt. Mudung!
Oh eternal flag of ours
Our dream, our cross.
Oh city of our youth, younger and younger
With the passage of time.
We are now, yes,
Firmly united, and will surely rise
Our hands firmly clasped.

Mt. Mudung: Famous mountain towering over Kwangju

Kim Joon Tae is a poet and until recently was teaching at Chunnam High School. This poem was printed in one of the many broadsides which appeared in Kwangju during the recent uprising there. Mr. Kim’s whereabouts now are not known — he may have been killed or arrested, but there is some hope that he may have gone underground.
Voices from Korea

The following is a series of "Voices from Korea" which reached Japan in May, June and July, during and after the uprising in Kwangju.

The series reflects the urgency and despair sensed by those in the city and the rest of the country, as the uprising unfolded into a full-scale confrontation between the people of south Cholla province and the Martial Law Command.

The details in each "Voice" indicate the extent to which word was circulating within Korea, despite a thorough clampdown by the Martial Law authorities.

1 Newsless News, Twisted Facts

The military in Korea has done it. Nobody thought they would dare. Many of our colleagues have been arrested and at present we do not know where they are. We do not know why some of us were left out.

We are at a loss. We do not know where to turn, what to say, how to act.

Through all their statements and newspapers our government is twisting the facts completely. It is not true at all that our students ran wild. It is the police who threw the Molotov-cocktails. It is not the students who drove the bus which hurt the police — it seems like it was a stranger who seemed to have been hired by the authorities in order to agitate the students. There were 500 to 600 students and civilians injured in Seoul alone, and more than 1,000 have been arrested.

However, no brutal forces can suppress the surging power of the Korean people. We will endure the severe winter that has visited us again, and with our hands joined together, we will continue as we did before, until spring comes once again.

Please, pray for us.

Evening, May 19, 1980
We Know What We Have to Do

Our people took control of practically all of the province of Cholla-namdo. Besides Kwangju and Mokpo, they are controlling 16 countries. They took several police stations in the area and armed themselves to defend themselves against the brutal Martial Law troops, who are shooting and killing unarmed students and citizens. Now, even some police units have joined us in our fighting!

The military is surrounding Kwangju and preparing to storm the city in case the talks with the government fail. Our most important demands besides the unconditional release of the students, without retaliation, are: the release of Kim Dae Jung and that he be brought to Kwangju to prove that he is at liberty; and the dismissal of Chun Doo Hwan. The military has cut all communications to and from Kwangju to isolate us from our people, and the news, which has been allowed to be broadcast since tonight, is merely distorting most of the facts. For example, it is not the students who started the rioting, but the military, and nobody came from outside into Kwangju to “agitate” our students and citizens. We know very well ourselves what we have to do — both now, and in the future.

The tendency to resist Martial Law is moving northward, and has reached Danyang-Kun. And as time passes we hope the people in other areas will join us.

Already there are demonstrations against Martial Law all over the country, including Seoul. Hundreds of students have been arrested and are being tortured. We fear for their lives. We fear especially for Kim Dae Jung’s life, and for the lives of his children.

Please tell our friends around the world the true story about our struggle and our determination.

May 22, 1980
Out of Cholla-namdo

We Are Ready to Die

We are helpless. The superior force of the military is choking us. Korean soldiers, with the cooperation of the U.S. military, are squeezing us to death. We know that to resist means death. But we are ready to die for our country so that it may be free of hatred and brutality.

There are now 40-50,000 military personnel stationed in Seoul. They have occupied the universities and are searching for materials to be used against the students and professors who have been taken to prison. Those arrested between May 12-15, and again on May 17, when Martial Law was extended to cover the whole nation, are being tortured severely. It is known that in the case of one minister, for instance, because of the torture he is now unable to use his legs. As of Saturday, May 24, the police in Seoul have been disarmed. Many journalists are refusing to edit the military’s prefabricated stories, so the editors-in-chief are having to do it themselves. According to a rumor, the food supply to Kwangju — and blood for the hospitals — has been stopped, contrary to what the government is claiming.

In Kwangju an official committee has established the identity of 92 dead persons, but it is estimated that there have been more than 200 killed. Observers of the massacre in Kwangju last week report that the troops committed numerous brutalities as if they had been doped. Heavily injured persons, lying in the street, were kicked and finally killed by bayonets. In one case five highschool girl students were taken by the soldiers, stripped of their clothing, and then stabbed by bayonets. Their fellow students were told to keep quiet and stay put; if not, they would be submitted to the same treatment.

Seoul, May 25, 1980
How Many Have Died?

It was on May 16 that the cabinet decided to extend Martial Law to cover the entire country. It took the cabinet only five minutes to reach its decision, because General Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command and Acting Director of the KCIA, had surrounded the meeting place with his troops. He is reported to have said: "We are going to issue Martial Law over the entire country. Is this okay?" It was okay.

The paratroopers in Kwangju had to retreat, when angry taxi drivers drove their cars right into the military. Some of their colleagues had been stopped by the military, accused of transporting students, then stabbed with their bayonets to death, "as if the troops enjoyed it."

"We will extinguish the people of Cholla-do" was one of the slogans heard from the paratroopers. So even children could be killed.

At a press conference in Seoul on May 24, General Chun told the Korean press: "I could have extinguished that ridiculous province of Chollanam-do in two days . . . but there might be some people there who don't deserve this, so I had to find another solution."

To the same press people he said he knows them all and will remember their names. If reports contrary to what the Martial Law Command ordered appear, he will settle this problem with them later . . . for sure.

When going to Kwangju from the Seoul area one has to pass through several military controls, which makes it difficult to travel at all, even for foreigners.

Members of the citizens' committee in Kwangju, numbering 15, include:
- Kim Chang-ki CChonnam University, Agricultural College; Chairman.
- Kim Chong-bae Chosun University; Vice-chairman.
- Lee Jong-gi Vice-governor of Chollanam-do.
- Chae Han-yang Advisor to the city council, and one who had once fought against the Japanese.
- Lee Yang-saeng YMCA Board Member.
- Chang Chu-tong Archbishop of the Catholic Church.

The two leaders of the students maintained that all political requests would have to be upheld in their negotiations with the Martial Law Command. The Vice-governor's opinion, on the other hand, was to postpone all political provisions and secure the survival of the city and its people first. On Sunday (May 25), however, the students succeeded in removing the Vice-governor. A lawyer was named to head the committee instead.

By Sunday, May 25, a rather large group of students and non-students escaped into the moun-
trucks. According to eyewitnesses it could have been more than 100.

Others saw the military burn the bodies of those killed.

On Thursday, May 23, about 700 students marched from Seoul to Kwangju to help the people there. Only 30 out of them made it -- they reached Kwangju after long and bitter fighting with the military. But what happened to the rest? They, too, have disappeared. Many guess that all of them have also been killed.

We still don't know the full extent, but we suspect that the number of dead persons so far might have reached close to 1,000 people in Kwangju, including students, citizens, and children.

It has been known to us that Kim Dae Jung has been held at "Suh-Bingo," which has been known as the torture chamber of the KCIA and the Defense Security Command. We do not know his whereabouts at the moment. Many suspect and fear that his life is in great danger.

May 29, 1980

Written in an undisclosed location between Seoul and Kwangju

5 Days of Fear and Terror

We are writing in a situation in which people are afraid to talk politics even among themselves. Professors, for example, evade meeting anyone and pretend they are not home when the phone rings. Everyone feels suppressed by the military's boots, and no one can dare to stand up straight.

Some people believed what Chun Doo Hwan told the press the other day: that he would confine himself to military matters as soon as the purificaiton of government officials, politicians, and society at large could be achieved. But now we know he is lying to us, and nobody believes him any more. Even the U.S. government, which supported the Kwangju massacre by allowing Korean troops to take part in the suppression of our people under the Martial Law Command, seems hesitant to trust Chun Doo Hwan. In addition, there is a growing hostility among the people towards the U.S. government for its support of the atrocities committed in Kwangju.

We have noticed the disappearance of Kim Bok-tong, a classmate and close friend of Chun Doo Hwan, who was one of the brightest students at the military academy and who as division commander supported Chun even when he staged his coup on December 12, 1979. Our sources indicate there was a disagreement between Kim and Chun concerning Chun's excessive domination of the situation. It is rumored that Kim has been killed.

A rumor spread by the military power center itself indicates the military is ready to sacrifice Chun sooner or later as well as the responsible commander for the Kwangju massacre. Although the people expect an apology from the military, the military excuses itself by saying it wants to apologize to the people of Kwangju, but it cannot do so out of fear of its own soldiers.

We are being told by friends that the paratroopers who conquered Kwangju were using Dum-Dum bullets, which have been forbidden by international laws and agreements since 1868. Out of fear of this being exposed, the military took all the wounded out of the hospitals on May 22, saying that the army hospitals could take better care of them. We are also being told that many of those shot in Kwangju were shot in the back when trying to run away...

One eyewitness reports that at one point he saw 5 trucks loaded with dead bodies -- all burned. He says it is difficult to estimate the number of dead persons on those trucks, but according to a foreign military expert here in Seoul, it could be 200 or more.

We still do not know where our prisoners are. It seems that some are still being held at police stations in Seoul, but the whereabouts of most arrested between May 12 and May 27 and even afterwards are not known. Rumor has it that many have been taken to military camps. There is also a
rumor circulating that Kim Jong Pil’s backbone has been broken, and that Kim Dae Jung’s vocal cords were also damaged. We are very much inclined to believe these rumors since we know that Chun is determined to kill everyone who does not accept and support him. We still hesitate to accept the rumor that Kim Dae Jung has already been killed, although it comes from several sources.

Our government selected a group of at least 25 so-called leaders of the Seoul demonstrations and placed a prize of one million won for the capture of those leaders. In Chang Ki Pyo’s case — a former Seoul National University student leader — the prize is five million won. These “leaders” seem to be hiding. Police and the military are searching for them and have been ordered to shoot should those “leaders” try to run away.

We also know that the government is still looking for other groups of students and citizens — including Christian and humanitarian organizations — which are trying to help those in trouble, or which have been active in promoting democratization.

Any meeting of citizens without the permission of the Martial Law Command is prohibited except Sunday services. Even walking or staying together in small groups in downtown Seoul is dangerous. People’s ID-cards are being checked repeatedly by the many military patrols which march through the streets day and night. Thus, even if students or citizens in Seoul planned a demonstration, they would not be able to reach any downtown location. All the colleges and universities are still closed and we don’t know when they will be opened again.

46 students in Pusan have been arrested because the government claims they have some kind of relationship with Kim Dae Jung. Besides thousands of arrested democratic people the Martial Law Command also arrested about 350 KCIA officials, all labeled as supporters of Kim Jong Pil, and about 700 press people nationwide.

The military is hunting even now for young people in Kwangju and Mokpo as well as in other cities. They search high and low, by day and by night, on the streets and in the houses, under roofs and in cellars, patrolling the hotels and subways and watching all street corners. Every young person who comes across a military patrol is forced at gun-point to open his bag, to show his ID-card, and to return home if so ordered. This creates an atmosphere of fear even among those who never deviated from the government line. The great majority of the people are trying to evade serving this military dictatorship. But at this time there is no way out. Complete pessimism has seized us. It will spread to the business world too. The government is encouraging the schools to take up lectures again, but teachers cannot face the students, and students cannot face the teachers.

Many congregations all over the country have been holding memorial or prayer services for the dead of Kwangju. In Yongnak Church, the biggest congregation in downtown Seoul, the minister prayed publicly for those who were murdered in Kwangju, and the whole congregation of several thousand people wept deeply. A Methodist bishop preached in Seoul about the storm on the Sea of Galilee — and the storm at Kwangju. The people around Jesus, afraid of the storm, were calmed by Jesus’ words: “Don’t be afraid!” — and he appeased the storm. A Hitler was possible in Germany because the Christians then and there were afraid of Hitler. We have had enough of Park ... Hearing this, the people wept throughout the sermon and prayers. The people in Kwangju are not asking for money, but for our prayer, and for the prayers of all friends around the world.

We are sure the time will come when the people will stand up without help from outside, whether from the U.S.A. or from Japan, and will throw out Chun Doo Hwan and his bandits, who are supported by nobody, and by nothing but their tanks and weaponry. There will be ways and means to overcome even these weapons, but many of us might have to die.

June 18, 1980
The “Kwangju-ization” of Korea—The Repression Spreads

We realize the difficulty of collecting reliable information for the foreign press. Already six Japanese newspapers and news agencies have been forced to close their offices in Seoul, after trying to give the real picture of our situation following the Seoul demonstrations and the tragic Kwangju incident. Through the control and manipulation of all mass media — about 700 reporters all over the country have been arrested — it seems that our government has effectively isolated our people from the true facts of our political, social, military and economic situation. Because in this context the truth must be known, I will try to inform you of some recent developments which do not appear in our newspapers and which, I hope, will be published outside of the Republic of Korea.

1. First, it is important to know that the mass arrests of citizens in Kwangju, regardless of their age, are still going on, two months after the military’s brutal takeover. Lately they are even arresting those women and men whose only role was to bring food and drink to the demonstrators in the streets. We are asking ourselves what they want even these people for. Since they couldn’t kill all of them at the time of the assault, are they going to punish them now? The demonstrators were their own people, their husbands, their sons and daughters.

A few days ago 17 professors from Chonnam University in Kwangju were arrested without being given a reason for their arrest.

Our government still seems to be greatly afraid of the students and their teachers, not only in Kwangju or Seoul, but all over the country. High schools in Kwangju are open again, as are quite a few colleges and vocational schools, and even some departments at universities such as the medical or dental departments. But the controls they are operating under are incredibly severe. At the high schools the teachers have to report on each student on a daily basis, with such information as who missed class, when, for how long, and why he was absent. They also have to report on his family background. Later, the police are to take up each individual case and reprimand the student and his parents, and take appropriate measures to ensure loyalty and order.

At the colleges and universities the professors are made responsible for the presence of all students. They have to report on an hourly basis, preparing lists of the students who are loyal and reliable and, naturally, those who are not reliable. Since this kind of far-reaching control has never been practiced before to this extent in this country, it must be difficult for the authorities to reopen all of the schools at once, in the face of the potential for unrest, anger, and memories of recent events.

All the university campuses in Seoul are simply empty. Sometimes a lone student or professor is walking to or from his study. But be sure he has special permission to finish his thesis. So the campuses are empty — except for the soldiers with their fixed bayonets, and their military vehicles which guard the entrances. You still find the same picture at public places and buildings such as post offices, the city hall, broadcasting stations and, for example, the Christian Building. There are still many barricades across the streets of Seoul, but not many military personnel are visible.

2. July 17 is Constitution Day. Our government saw fit to use this fateful date to start a new wave of arrests. By July 21 the names of the following 21 persons were known, but it is expected that many more have been or will be arrested soon.

3 Protestant ministers: Kim Sang Gun Cho Nam Gi Kim Yong Bok
11 University professors:
Hyon Yong Hak (Ehwa Univ.)
So Kwang Sun (Ehwa Univ.)
Paik Nak Chung (Seoul National Univ.;
literary critic)
Cho Yo Hon (Sungchon Univ.)
Lee Chong Uk (Songkyunkwan Univ.)
Tak Hi Jun (Songkyunkwan Univ.)
Kim Pyong Gol (Literary critic)
Lee Song Il (Songkyunkwan Univ.)
Im Chae Kyong (Hankuk Ilbo ed. writer)
Kil Hyon Mo (Sogang Univ.)
Lee Woo Song (Songkyunkwan Univ.)

3 Lawyers:
Park Sei Kyong
Lee Dong Myong
Hong Song U

4 Dong-A Ilbo reporters:
Park Chong Man
Chang Yun Hwan
Song Yu Bo
Paik Ki Bom

These 21 are those known to have been arrested recently — Christian ministers, intellectuals, college professors, journalists, and lawyers for Kim Dae Jung. Most of these names are among the signers of a statement, dated May 15, known as the “Declaration of 134 Intellectuals.”

These secret arrests have to be seen against the background of the other highly publicized arrests in connection with alleged corruption. They clearly convey the message that the military’s real goal is not the rooting out of corruption, but the elimination of democratic people. Though some persons detained around May 18 have been released recently, this is clearly nothing more than a cover-up for those many people still under detention at places unknown. Rumors about their torture and whereabouts are spreading everywhere, but there is no way to verify any of these rumors.

3. The other day, July 12, the Martial Law Command announced that Kim Dae Jung and 8 co-defendants have been transferred to a military prison. The families of these prisoners of conscience were informed about this development. But when they went to the prison and tried to meet their prisoner, the authorities denied that they were there. There is no way to confirm anything. The families were not able to leave books or clothing or money for them. Simply: “No, they are not here!”

6:50 a.m. May 27: Army tanks and troops position themselves in front of the Kwangu provincial building, where citizens and militants have set up their headquarters following the recapture of the city by the Army earlier in the morning.
At the same time it became known to the families of 22 prisoners (out of the 28 others who were investigated and reported on together with Kim Dae Jung), that they had been transferred to the Sudaemun Prison.

It seems very strange to us, however, that two persons to be indicted together with Kim Dae Jung are still "at large," or are still in hiding underground. They are: Shin Jae Ung and Chang Ki Pyo. The police and military have not been able to find them yet. And out of the 28 who were supposed to be transferred in a group to Sudaemun Prison, at least six persons, it seems, are still in hiding. As the government has not yet revealed a list of who these 28 are, their names are still not available.

4. The Kwangju uprising is becoming a symbol of hope for all the country as the facts are becoming known to the people. The brutal assault by government troops, on the other hand, is becoming a symbol of suppression of any move towards democracy.

The most intriguing fact following Park Chung Hee's death is that already back in November and December 1979, it is known that some troops underwent a period of special training, and it was these troops who were used in the assault on Kwangju. This is not a great surprise to us, but hearing this being confirmed by Western diplomats in Seoul gives us some satisfaction. What we came to understand only through the tragic events in Kwangju is that long before those events, plans had been carefully laid for the eradication of the democratic forces, and especially Kim Dae Jung, by using outwardly liberalizing developments to implicate and ensnare Kim's home base of Chollanamdo. Western diplomats, who have analyzed this 8-month period very carefully, agree that each step had been prepared intentionally to settle the issue of Kim Dae Jung and his friends.

In this sense the uprising was — like it or not — the one big chance the military was waiting for. And they grabbed it and executed it without hesitation according to their planning and training from eight months earlier.

5. According to the Martial Law Command's announcement Kim Dae Jung will be put on trial. We still don't know the contents of the final indictment, but it should be published soon. According to a legal specialist, when reading the investigation report there was a sigh of relief as there was nothing in the reports on which grounds Kim Dae Jung could be legally indicted. The whole report is just ridiculous.

Our big leader and his bandits, however, have decided to carry through with the trials — even at the expense of the security of the nation, and disregarding the danger of an absurd indictment and sentences fixed in advance.

We are asking ourselves why the government had to arrest Kim Dae Jung's lawyers right before his indictment? The lawyers Park Sei Kyung, Lee Don Myong, and Hong Song U are well known lawyers in Korea and overseas as well, as they had courageously defended in court many of the democratic people who had been arrested by Park Chung Hee's KCIA. For this they had to suffer all the years of Park's rule. It seems the government wanted to pressure them into defending Kim Dae Jung in court — to give this trial a semblance of a just and fair trial (as was attempted during Park's rule). But the lawyers were not willing to cooperate. Who could justify putting up a legal defense where there is only the presence of guns to decide the case?

The newspapers are already reporting that one portion in the investigation report concerning Kim Dae Jung is wrong. Whereas the investigation report claims that Kim Dae Jung is the source of a "donation" of 5-million won received by students of Chosun University in Kwangju, the newspaper reports reveal the funds came from a university account for student activities. How can anyone believe any more of the "revelations" of the coming indictment, based as it will be on this investigation report?

All of the government's efforts to discredit Kim Dae Jung through radio, TV, and the newspapers is only getting them into more trouble, alienating them from our people and marking them as the real enemy against whom we have to fight. I am very sad to say that another tragic development is how the U.S. government is fully supporting these bandits who are ruling us, and how the U.S. is thereby gaining nothing else than the hate of our people. Someone told me the other day: "The first ones we are going to shoot, if civil war starts, will be the Americans!" Even if the U.S. government could perceive the true situation, at long last, we doubt whether it will be able to change anything. The military is determined to stay in politics, and even to intensify its role. The U.S. — willingly or not — was not able to resist the beginnings of this development, so how can they stop them now or in the future?

6. Finally, may I add an appeal to the friends of democracy all over the world? We are grieving for the dead of Kwangju, we fear for the life of Kim Dae Jung, and we are worried no less about the complete house arrest of Lee Hee Ho, the wife of Kim Dae Jung. Her isolation from any outward relationship is terrifying. She doesn't know where her husband is, and she cannot even get confirmation that he is still alive. She can never get out, and can never receive visitors. All her telephone conversations are being recorded. The government agents are staying in her home with her day and night. Even if a maid goes shopping an agent accompanies her to prevent any contact with other people. This complete isolation is designed to make her break down. We know she has a strong faith in God, but we ask you to pray for her as well as for Kim Dae Jung and all the other prisoners of conscience, and to give her full support in your struggle for democracy in our country.

Seoul, July 21, 1980
The National Coalition for Democracy and National Unification severely criticized and issued a warning to the U.S. government in a statement released on May 24 regarding American support of Chun Doo Hwan and his group. The statement says that this support actively condones the atrocities committed by Chun against Korean citizens and for the people of Korea.

The May 17 nationwide expansion of Martial Law, arrests of democratic leaders and the indiscriminate massacre of innocent people staging protest demonstrations in Kwangju by the paratroopers have driven our national fate into an irreversible catastrophe.

Chun Doo Hwan’s individual shameless desire for power and delusive attempts to retain the Yusin system have at last caused an unprecedented national crisis that might drive the whole of our nation into ruin. Presently the whole population cannot control its burning fury over Chun Doo Hwan’s unlawful May 17 coup d’etat and the slaughter of Kwangju citizens. Our entire nation cannot refrain from resenting and lamenting the newly rising Yusin dictatorship and the deepening gloom spreading across the future of this country. The furious war cry, heard in every corner of this country, demands the overthrow of Chun Doo Hwan and the resurrection of our dying democracy, and sentiments have now reached the point of explosion. All of the military, the police, citizens and students are of the same nation and people. Why should we, as brethren, point weapons at the breasts of each other for the sake of one individual, Chun Doo Hwan, and why should the fate of our fatherland be driven to the highest limits of catastrophe for his sake!!

Our nation is really in a life-or-death crisis situation. In spite of the fact that a national consensus had developed to press for the recovery of a democratic constitution, and that this was the correct direction for national progress, Chun Doo Hwan’s dirty desire, betraying this trend, has brought appalling internecine tragedy and national ruin.

The National Coalition for Democracy and National Unification proposes the following points as a solution to this difficult crisis.

1. Chun Doo Hwan should resign from all public offices.

Chun Doo Hwan, who had already shown his contempt for the nation’s constitution through the December 12 coup, has subsequently made the president announce the May 17 coup to gratify his individual desire, arrested representatives of the National Assembly, stopped the functions of the National Assembly, threatened the judicial authorities to sentence Kim Jae Kyu, former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency to death, and finally employed violence to seize the three branches of government. Chun Doo Hwan’s immediate resignation from all public offices is a prerequisite, and is the only way by which our present situation can be resolved.

2. All democratic leaders including Kim Dae Jung should be immediately freed.

Many democratic leaders including Kim Dae Jung, a co-chairperson of this National Coalition, have been detained and arrested on groundless, fabricated charges, and even their lives are endangered by barbarous torture that is beyond description. The charge by the authorities that the National Coalition agitated for the citizens’ uprising is completely false. We make clear here that the announcement was false and without any basis in fact.

3. Emergency Martial Law should be lifted.

Since the October 26 event, citizens and students, aspiring for democratization, have used their wisdom and perseverance to restrain their desires that the remnants of the Yusin system be completely removed, and they have eagerly demanded the realization of a democratic constitution through national consensus. However, was it not Chun Doo Hwan — himself a remnant of the Yusin system — who destroyed social stability by his dirty December 12 power scramble? After the opening of classes in March, students restrained themselves for more than two months in expectations that the government itself would lift Martial Law, totally unnecessary except for its use in suppressing the press. But the price for the students’ restraint appeared as the expansion of Martial Law, and this in turn became the compelling reason for the Kwangju citizens to demonstrate.

4. The government should promptly announce its political schedule for democratization.

There is no need to reiterate that the recovery of a democratic constitution is the aspiration of the whole nation. The unclear timetable for political development is a central causal factor in the instability of our present situation. This caretaker government is only a transitional government in the true sense of the expression, and its duty is to promptly carry out only transitional procedures so
that a new democratic government can be established. More than any other factor, it is this government itself which has brought about catastrophe by not making clear its political timetable for democratization.

5. The military and the police should maintain strict neutrality.

The military's essential duty is the holy mandate to safeguard the country. The basic duty of the police is to keep public peace and order in order to safeguard the people's basic rights. However, how can the military and the police stab peacefully demonstrating students with their bayonets and assault the citizens even when ordered by their superior officers? The bloody murdering of demonstrating students on May 18 by the military and the police — a scene so appalling that no one could bear to watch only from the sidelines — was the factor which aggravated to crisis proportions the events in Kwangju. The military and the police should be faithful only to their proper duties.

We, the National Coalition for Democracy and National Unification, solemnly demand in the name of the whole people, that the Choi Kyu Ha Government immediately put into effect the above five-point proposals to resolve our nation's present situation. The TV conference by Park Choong Hoon, the acting Prime Minister, only further disappoints and enfeebles the people. The authorities should clearly understand that the present situation cannot be solved by temporary makeshift answers or false propaganda. Is it possible that the furious war cry from across the nation, which is gradually growing high and violent from every corner of this country and from all social strata, does not really reach their ears? At this very moment a national tragedy and the self-ruin of our nation is near at hand. The slightest postponement in reaching toward a solution to the situation, and any makeshift response cannot be allowed. We announce to the people in the press and media: do not report distorted news any more. If the censor's authority is so dreadful, it is better for you to stop writing. You people of the press, committed a great crime against history and the nation during the seven years of Yushin dictatorship. How can you continue to report false news, betraying the nation once again in the face of our fatherland's ruin, while you are surrounded by the appalling dead bodies of your brothers who are dying in the struggle for democracy? Not because of the dreadful judgement of history, but for the sake of your brothers and sisters, and for the sake of your family and your country: you press people, stand up courageously to fight. Take up the true duty of the press. Don't commit your crimes any longer.

Finally, we warn the United States, our long-standing ally. We, who remember well what the U.S. government contributed to our democratic struggle in the April 19 Revolution, cannot help being deeply disappointed and angered by the actions taken by the U.S. government in response to the present situation. In addition, this National Coalition is deeply afraid that the U.S., our traditional ally, has lost the confidence of our people. Why does the U.S. help the cutthroat Chun Doo Hwan kill innocent people? Why is the U.S. going to repeat the miserable failures of its Iranian policy once again in Korea? You — the U.S. government — must have judged that it was inevitable to mobilize the military to settle the present situation, but your action only aggravated the situation and certainly did not help settle it. We hear that you demanded of the Korean government that democratic development be pursued after settling the situation (in Kwangju), but this is a way of thinking whose order is completely reversed. Why do you not know that various measures to realize the fast accomplishment of democratization is the only way to settle the situation? We demand that our ally, the U.S., more humbly listen to the true outcries of citizens and students.

May 24, 1980

National Coalition for
Democracy and National Unification

Co-chairperson: Yun Po Sun
             Ham Sok Hon
             Lee Hee Ho (for Kim Dae Jung)
Dong-A Ilbo’s Missing Dispatch: Censored Reports on Kwangju, May 19-20

The following is an hour-by-hour, detailed report of events on May 19 and 20 filled by a special correspondents’ team sent by the “Dong-A Ilbo” to Kwangju, which was completely censored by the Martial Law Command. Due to such censorship, the “Dong-A Ilbo” was delayed for more than five hours on that day, and did not contain this dispatch.

THE SITUATION IN KWANGJU, MAY 19

On May 19, following the extension of extraordinary Martial Law, the participation of the general population of Kwangju in the ongoing student demonstrations brought about a situation in which nothing could be done. On the 18th and the morning of the 19th, in particular, the citizens of Kwangju reacted to the indiscriminate violence carried out by the invading Martial Law troops – violence not only against the demonstrators, but also against bystanders. The citizens became hostile against the troops as if they were enemies, and began burning and damaging many things in protest. As a result, the whole of Kwangju became a city of fear after the protests spread from the demonstration-torn central area to encompass the whole city.

On the 19th alone, demonstrations among the citizens took place in over 30 locations throughout the city. There was considerable bloodshed throughout Kwangju, with the smoke from buildings burned by the citizens mixing with the tear gas sprayed by the troops.

The First Stand-off

On the morning of the 19th, even after the troops had violently enforced their control, demonstrations began with about 600 citizens gathered on Kumnam Street, which the Martial Law troops had closed to all traffic. At 10:00 in the morning, the riot-control police used military helicopters and megaphones to order the disbandment of the demonstrators who had gathered in the center of the city, but the number of demonstrators only increased, and at 10:40 clashes began with the throwing of stones between the citizens and the police. A stand-off began between about 500 riot-control police, who had closed off the main intersection of Kumnam and Kwangnam Streets, and the citizens and students, who built barricades across the street using the sidewalk railing from in front of the Kwangju Tourist Hotel and the Seoul Trust Bank Building on Kumnam Street.

The citizens and students began their demonstration by singing the National Anthem and other popular songs. Very rapidly the number of demonstrators increased to 5,000 (police sources say 3,000). A clash ensued between the riot-police, who sprayed the crowds with tear gas and pepper gas, and the demonstrators on the other hand, who threw stones, molotov-cocktails, and wooden sticks at the police.

Troop Concentration Grows

At 10:50 the police, unable to restrain the excited demonstrators, were joined by 30 vehicles of the Special Forces brigade, who surrounded the demonstrators by placing four armored vehicles across the Kwangnam Street intersection from both directions in front of the Provincial Building. At this point, the demonstrators clashed head-on with the troops, using wooden sticks, steel bars, and pipes taken from a construction site at the 3-ka (block) of Kumnam Street. In reaction to the indiscriminate violence carried out by the Martial Law troops, the bystanders along the street joined the demonstrations and swelled their numbers even further.

The approximately 1,000 Special Forces troops who entered the Kumnam Street area indiscriminately beat the demonstrators with clubs and stabbed them in their shoulders and legs with their bayonets, turning the street into a sea of blood and filling the air with the screams of onlookers. In their attempts to escape this indiscriminate brutality by the Martial Law troops, the demonstrators fled into Chungchang Street, back alleys, and into nearby buildings, but the troops pursued them into the side streets and buildings as well. The troops dragged people out of these buildings, made them kneel, kicked them in the chin with their boots, and then trampled on their heads and backs after they had fallen to the street.

Here and there along the streets, the troops made people line up in lines two-abreast kneeling and with their heads on the ground. After stripping young people in particular down to their underpants, the troops beat them and tied their hands tightly behind their backs. Even frightened and trembling women
students were kicked and beaten in the stomach and chest, and their clothes were torn into pieces by the troops' bayonets. The citizens watching from such places as the neighboring rooftops, seeing the students and other young people beaten and bleeding in this way, were shouting and weeping in response.

The People As Enemy

Following this, the troops continued to commit acts of violence, and in squal and platoon formation the troops started searching people in houses and side streets. At 11:15 a.m. the troops went through the streets announcing over loudspeakers for people watching from rooftops and windows to go indoors and shut their curtains. As a result, all municipal and public buildings in the Kumnam Street, Kwangnam Street, and Chungchang Street areas, which had been open in the morning, closed their doors for the day and the employees fled to the suburbs.

Even after the demonstrations had come to a halt, the troops searched from house-to-house and in side streets, attacking and beating anyone under 30, both men and women. A group of troops would surround individuals and attack them. At one point, about 500 Special Forces troops engaged in a practice-maneuver with their rifles, bayonets, and very loud yells, frightening the residents in the area of Kumnam Street tremendously.

The troops stopped, tripped, kicked, and beat even the employees of offices in the area which had closed, especially those in their twenties, as they tried to hurry home. The troops even broke into the classrooms of the Mutang college preparatory school behind the Chon-An Building, where young students were studying, and beat them as well. The troops even violently beat the policemen who were helping load into ambulances people lying in the streets with their skulls cracked and injured seriously in other ways. A lieutenant colonel of the Martial Law troops threatened even a senior officer of the provincial police, Mr. Ahn Su-taek, who was directing where the injured should be taken, with the following words: "If you police try to hide the students or let them escape, we will treat you in the same way as the demonstrators."

Although about five troops were injured by flying stones thrown by the demonstrators in the confrontation, an undeterminable number of people — in the hundreds — were injured by the troops. One police officer, yelling through a megaphone, pleaded in tears with the people still in the area saying: "Please, please leave this area at once. If the Martial Law troops catch you they will kill you." From this time, the troops expanded their house-to-house search beyond the central area of the city to include the surrounding areas, such as along Kaebon Street, Choon-gang Street, and other main and back streets. They beat and detained anyone they found in their twenties.

Ordinary Citizens Roused by What They Have Witnessed

The troops severely beat even citizens who pleaded on their knees to be spared, and chased and beat fleeing people in groups of 5 or 6 troops to one person. As a result, any young people who were spotted by the troops were completely helpless. Citizens who saw all this happening protested the troops' actions, asking how they could engage in such violence.

The demonstrations which began again in the afternoon were of a completely different character than those in the morning. The general public, extremely angered by the Martial Law troops' indiscriminate and violent attacks on men and women, young and old alike, that morning, now joined in counter-attacking against the troops, throwing molotov-cocktails and other things in their intense anger. Even though disbanded by the troops, the citizens' demonstrations formed again spontaneously in other areas such as Kwangnam Street and Chungchang Street. About 1,000 demonstrators clashed with troops in the intra-city bus-line terminal in the Taein-dong, Tong-ku area, throwing stones and other things at the troops.

At 4:40 p.m., the demonstrations had spread even as far as the railway tracks in Hak-dong, Tong-ku area. In these instances as well, a great number of citizens spontaneously clashed with the troops, throwing stones, starting fires, and the tragic bloodshed spread even further. Following the numerous demonstrations on this day, the 1,800 police mobilized at the 8 police stations in Cholla-namdo, excluding Mokpo and Yosu, were barely able to control even the main roads in the city, as the demonstrations spread all over Kwangju.

Impartial Reporters Challenged

At 5:10 in the afternoon, in front of Kwangju High School on Chungang Street, about 500 demonstrators were so extremely angered and agitated — throwing rocks and sticks — that the troops were un-
able to approach an armored vehicle which had been surrounded by the demonstrators. The demonstrators then burned straw on the roof of the vehicle, and threw molotov cocktails. At that point, the leader of the troops still in the vehicle yelled to those in the Dong-A Ilbo reporting team’s car, who were filming the events, to contact and bring reinforcement troops to their rescue. At this, the people also surrounded our Dong-A Ilbo car, kicking it and throwing stones at it — as had happened with other Korean reporter’s cars — yelling at us: “Why is the Dong-A Ilbo silent even when the people are being killed?”

At 5:20, 1,000 people gathered again at Kumnam Street, when the Martial Law troops there had been withdrawn to help fight the people’s demonstrations in other areas, and began burning and damaging things. Then, with the return of the troops, clashes broke out anew.

At 6:50, the demonstrators occupied the public parking lot and the Kwangju bus terminal. There, the citizens clashed with troops from the 31st Division, and when they commandeered and set fire to several taxis, the billowing smoke made it appear to be a much larger fire. These demonstrations continued until 8:20 that evening, and at around 7:00 p.m., when it began to rain, someone held high a torch on the hill behind Chisan-dong in the Tong-ku area and let it burn for several minutes, bringing rallying cries from the people below.

High School Students’ Mood

When rumors of the intensity of the day’s demonstrations and of the brutality of the troops’ attempts to suppress the people by force reached the students of three high schools — Kwangju First High School, Chunang Women’s High School, and Dae Dong High School — at about 4:00 p.m., the students refused to continue their classes. They rallied on the school grounds, and threatened to go out on the streets to join the demonstrations. By 5:30, however, most of the students were convinced by their teachers to come back into their classrooms, so a frightening situation was narrowly avoided.

In consideration of this mood among the students, and of the seriousness of the citizens’ demonstrations, the Education Committee of Cholla-namdo decided that classes would not be held in high schools the next day, and that students would be asked to stay home for a day of studies.

Night Falls on the First Bloody Day

With the rain which began at around 7:00 p.m., the lack of traffic in the streets, and with the city growing completely dark, it appeared to be an apparition of the underworld, and one could sense the anxiety spreading throughout the city. From about 7:00, the troops rode through the city asking the citizens over loudspeakers to hurry home, and ordering shops in the suburbs to close for the night. The Special Forces troops occupied the major roads leading out of Kwangju, and all main streets leading into the heart of the city, such as Kwangnam Street, Chungang Street, and Kaepung Street.

In the course of the day, the songs sung by the demonstrators changed from rousing oppositional songs in the morning to more traditional, older Korean tunes in the afternoon, also including the National Anthem. The afternoon demonstrations, made up of students and citizens, had begun at about 1:30, when the Special Forces troops went to the campus of Chosun University for their lunch.

At about 7:30, 7,000 demonstrators (the police say 3,000), all armed with metal pipes or wooden sticks, gathered in a state of great excitement. These demonstrators clashed with the troops lining both sides of Kumnam Street, throwing stones and molotov-cocktails, and bringing vehicles into the area. Four cars, including a Pony-make car with license-plate number “Chunam 145236,” were set afire and pushed into the lines of police by the demonstrators, who included housewives and women in their 40s. They also set fire to druncans and rolled these into the police lines. The demonstrators took apart the metal-pipe taxi waiting booth, and made barricades with some parts, throwing other parts at the police. With metal pipes and sticks in their hands, the demonstrators were yelling and in an extremely excited mood.

Having run out of gas and other means by which to control the crowds at about 3:00 in the afternoon, the riot-police simply stayed in formation and attempted to hold their lines, unable to go on the offensive. At that point, two military helicopters flew low over the roofs of local buildings, announcing: “Students and citizens, if you lose your sense of
reason, the commotion will only get worse! Quit your futile resistance, disband and go home at once! If you citizens get involved, you will only bring grave misfortune upon yourselves and upon your families!” Even with these threats, there was no one who went home. Rather, the demonstrators shook their metal pipes and such in the air, boooing the helicopters.

At 3:00 p.m., about 300 demonstrators rallied around the building at the 3-ka area of Kumnam Street housing the Christian Broadcasting Service (CBS) and the Catholic Center, and completely surrounded the group of Martial Law troops which were therein. They were able to force the troops to give up their arms and remove their uniforms, and planned to hold them in the building as hostages, but the director of the CBS offices — Mr. Hong Yun-pyo — persuaded them to give up the idea, and they agreed to this in about 30 minutes. The demonstrators who had occupied the CBS station destroyed some equipment in the operations room, temporarily interrupting broadcasts.

At 3:17, having finished their lunch, the Martial Law troops reappeared in front of the Provisional Building, and took control of the Kwangnam Street intersection again. They surrounded and began closing in on the demonstrators. The citizens, however, clashed again with the Special Forces troops, throwing stones and wooden sticks at them. An armored vehicle fitted with a 60-calibre machine-gun began moving into the crowds, causing them to flee. They were pursued by the troops and beaten again.

At 3:25, about 100 people who were being pursued by the troops entered the building housing the Munwha Broadcasting Co. (MBC) in the Cho-dong area of Tong-ku. They stormed the second floor offices of the broadcasting company and hurled molotov-cocktails, causing the employees to flee, but no fires began. They then set fire to five cars in the MBC parking lot, and also set fire to an electrical appliance store — the Munwha Co. — owned by the director of the MBC.

By afternoon on the 20th, the third day of uninterrupted demonstrations in Kwangju, the citizens in the city were in such an excited state nothing could be done to control them. From this day, virtually all municipal government and public buildings — except the Provincial Government Building — police boxes, and broadcasting stations were damaged or set afire. As a result, the governmental functions and intelligence actions by the police in Kwangju came to an end.

This intense anger and agitation on the part of the citizens was caused by the brutal treatment conducted by the Martial Law troops on the 19th; and by the people’s witnessing of the bloodshed which resulted in the injury and death of many.

Rather than the political demands heard earlier, the demands one hears from the people now are highly emotional pleas, such as “bring back to life all those who have been killed!”, or “Kill all of us!” Within a constant volley of molotov-cocktails being thrown and blank shots being fired by the riot-police in return, many of the inner-city and highway buses have been commandeered by the demonstrating citizens, and most of the gasoline stations have been occupied by them as well.

In this situation, with clashes occurring constantly between citizens and students on the one hand, and troops and the police trying to put down the people on the other, there have been numerous casualties and deaths on both sides. The confrontation between troops and citizens in front of the Provincial Building continued until after midnight the night of the 20th.

The demonstrations on this day began at about 2:30 in the afternoon, when about 500 demonstrators gathered around the Sumi coffeeshop at the 3-ka area of Kumnam Street, near the center of downtown Kwangju. This demonstration, which included high school students in plain clothes, housewives, and even men in their 50s, began as a result of an incident earlier in the day. At six o’clock that morning, the body of Kim An-pu, a 35-year-old laborer who lived at 132-22 Wolsan 2-dong, Suh-ku, was found on a street in Hak-dong, Suh-ku, in front of the Chunnam Brewery, bleeding from many open stab wounds inflicted by the troops’ bayonets. This had added to the citizens’ agitation and rage, which had grown overnight as people exchanged stories on the suffering inflicted on the people of Kwangju.

One Mind and Spirit

The people who gathered in the afternoon strengthened their resolve to continue resisting together, with words such as: “We are all of one mind and spirit.” Their agitation and anger was intensified as rumors got around that “the Special Forces had been ordered to kill even as many as 70 per cent of the people of Kwangju.” At the same time, in Taedin-dong, Tong-ku, people started closing their shops and about 600 demonstrators were already engaged in clashes with the troops.

At about 3:00 in the afternoon, 300 or so junior high school students on their way home began throwing stones at rifle-wielding troops they encountered on the way. In return, the troops fired tear-gas canisters and pepper fog at the students, and chased them, so the students dispersed and ran away.

By 3:30, about 5,000 demonstrators had gathered on Kumnam Street. As the riot-police advanced on the crowd, firing tear gas and pepper fog into their midst, the people continued their demonstration by sitting down in the street and waving the national flag. As the troops moved closer, many people fled into Chungchang Street and towards the Modern Theater, but several thousand rallied and clashed repeatedly with the troops after calls of “Let’s gather again!” went through the crowds.

At about 4:50 that afternoon, the demonstrators were gathered along the six roads converging at the Provincial Building, setting off molotov-cocktails and
rolling burning drumcans towards the troops. Some had armed themselves with metal pipes and kitchen knives, and yelled “Let’s die together!” as they tried to hold off the troops.

The riot-police were advancing in lines 3 or 4 deep along the 6 roads leading into the demonstrators around the Provincial Building, and the Special Forces troops then moved in behind the police, increasing the tension between the demonstrators and the advancing troops and police. At 5:20, from among the demonstrators on the six roads surrounding the Provincial Building, small groups formed and tried to rush the building itself, and clashed repeatedly with the police guarding the building.

The demonstrators gathered and sat in the street in front of the Taejo Hotel, chanting “Chun Doo Hwan must resign immediately,” and “The army should go back up to the 38th parallel (dividing Korea into north and south).” They chose representatives to approach the police lines, to ask that the police disperse and let the people directly confront the military, “which considers the people of Kwangju its enemy.”

*The People’s Anger Spreads Like A Prairie Fire*

At 6:50, about 10,000 demonstrators gathered on the Mutung Field adjoining Kumnam Street, and in a greatly excited and angered mood, they severely criticized the military’s forceful attempts to suppress the people on the day before (the 19th). Most vocal were about 200 taxi drivers, who suggested that the demonstrators break through the police lines by using their taxis as the front line of attack. With their headlights on, about 30 taxis formed a cluster, followed by 7 or 8 buses and 3 or 4 trucks. At this moment, a youth from among the demonstrators climbed on top of a bus and shouted “3,000 students from Korea University in Seoul are on their way to Kwangju to help us!”, at which roars of approval came back from the crowd.

At 6:55, amid the stone-throwing by the demonstrators, a bus registered with the Kwangchon Bus Co., license-plate number “Chunnam 5A-3706” moved forward with its headlights on, encouraged by the crowd. Although it started to rush toward the police lines, the tear gas was so thick that the bus ran into a tree in front of the Kwangju Tourist Hotel. The bus was then attacked by about 100 rifle-wielding troops, who broke through the windows with their rifle-butts and night-sticks, and severely beat the driver — in his 20s — and the other 8 people in the bus, who vainly responded with their own sticks.

For about 10 minutes, the vastly outnumbered 9 people in the bus were beaten and kicked, until finally they were dragged off the bus and dumped on the street in front of the Hoba-hoba Photo Studio, their faces and heads beaten beyond recognition. Seeing ten or more troops continue to trample with their boots and beat the 9 unconscious demonstrators, a group of 500 or more demonstrators rushed towards the troops yelling, and succeeded in pulling the troops away from the fallen nine. Three citizens rushed out of the nearby “London” pharmacy with medicine and bandages, but they were prevented from approaching the fallen 9 by the troops, who demanded that they hand over the medicines. On woman in her 40s, disregarding the troops’ orders to stay away, rushed towards the 9, and finding their blood forming pools on the street, she screamed at the troops: “Look at this blood! Can you call yourselves defenders of our country even with this?” She then fainted in the street. Despite the continued beatings they were receiving, about 500 demonstrators persisted in demanding that the 9 fallen youth be handed over to them to be cared for. They were successful in securing five of the fallen youth from the troops, despite their serious injuries, and the remaining four were carried away by ambulances.

At 7:26, in the Chung-chang-dong area, another clash between police and demonstrators was underway, a bus from the Chun-II Bus Company, license-plate number “Chunnam 5CHA-1051,” was driven towards the police lines. This bus ran into the fountain in front of the Provincial Building, and as the police had dispersed in time, no one was hit. The two young drivers of the bus, however, were arrested and taken away.

At 7:30 in the evening, the demonstrators from the Kumnam Street area occupied a bus parking lot and, joining forces with demonstrators from other areas, commandeered a number of local and long-distance buses. Singing “Arirang” and other songs, they formed two lines of buses 5 abreast, and slowly advanced on the police lines. Frightened by the demonstrators’ advance, the police and troops broke lines and retreated to the Chun-II Broadcasting Station area. There, making their own barricades by tearing down the side-walk guardrails, the troops discharged great amounts of pepper fog and tear gas indiscriminately at the crowds. Braving the fierce discharge of tear gas, women from the shops and homes along the street came out into the streets carrying wooden staves, and joining together with the demonstrators, came within 10 meters of the police and troop lines.

At about 7:45, a pick-up truck belonging to the Honam farm, license-plate number “Chunnam 7KA-5259,” approached the fountain in front of the Provincial Building. Using the truck as a rallying point, demonstrators converged on the fountain area from
all directions, and began to surround the troops assembled there, amidst a tremendous noise of singing, tear gas being discharged, stones flying, and people screaming as they fled to and fro.

From this time until after 8:00, with so much tear gas in the air that visibility was severely reduced, the demonstrators clashed directly with the troops in the vicinity of the Chun-II Broadcasting Station on Kunnam Street. The air was filled with the cries of people being beaten, and with yells as people attacked. At the end of this 20-minute battle, the streets and spaces between the cars, buses and trucks were littered with people with broken bones, skulls, bloodcovered and unconscious.

Several women bus-guides in their twenties were weeping as they clung to bus drivers who had been severely beaten. The police, too, while carrying people to and fro, were yelling through their walkietalkies for ambulances to be called quickly, as many were injured critically. Between these frantic sounds, one sensed the brutality of the bloodshed in progress.

Kwangju “Ungovernable”

After a 10-minute lull from 8:20, at 8:30 the demonstration reached a new peak as the demonstrators rallied from the six directions leading to the Provincial Building, walking beside and blaring the horns of the fire engines, local buses, and long-distance buses they had commandeered. At about 8:30, the demonstrators fired the water hoses from three fire engines they had brought to the fore, dispersing the tear gas, but they were met by armored buses driven by the troops, and a battle ensued with the repeated ramming of these vehicles together.

At about the same time, in the Kong-dong area of Tong-ku, demonstrators broke into the MBC broadcasting station, setting it afire, and broke into the KBS broadcasting station, smashing the equipment and halting its broadcasts. The police lines guarding the Kwangju City Hall were broken, and the demonstrators came into total control of the City Hall Building.

A great commotion ensued when the fires from the MBC station spread to the Park Chonkak Surgical Hospital next door, as the patients were being evacuated. Local government functions had been completely paralyzed from about 5:00 p.m., when all telephone communications were cut, and when the City Hall was overrun by about 6,000 demonstrators, the police and troop lines were unable to offer any resistance.

At 9:10 that evening, demonstrators threatened to break through police lines in front of the Labor Office, on the intersection, by setting fire to a bus. At 9:20, when the demonstrators ran into police lines with over 10 buses they had commandeered from the Kwangju Highway Bus Co., four policemen — Chief of the Hampyon Police Station Mr. Chung Hong-kil, Lee Sae-hong, Kang Chong-tong, and Park Ki-oong — were killed on the spot, and five others were injured and carried to hospitals.

After 8:30 in the evening, demonstrators in the suburbs successfully attacked police boxes, police stations, and fire stations, and occupied them all.

At about 10:00 p.m., the sound of M-16 automatic rifle-fire could be heard coming from troop lines both in the city center and in the suburbs, and tensions noticeably increased as the totally blackened city was lit by signal flares. At 10:10, the Provincial Governor, Mr. Chang Hyong-tae, was no longer able to stay in his 3rd floor offices, and rushing to the first floor offices, he telephoned to fire stations in neighboring towns, asking them to be prepared to come if needed, as the city’s fire engines had all been commandeered.

At 10:30, another pitched battle began between demonstrators and Special Forces troops in the Tongmyong-dong area of Tong-ku. In this battle, a young laborer in his thirties, wearing yellow work-clothes, fell overcome by the tear gas. While lying in the street, he was savagely attacked and beaten to death by several troops, and his body was hauled to the Provincial Building atop a gas-truck, where it was thrown into an underground air-raid shelter.

After 10:30, the Provincial Building became filled to overflowing with the injured bodies of students and police, and exhausted police were being carried into the building. At 10:50, a bus and 5 trucks commandeered in the Im-dong area of Suh-ku, carrying demonstrators armed with metal pipes, sticks, and pickaxes, made their way through the streets towards the Provincial Building. As they passed, the air was filled with the sounds of the troops’ rifle-fire and the demonstrators’ screams.

At 11:05, when the Provincial Building was once again under threat of falling into the demonstrators’ hands, two companies of Special Forces troops arrived in the area of the fountain. The air was filled with the popping sound of M-16 rifle-fire, and the light from flares. The administration and traffic throughout the whole city were paralyzed by the demonstrations, which continued throughout the night, and Kwangju dissolved into an ungovernable situation.

Although it is not possible to confirm the number of people who died on this day, it is thought to be more than several tens. Police sources estimate the number of citizens who took part in the demonstrations on this day at 45,000, but the actual number is in excess of 70,000.
Indonesia’s main dailies, Kompas and Sinar Harapan, and the weekly Tempo recently had to tone down their reporting on the south Korean student uprising. For all intents and purposes, it was a news embargo forced on the media by the authorities in order “to preserve good relations with the government of Seoul.” In fact, one may suppose that the purpose of this embargo was to prevent Indonesian students from being inspired by their south Korean counterparts.

It has happened before after all. When Thai students launched a boycott against Japanese goods in 1972-1973, their Indonesian colleagues followed up with the January 1974 demonstrations against ex-premier Tanaka’s visit to Jakarta. Furthermore, the present political and social climate is particularly unhealthy for the authorities because of rising anger over petrol and domestic fuel prices which rose 40 per cent in May (the government calls it “price adjustment”). Inflation is out of control (one kilogram of chicken now costs nearly 15 dollars) and hostility against the government is increasing in the universities which practically prevents officials from entering campuses (Education Minister Daood Joesoef was pelted with mud and assaulted in Ujungpandang and junior minister Gafour, was welcomed with salvos of rotten eggs at the University of Indonesia). All of this is taking place against a background of peasant revolts, seemingly spontaneous strikes by workers, racial clashes, and plots within the ruling establishment to uphold the specific and long-range class interests of the New Order regime.

In the Javanese feudalistic political culture now prevailing in Indonesia, these incidents are far from minor happenings; they represent a process of decay which threatens to undermine the foundations on which the New Order is built. Indonesian marxists recently analyzed this phenomenon from the point of view of the alienation process, the power structure and the possibilities for action.

Time and time again Indonesian officials stress the need for “political will” in view of the failure of nearly all its programs. For example, last year the government announced with much solemnity that it was going to proceed with the transfer of 2.5 million persons from overpopulated Java to the outer islands within the framework of transmigrasi (transmigration) and Repelita III (the Third Five Year Plan, 1979-1984). At present, several months have gone by without transmigrasi, and the credibility gap between the population and the government has thus become practically insurmountable. And transmigrasi is only one example. The opstib (Campaign Against Corruption) launched with much fanfare in 1976 has now died off without leaving any trace. Nor has the Pertamina mess been cleaned up politically. The former president of the state oil company, Ibnu Sutowo, who left it 11 billion dollars in the red, has regained a new legal respectability. “He was reckless but not dishonest,” the authorities say.

POPULAR PROTEST

Given this situation, government propaganda against “subversion” has lost much of its power, and
but circumstances will probably make that impossible. The equalization of income distribution will require more investments in the traditional economy, and this will put the government at odds with Japan, the western industrialized countries and their Chinese middlemen in Indonesia. Incapable of real choice, the Jakarta authorities have thus decided to favor all sides (and risk even greater loss of control over the situation). While petrol and fuel prices have been increased to satisfy the World Bank (which in fact pushed for an increase in electricity prices), local Indonesian businessmen are to be favored over their European counterparts. “Growth” would be impeded by the much needed public works, educational, and health programs which are being sacrificed in favor of quick profit-yielding projects undertaken in cooperation with foreign powers, but these can only create more friction and hostility within society. Large segments of public opinion are castigating the consumptive and non-productive character of the Indonesian economy. As a consequence, “stability” becomes an even more distant goal.

The actual evolution of Indonesian society has brought about considerable social change. The increase in the number of absentee landowners (who constitute a comprador bourgeoisie), the penetration of military representatives inside the villages and the increase of rural workers have increased class consciousness in the rural areas, superseding other forms of local solidarity (religion and so on). The authorities are thus led to strengthen their hold over the villages by replacing, for example, duly elected village headmen with appointed representatives of the administration.

WIDENING GAPS

Gaps are widening within the Indonesian bourgeoisie itself because a small number of compradors are enriching themselves through their hold on the State apparatus. Ibnun Sutowo is the first and foremost example of this type of individual. The alliance of this group with the Chinese middlemen also gives a more nationalistic outlook to the local Muslim bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Anti-Chinese feeling is running strong, as can be seen by the racial clashes which broke out in Ujungpandang in April and more recently in north Sumatra. Meanwhile the lumpenproletariat is ever increasing its numbers in the towns (Jakarta could have a population of more than 20 million by the year 2000, and military planners are said to be laying plans for the defense of its rich center, which is thought of as a city besieged by the destitute masses). It therefore comes as no surprise that egalitarian, populist and other idealized notions of social justice are beginning to reappear in Indonesian society. The radicalization of Islam is one noteworthy example.

The power structure of the New Order was created in 1965 in order to fight communism. It lost its raison d'être in 1970 when many active underground communists were captured. As for the development of government ideology, this has been thoroughly discredited by the events outlined above. Many anti-communist elements (such as the Muslim political) have left the New Order alliance, and in the present context, the armed forces (especially the Army) remain the main bulwark of the established order, but even the Army is difficult to control. At present, independent power bases are being established to fill a widening void inside the political structure of the New Order. Such is the case of Vice-President Adam Malik, Ami Murtono, the leader of Golkar, the government offer to go? It has only two choices: to generally to set up an “institute” for development, education or the like. In a similar manner, economic power bases are being built up and consolidated through systematic corruption.

To check the erosion within its ranks, the regime has had to offer concessions. But how far can the government offered to go? It has only two choices: to support the status quo or to implement reforms. As far as one can judge, Jakarta is now playing for time by reforming the Army. It will ultimately have to be reunited with the nation (“the people” according to government declarations) after having grown into a separate entity under the New Order. But even this will mean treading the path of populism and limited democracy.

For the last 15 years, Indonesian has grown and developed without popular forces playing a part. The void thus created is being felt even by those now in power, and it appears that these forces are trying to make a comeback by forming a coalition among broad segments of society. For the moment, class analysis and the study of the strengths and weaknesses of imperialism are considered to be the starting point for any action by Indonesian Marxists, who for the most part have been shut out of the mainstream of Indonesian life for 15 years.
Taiwan’s New Reign of Terror: The Movement for Democratic Rights Reaches a Turning Point

by Ohashi Seiko

On the eve of December 10, 1979, 20,000 people staged a demonstration in the southern industrial port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan in commemoration of the United Nations’ International Human Rights Day. Violence erupted when police, protected by 30 armored vehicles, charged the crowd and opened fire with tear gas grenades. Also apprehended were the members of the monthly magazine Melituo (Formosa) who had organized the demonstration. At the military tribunal convened afterwards, they received sentences ranging from twelve years to life. The Kaohsiung incident dealt a serious blow to the non-party (the term non-party refers to the broad masses of people united in their opposition to the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, and includes those favoring the peaceful re-unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland as well as native Taiwanese involved in the Taiwan independence movement) forces in their drive for the democratization of a country ruled for over 30 years by a one-party dictatorship, that of the Kuomintang (KMT). Taiwan has once again entered the dark age.

The Origins of a Dictatorship

The contemporary crisis confronting the people of Taiwan dates from 1949 when the nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to the island to escape the advancing forces of the Chinese liberation army. In December of that year, the Republic of Taiwan was established with Taipei as its capital, and the KMT proclaimed itself the sole legitimate ruler of all China.

The Chinese who crossed over to Taiwan with the KMT constitute only 14 per cent of the total present population of 17 million. The remaining 86 per cent are native Taiwanese. Approximately two million mainlanders immigrated to the island after 1949, and since then, they filled all important government and military positions and succeeded in establishing a virtual monopoly over economic and social rights. The establishment of a two-tier structure of government consisting of a central State apparatus and several provincial governments has further contributed to the subjugation of the Taiwanese people.

In May 1949, prior to the nationalist retreat to Taiwan, the Chinese National Garrison Command (popularly known as the Taiwan Garrison Command) formally declared martial law. Nationalist strategy called for the reconquest of China, and the KMT took no note of the desires of native Taiwanese or their feelings and attitudes toward the mainland. This meant that martial law was forced upon the people in support of the military and political ambitions of the KMT. The martial law regulations abrogate almost all
of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the 1946 constitution. These include freedom of assembly, the freedom to demonstrate, to stage strikes and to petition, and freedom of speech and the press.

The enormous volume of U.S. military aid as well as active Japanese economic cooperation were indispensable elements in maintaining the repressive KMT regime. Immediately following the Second World War, the U.S. granted some 3,000 million dollars in military aid to Taiwan in order to promote its Asian strategy of containing communist China. During the fifteen years between 1951 and 1966, U.S. economic aid amounted to 1,470 million dollars, an average of about 100 million dollars per year. It is clear that Taiwan could not have developed economically without U.S. military and financial backing.

Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. During the fifty years of occupation, the Japanese imperial government forced its emperor system on the people of Taiwan, the Japanese language was made compulsory, shrines and pathways leading to them had to be constructed and even people's names had to be changed to suit Japanese customs. The Japanese robbed the people of many of their human resources by conscripting them against their will. Even after Japan surrendered, the close-knit economic relations between Japan and Taiwan were maintained, leaving the question of responsibility for the war in mid-air. Kishi Nobusuke, former Japanese prime minister and Taiwan lobbyist, is a member of the Japan-Republic of China Cooperation Committee. Established in April 1957, the Japan-ROC Committee is an anticommunist body composed of private representatives from each country whose primary function is to deal with problems which are too difficult to handle within the scope of normal Japan-ROC relations. For example, in 1965 it was responsible for setting up a system of extending government loans to Taiwan as a result of which a yen credit of 150 million dollars over five years was promptly granted. This was followed by the active private investment of Japanese corporations which were on the look-out for new sources of cheap labor.

With the formation and development of a united front, the non-party forces applied growing pressure on the KMT to grant basic reforms. In 1960, Lei Chen, who founded the publication Tz'iu yu Chungkuo (Free China), became a central figure in the drive for democratization which attempted to forge anti-KMT sentiment into an effective opposition movement. However, this wave temporarily subsided with Lei's arrest.

The announcement of Nixon's visit to China in the summer of 1971 followed in quick succession by the acceptance of China into the United Nations in the autumn of the same year signaled an important turning point in the history of Taiwan.

Subsequent to the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN, the United States in the Sino-American communique of February 1972 recognized Taiwan as
being under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China. In September of the same year, the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration was announced, and Japan broke off formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Other neighboring countries followed suit, thereby isolating Taiwan internationally and leaving the island with only 21 nations that officially recognized it. These circumstances led to the heightening of political awareness on the part of the citizens of Taiwan, and the anti-KMT movement gathered momentum.

In August 1975, Taiwan Chénglun (Political Review) was founded as a forum for the exchange of people's opinions. Advocates of democratic reform took up many pressing issues in its pages, gradually building toward a general critique of the government. Two editions of the first issue sold out within three days, five additional editions had to be printed and this issue of the magazine eventually reached about 30,000 readers throughout the island.

The journal was terminated with the December 1975 issue because its content (e.g., the demand for the abolition of martial law) was deemed by the authorities to encourage internal disorder. Although the publishers were imprisoned and are still serving long sentences, other non-party elements attempted to revive the publication and keep the flame of democracy alive. They also made their positions public and were able to appeal to the population in the elections held after 1969 to replace aging members of the Yuan, Taiwan's national legislative body.

The Movement for Democratic Rights is Born

General elections for the Yuan have not been held in Taiwan since 1948. The approximately 2,000 deputies in the present government were elected to life terms on the mainland in 1948. As a result, the average age of the current membership is over 70. Inevitably, death takes its annual toll, and less than one-third of the legislators are actually able to attend Yuan sessions. Moreover only 30 people, one third of those still able to participate, can endure the workload.

In 1969, a "supplementary election" was held for the first time to fill the vacancies. Although only a handful of non-KMT candidates were allowed to stand for election, this proved to be a unique opportunity for raising the political consciousness of the citizenry.

In April 1975, Chiang Kai-shek died, and the party leadership along with control of the national army and security police passed to his son, Chiang Ching-kuo.

During the December 1975 supplementary elections, candidate critical of the KMT campaigned on issues such as the abolition of martial law, the release of political detainees, an end to secret trials and the guarantee of basic human rights. They did so knowing that any criticism of the nationalist government was prohibited and would most probably lead to their arrest. The most outspoken among them was Yen Ming-sheng of Kaohsiung.

In his election leaflet, he openly attacked the government:

It has been 30 years since the KMT was chased into Taiwan. Since then, it has cried out for resistance against the mainland, but not once has it been listened to... The Taiwanese are helping these people to return to their native country and meet their children by paying taxes and fulfilling military duties, yet we have no right to participate in politics....

The nationalist authorities warned the people that Yen's appeal was "all rubbish and in violation of the law." Nevertheless, his candidacy was overwhelmingly supported by the Taiwanese people, and the halls in Yen Ming-sheng's election district were always full. The KMT could not dampen the voices of criticism, and his election seemed certain.

However, at election time, as if by coincidence, four blackouts hit Kaohsiung province preventing many voters from casting their ballots, and the final results placed Yen in fifth place. The citizens, angered by the election outcome, converged on the Kaohsiung election committee office. Approximately 40,000 people gathered there to protest what they saw as blatant fraud, and the authorities, unprepared for such a contingency, could only look on helplessly. Thoroughly shaken by the sudden outpouring of popular anger, the KMT promptly arrested Yen Ming-sheng on charges of insurgency. He was severely tortured after which a confession was extracted and he was sentenced to prison for twelve years.
In November 1977, another incident again shook the repressive Chiang regime. At a local election held in Chingli city, Taoyuan province, 44 kilometers southwest of Taipei, an old couple attempted to cast their vote for an anti-KMT candidate standing for the office of provincial governor. Word leaked out that election officials had colored over the ballot and tried to pass it off as being invalid. Ten thousand angry citizens (government estimate), gathering to protest against such fraudulent behavior, surrounded and set fire to the police station in which the frightened election committee had taken refuge. The authorities mobilized armed militia to quiet things down, and about two hundred arrests were made. Eight youths were charged with arson and after making "voluntary confessions" received heavy sentences. The subsequent balloting was carried out under the strict scrutiny of the citizens themselves, and nonparty nominees were elected in great numbers.

In the past, the KMT controlled virtually all of the seats in the legislature, but as a result of the Chingli incident, it was able to retain only 85 per cent of the 1,318 seats in the Yuan. Although the KMT still holds a majority in the Yuan, four out of Taiwan's 20 cities and provinces including Taoyuan and Kaohsiung provinces have elected non-KMT people to office. Moreover, non-party members have been able to increase their hold from 8 to 21 of the 77 seats in the Taiwan provincial assembly.

The gains registered by non-party elements were possible because of the strict vigilance exercised by the people over the voting process which prevented any major deceptions. The fact that the non-KMT candidates were able to break the one-party nationalist monopoly on public office was an unprecedented event which created a sense of crisis in KMT circles. The ruling elite moved to check the growing political awareness of the people by stepping up repression, revising the law to make it easier to detain citizens on charges of sedition.

Nevertheless, the democratization movement continued to move forward. In preparation for the supplementary election of 1978 in which seven per cent of the total number of assembly seats were to be filled, the non-party members organized the Campaign Support Group. They drafted a twelve-point policy platform advocating the complete re-election of the provincial assembly, freedom of speech and the press, recognition of opposition parties, the abolition of martial law, the release of political prisoners and similar reforms. The Campaign Support Group openly adopted the promotion of human rights as its basic unifying principle and thus received widespread support from each region. For instance, in Taoyuan province, where the Chingli incident occurred, 60 per cent of the eligible voters supported non-party candidates, making their victory appear almost certain.

However, in December 16, 1978, just before the elections were scheduled to take place, the U.S. announced the normalization of relations with China and severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo promptly ordered the postponement of the elections, thereby adding more fuel to the anti-KMT movement. Two days after the break in US-Taiwan relations, the Campaign Support Group held a meeting and reaffirmed the need to continue agitating for human rights and democratization through legal and peaceful means.

Repression and Resistance

The KMT's response was to tighten the reins of martial law. Due to international pressure, the nationalist government could not openly arrest antigovernment dissidents, so they charged them with sedition or rebellion.

In January 1979, 16 non-party leaders including former Kaohsiung provincial governor Yu Teng-fa were arrested, and severe sentences including the death penalty were meted out to them. Yu had long incurred the anger of the government for his anti-KMT sentiments. The authorities decided to get to him through a close associate, Wu Shuen-fa, who was arrested on trumped-up charges of having undergone espionage training at the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, set up an underground organization to disrupt the 1978 election and engaged in spy activities for the People's Republic of China. Yu Teng-fa was apprehended and sentenced to eight years in prison for allegedly having knowledge of the affair and failing to report it to the authorities. As proof of his "complicity," the government claimed he had disseminated communist propaganda. In fact, all Yu had really been guilty of was showing several people a copy of a
December 27, 1978 article from the *Asahi Shimbun* (a leading Japanese daily) giving an account of an interview with the Chinese foreign ministers. His friends, who received copies and an explanation of the article, were not allowed to testify on Yu’s behalf or meet with non-party lawyers. To protest Yu’s arrest, the first openly anti-KMT demonstration with broad popular support in Taiwanese history was organized.

In August 1979, those responsible for the non-party underground publication *Chao-liu* (Time) were arrested. This led the Campaign Support Group to harden its non-party, anti-KMT stance, and the result was the founding of the monthly magazine *Melitao* (Formosa) in August 1979. Most of the leaders of the non-party movement participated in managing and editing the journal. These included the publisher Huang Hsin-chieh, Yuan legislator and publisher of the *Taiwan Chonglin* (Political Review); the president Hsu Hsin-liang, former Taoyuan provincial governor; the vice-president Lu Hsiu-lieh, women's organizer; the managing editor Chang Chun-hung, Taiwan provincial assemblyman; editor Lin Yi-shu, lawyer; editor Chen Shu, human rights activist; editor Wang T'o, writer; editor Yang Ching-chu, opposition candidate and the general manager Shih Ming-teh, secretary general of the Campaign Support Group, who had spent 15 years in Jail.

*Formosa* sold like wildfire. With each new issue, the number of copies was increased, and 100,000 copies of the fourth – and final – November issue were sold, an unprecedented number for a Taiwanese publication. *Formosa* criticized the KMT in the fields of politics, economics and culture, lending its voice in support of human rights and democratization issues in particular. The article which elicited the greatest response was one entitled "Debunking the South Korean Economic Miracle, Part I" (volume 2, September 1979). “South Korean economic development has brought about the destruction of democratic politics and caused suffering among the farmers and workers.” “The notion that the Korean people must submit to a government dictatorship in order to achieve economic growth is mistaken.” “The basic solution to this problem lies in paving the way toward democratization.” These and similar propositions raised a strenuous protest from the south Korean Embassy which demanded the immediate suppression of the magazine. However, it was clear from the context that these criticisms were actually aimed at Taiwan, not south Korea, and the authorities prohibited publication of the second part of the article.

Since the magazine sold so well, its financial base was consolidated early, enabling outlets to be established in 15 of the 20 cities and provinces of Taiwan. As the organizational network was expanded, *Formosa* began to take up labor, agriculture, and other issues closely related to the daily life of the citizens. In addition to its publication activities, the magazine discussed concrete policy formation directly with the KMT, in effect assuming the role of an opposition party.

After the demonstration protesting the arrest of Yu Teng-fa, the *Formosa* group organized 14 demonstrations of varying sizes, all of which were suppressed by armed security troops. On International Human Rights Day (December 10, 1979), the publishers of *Formosa* organized yet another human rights rally in Kaohsiung. They had applied for authorization two weeks prior to the scheduled meeting, but, as expected, permission was denied. On the evening before the rally, two workers who were announcing the meeting from a sound car were arrested by the police. When they were released, both were unconscious due to torture. *Formosa* made an official protest, but this was rejected by the security authorities. When the strongly anti-KMT citizens of Kaohsiung learned of the incident, they were filled with indignation, and tensions quickly mounted within the city.

Ironically, on December 10, the same day, another human rights meeting, this one sponsored by the KMT, was taking place in Taipei. There “anti-communists” staunchly attacked the People’s Republic of China, charging that the ruling against Wei Chingsheng, editor-in-chief of *T’an So* (Quest) who had been sentenced to fifteen years for counter-revolutionary activities, and the suppression of the “Democracy Wall” constituted a violation of human rights by the Peking authorities. They trumpeted these charges as if Taiwan itself were not plagued by human rights offenses.

From early morning, people gathered in Kaohsiung to attend the *Formosa*-sponsored rally. As non-party leaders arrived from each province, the number of

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A New Strongman for Thailand: A Victory of the MNCs?

by Pracha Nakhao

In March of this year, General Kriangsak Chomanan was forced to step down as Prime Minister of Thailand and was replaced by his rival, General Prem Tinsulanond. Unlike his predecessor whose bickering with the royal house may have hastened his downfall, Prem has the confidence of the monarchy. His nomination to Prime Minister indicates that in the present period of pseudo-democracy, Thailand’s ruling elites (the royalists, the military, the economic monopolies and the bankers) have settled not only on a strong military figure but on one who has the political influence to mediate between the contending cliques at the center of Thai society.

Prem’s rise to power has been meteoric. Between 1974 and 1977, he was in command of the Second Army Region in the northeast where the war against communists has been pursued with greatest zeal. In 1977, he began stressing the need to mobilize villagers on a political basis to support the conventional (and generally unsuccessful) search-and-destroy tactics then exclusively employed. The following year, Kriangsak himself appointed Prem Commander-in-Chief of the Army and in 1979 promoted him to Defense Minister. Although Prem has had little direct experience in politics, his backers, chief among them the royal court, believe he is the only military leader capable of securing the cooperation of Parliament, political pressure groups, the military and big business. But his victory appears to have favored this latter in particular at least for the time being. Using its privileged ties to international finance capital, a small group of Thai financiers now close to power is urging a break with tradition and the opening up of the country to large-scale foreign enterprise. In the long run, this initiative may well prove to be the biggest single threat to the security of the new regime.

Why Kriangsak Fell

Just why Kriangsak resigned as Prime Minister has been a puzzle to most observers abroad. A key member of the military junta which put the fiercely anti-communist lawyer Thanin Kraivichien into power on October 6, 1976 and then deposed him October 20 the following year, Kriangsak seemed to foreign observers a leader bent on implementing a more realistic foreign policy than his predecessor while assuring more democracy at home. For example, his benevolent attitude towards refugees and his leniency towards those arrested in connection with the October 6 incident won him much respect at home and abroad. But in March 1980, after 28 months in the premiership, at an extraordinary session of Parliament called by opposition members to discuss confidence in his government following huge oil price increases, he announced his decision to step down.

Kriangsak’s resignation came as the Thai economy reached a critical turning point in its development. The underlying cause was the second oil shock of 1979 brought on by the Iranian revolution. In 1978, oil accounted for 85 per cent of Thailand’s total energy needs. While the country does have limited petroleum reserves in the Fang oil fields in Chiang Mai province (which are capable of producing 1,000
barrels of refined oil per day), these can supply only a tiny fraction of Thailand's daily consumption, and the country has to rely on overseas sources of supply for 99.5 per cent of its needs.

During the seven-year period from 1973-1979, Thailand had enjoyed a healthy rate of sustained economic growth. There was a brief recessionary pause in 1974 following the first oil shock of late 1973, but Thailand was able to recover quickly due primarily to a brisk boom in the construction and housing industries. However, on July 13, 1979, as a result of the second oil shock, the price of oil and petroleum-based products shot up quickly, and between August and October when an increase in the official supply price was publicly announced, inflation grew rapidly, reaching 15 per cent, a figure double that of the year before.

Reflecting the spiraling price of petroleum products, the cost of cement and other construction materials rose across the board, going from 800 baht/ton (US$40) in January 1978 to 1,175 baht/ton (US$59) in August 1979. The result was a disastrous slowdown in the construction industry which had been the mainstay of Thailand's high economic growth rate. Moreover, to offset the climbing price of agricultural inputs, the government was forced to raise its rice price supports to farmers by 10 per cent (3,000 to 3,300 baht), and urban consumer and utility prices soared. For instance, city bus fares and bus fares in the provinces outside the capital were doubled from 0.75 baht to 1.5 baht, long distance carriers raised the price of their fares by 40 per cent (0.04 baht per kilometer), the cost of a telephone call increased by 33 per cent (1.5 baht to 2 baht) and the cost of electricity rose 56 per cent in Bangkok and 52.5 per cent in the provinces.

It was against this backdrop that Kriangsak's fall was played out. On February 9, 1980, the government announced a steep price hike for oil products. The price of diesel shot up over 50 per cent from 4.88 baht per litre to 7.39 baht, and the price of benzene rose about 25 per cent. The government move triggered a massive demonstration on February 21 by some 20,000 people who gathered at Sanam Luang, the traditional site of protests in Bangkok. It was the largest rally since the bloody event of October 6. The Sanam Luang demonstration was followed by protests and strikes by the Thai Industrial Association, the Fishermen's Association of Thailand and the Labor Congress of Thailand. The latter, whose leader, Paisal Tawatcheepan, was at one time close to Kriangsak, organized the rally at Sanam Luang. This action was publicly supported by the students' unions of 18 universities organized for the occasion in a loose front. There were also several publicized actions by right-wing influenced or sponsored groups, including a breakaway march from the main February 21 rally.

Public protests gave opposition parties and rival factions in the military ample leverage with which to pressure Kriangsak. In the face of these pressures, Kriangsak decided to reshuffle his cabinet. But the opposition was not easily placated. Demands for an extraordinary session of Parliament to discuss a no-confidence motion grew louder. Kriangsak was forced in the end to agree to the special session.

At this point, he seemed to have several alternatives to choose from. First, he could let the debate continue and try to avoid probable defeat through inducements, financial and otherwise, to leading MPs. Second, he could dissolve Parliament, a move that while legal would be bad politics and very unpopular. Third, he could attempt a pre-emptive coup to consolidate his own power, as was done by Thanom-Prapass in 1971. This was reportedly opposed by powerful military groups, including the Young Turks. Finally, he could announce his resignation at the opening of the parliamentary session, thereby cutting off a potentially embarrassing and divisive debate. He chose the latter path in order to show, in his own words, "political spirit and preserve parliamentary democracy for the country."

The Young Turks and the Monarchy

A staff man rather than a field officer, Kriangsak was not the general with the strongest base of support. Others such as Serm Na Nakorn (Deputy Prime Minister), Prem and Yos Indratomakasut (Deputy Communications Minister) wielded more power. But as Prime Minister, he proved to be an able coordinator and politician. His clever maneuvering was designed to ensure political stability in government while leaving as few influential figures in the military as possible. He had been particularly successful in playing off one powerful clique against another: Serm against Sangad Chaloryu, conservative chairman of the October 6 military junta, until Sangad retired from the political stage, and later, Prem against the ambitious Serm. In the last few months, however, he found his room for this kind of maneuvering increasingly restricted. Instead, he had to resort to cabinet shuffles, incorporating the Thanom-Prapass faction and the Serm clique into his government in an effort to placate opposition forces. But by this time, he had already lost the support of the more powerful field commanders, the so-called Young Turks.

The Young Turks are composed of colonels in the field who in general have been dissatisfied with the corrupt and inefficient high-ranking brass in the capital. One faction, which calls itself the "Democratic Military Group," supports the weekly magazine Tawan Mai (The New Sun), while another supports Sentang (The Line), a journal whose staff is composed largely of defectors from organizations linked to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), operating in the jungle or tied to CPT front groups. The Sentang faction denounces the CPT for its slavish adherence to the line of the Chinese Communist Party and takes a pro-Hanoi, pro-Heng Samrin, pro-Soviet but nonetheless in other respects independent line. Other Young Turks have staked out more ambiguous "liberal" positions. But all factions are more or less united in their approval of the military's role in politics and of its all-out war on communism.

The Young Turks expressed their dissatisfaction with the Kriangsak regime in their respective publications and through periodic visits to Prem and Kukrit Pramoj, another strong Kriangsak critic. As early as last August, they demanded a cabinet reshuffle,
which Kriangsak flatly refused. But thereafter, the anti-Kriangsak movement gained momentum in military and political circles, finding support even among progressive forces including students and labor.

A more immediate factor in Kriangsak’s fall may well have been his deep-rooted conflict with the royalists. As later became clear, Kriangsak himself had coordinated the October 20, 1977 coup that ousted Thanin, the King’s hand-picked man, in a direct military takeover that greatly disturbed the Palace. The King, in order to publicly express his displeasure and end the scathing criticisms directed at his protege, appointed Thanin a few days later to the Privy Council, the highest royal advisory body. Moreover, Kriangsak had been responsible for opening in the Ministry of the Interior one of Thailand’s biggest corruption cases against Pradoldej, a rural development officer and close relative of one of Thanin’s ministers, Samak Suntrorov, a demagogue favored by the Queen. Interestingly enough, Kriangsak did this only after promoting General Prem to the position of Deputy Interior Minister.

The King actively boosted Prem’s career, awarding him the Mahayotin (Great Warrior) medal, one of the highest decorations a general can receive. Prem, for his part, took to wearing the new national tunic designed by the King, claiming it more appropriate for Thai men than Western-style dress. Reports and photographs of Prem’s audiences with the King appeared more frequently. Kriangsak, on the other hand, reportedly had poor relations with the Crown Prince, who as a colonel had apparently angered several senior generals by his rough and arrogant manner with his own troops.

It was primarily the economic issue that united the various political parties and factions in opposition to Kriangsak. In the forefront of this movement, once public criticism of Kriangsak began to mount, were the Prachakorn Thai Party of Samak Suntrorov, the Social Action Party of Kukrit Pramoj and The Chat Thai Party of Pramarn Adireksarn (Kukrit had led the call for the resignation of five ministers concerned with economic affairs in August in response to the government’s failure to curb inflation and the rising cost of living).

In the military, there was discussion of a coup d’état, but the idea failed to win broad support. All opposition groups, including the military, agreed to adhere to parliamentary procedures on the assumption these would be successful in ousting Kriangsak. Kriangsak reportedly consulted both allies and rivals, including Prem and Serm Na Nakorn, about dissolving Parliament, but they were opposed. The Young Turk military officers then moved closer to Prem and broke off their contacts with the political parties. In a last maneuver, Kriangsak tried to pull together all his supporters in the Senate, whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister (i.e. Kriangsak). But while the meeting was in progress (most of the Young Turks stayed away, however), Kriangsak was summoned to a sudden audience with the King, then in Chiang Mai. He was warned of the impending crisis by the King but did not give it credence. Only when faced with the reality of both houses convening in opposition to him did he finally decide the best way out was to resign.

Prem’s New Order: Growing Social Inequality and Rural Terror

Prem’s rise to power promises to have far-reaching consequences for Thai society. In addition to a bold new investment program which, if it is implemented, will radically alter the course of Thailand’s economic development (see inset), Prem has outlined a number of short-term and long-term projects designed to forestall urban and rural unrest while expanding the fight against communism. To appease urban voters, the new regime announced recently, over the objections of the World Bank, an immediate 12–15 per cent reduction in the price of oil and diesel fuel. It then made public its intention to create a system of price controls for ten consumer products. To implement this plan, which involves increasing the supply of these products on the market to bring down unit prices, the government has enlisted the support of the country’s three leading manufacturers (Lever Brothers, Colgate-Palmolive and Saha Pattanapibul), all of which have close ties to multinationals (the executive director of the latter, Amnun Viravan, is the current Finance Minister). These companies will have exclusive control over the supply and marketing of the products, and the government has pledged to underwrite an extensive advertising campaign free of charge. So far, price controls have proved ineffectual; their primary effect has been to line the pockets of the companies involved and facilitate black market operations and the hoarding of important consumer items such as sugar, cement and pork.

In the countryside where 75 per cent of the population lives, Prem and his colleague, the bank tsar Boonchu (see inset), have earmarked an initial 3,500 million baht for the purpose of creating jobs through a system of land irrigation projects and the expansion of the non-agricultural sector. This represents essentially a continuation of the tambon program initiated by former Prime Minister Kukrit (under whom Boonchu served as Finance Minister) which was designed to secure the political loyalty of large landowners and the rural elite (Kukrit spent a total of six billion baht on this project between 1975 and 1976, giving his party a majority of the seats in the Lower House in 1978). Boonchu’s team hopes to consolidate this prize constituency while setting up a network of “economic zones” to stem the flood of rural migrants who are converging on Bangkok at a rate of 100,000 people each year.

The results of the Kukrit-Boonchu venture were less than spectacular. According to a report released by the Interior Ministry in 1976, the program produced a massive increase in the cost of living and soaring inflation in the rural areas. Instead of solving the problems of rural society, the recent initiative, by cooperating with and encouraging agribusiness (which aims at supplanting less efficient peasant cultivators and replacing them with capitalistic large-scale farmers) will only widen the gap between the rural rich and poor. It cannot get at the root of the problem which is the system of unequal landownership that prevails in central and northern Thailand. Here a
majority of cultivators are tenants working for big landlords who think nothing of taking half the producer's crop as rent. Although a 1974 law entitles landowners to only one-third of the tenant's crop, confronted with rising inflation sparked by the oil crises, landlords have hired gangs of thugs to squeeze more surplus out of the peasants by naked terror: hundreds of tenants have been murdered outright in the past few years.

The local terrorism practiced by big landlords is second in ferocity only to the official terrorism organized by the State against the whole of rural society in its unrelenting crusade against communism. It is here that Prem's peculiar genius manifests itself. In 1978, Prem, drawing from a secret slush fund, organized the first "Communist Hunting Squad." Recruited from among the jobless (and sometimes hooligans or gangsters) in Thailand's hard-pressed villages, these squads, each consisting of 80 men and concentrated mainly in the south, have been given a license to kill or detain people on mere suspicion of being communist agents or sympathizers. No special proof or evidence is required. These squads are responsible for the deaths of a large number of rural people. In 1974, a special squad attached to the Fourth Army caught several dozen suspects in the province of Pattalung and burned them alive in oil drums in order to frighten the local population into compliance with the Army's anti-communist directives. The Army has since refused to withdraw the unit in question despite the pleas and protests of MPs from the Democratic Party; it claims they are an effective deterrent to subversion in the region.

A variant of the "Red Drum" incident was reenacted on March 6th of this year in Kuang Kanoon village (Pattalung Province) where a death squad commando attached to Camp 402 burst in upon a funeral gathering of 100 people and opened fire with his M-16, killing eight, including three children, and seriously wounding 12 others. The villagers have filed a formal complaint with the Justice Minister denouncing the incident and demanding protection:

We have to hide ourselves in fear. We dare not come out to work as before. . . The smell of blood . . ., the wailing of mothers who lost their children and wives who lost their husbands . . . are still haunting us.

Robberies, rapes and other abuses of power by "rangers" are frequently reported by villagers. These incidents, far from preventing the spread of communism, have provoked outrage at the authorities and a desire for revenge. One villager interviewed by the English daily The Nation remarked, "We have no regret seeing 'rangers' killed by insurgents. The insurgents are making the revenge on our behalf."

With Prem at the helm, such reactions are likely to multiply. As recent Thai history demonstrates, repression directed at dissident elements is easily redirected against the population in general as the social and economic consequences of policies designed to ensure the maintenance of class rule and privileges are driven home to the broad masses of the people and arouse popular hostility. The programs advocated by Prem, Boonchu and Company seem fated to achieve just that.

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**Thailand Inc., or How to Sell a Country in One Easy Lesson**

Although Prem was propelled into office by rising oil prices and the uncertainty and dissatisfaction these bred in ruling circles, his accession to power represents a good deal more than a mere changing of the guard. Prem's victory coincides with an important shift in emphasis in the regional strategy of the multinational corporations (MNCs) and the efforts of the international financial community to enroll the comprador elements in the Thai business establishment in its support.

The first indication of a major change in orientation came with the appointment of Boonchu Rojanasathien, former head of the Bangkok Bank, the largest in Southeast Asia, to the position of Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs. Two months later, in an interview with Ho Kwon Ping of the Far Eastern Economic Review (May 23, 1980), Boonchu unveiled a startling plan of unprecedented dimensions designed to open the door to the MNCs and "turn this country into Thailand Inc."

I am now announcing that Thailand, as a nation, is open to all local and foreign businessmen who are invited to propose projects, of any kind, at (sic) the private sector, and note, even in the traditionally public sector.

Boonchu's investment scheme contains three novel features. First, all major foreign projects will bypass the administrative organs originally set up to deal with them and will go instead directly to the Prime Minister's office, presumably with Boonchu acting as gateman and unofficial lobbyist for the multinationals. A second proposal is, as indicated above, the opening up of the public sector, for the past few decades the exclusive preserve of the military and State bureaucracy, to big capital. Multinationals will be invited to engage in unrestricted profit-taking in areas previously off-limits to foreign capital including transportation and telecommunications, port and bridge construction, waterworks and mineral-resource extraction. Finally, the new regime is apparently ready to scrap the policy of import substitution consciously pursued for the past twenty years in favor of a wide-open door policy which, if it is implemented, will establish a series of free-trade zones and offer sweetheart contracts to attract foreign-owned, labor-intensive, export-oriented industries, giving them preferential access to the country's reserves of cheap labor and natural resources.

In the background of Boonchu's grand plan, then, is the increasingly visible hand of the multinationals who, in addition to trade and oil-related difficulties, have seen their profit margins in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore pared
considerably as wages there have risen and labor has organized. According to the FEER, current wage levels in Thailand are still less than 25 per cent of those obtaining in the export-oriented economies of Southeast Asia and a mere 5 per cent of the minimum wages in the industrialized capitalist countries. A move is underfoot to transfer multinational operations from these now high-cost countries to relatively lower-cost areas such as Thailand. But in order to tap the rich vein of Thai labor power and natural resources, an adequate infrastructure, sorely lacking, must be built. Enter Boonchu with his open door policy. This is the real meaning of the proposed new transportation systems, the free-trade zone planned for Laem Chabang, the deep-sea port and heavy-industry zone to be built near Sattahip. Already, Amax, one of the world's largest mineral-resource MNCs, is negotiating a US$300 million potash project for the export market, and two joint ventures have recently been approved to develop the natural gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand and build a coal-operated generator plant.

THE WORLD BANK

Behind the jockeying for position as the MNCs scramble to line up for Boonchu's promised big payoff is the World Bank which has quietly been working off-stage to lay the groundwork for Thailand's capitulation to big foreign capital. The bank's intentions became clear following Prem's elevation to the premiership when a high-ranking bank official received assurances from Boonchu that a pending US$1,000 million five-year "structural adjustment program" would be favorably considered by the new government (previous regimes had been less than receptive).

One of the bank's first ventures into large-scale "program lending," the plan calls for a comprehensive remodeling of industry, energy-resource enterprises and agriculture. However, as the bank's preconditions for granting the loan indicate, what is really intended here is the restructuring of the economy to accommodate the MNCs in their approaching hour of need. These conditions include preferential credit for export industries (foreign-owned), which amounts to direct subsidization by the Central Bank of Thailand, the streamlining of rebates on taxes and tariffs on materials required by export industries, the creation of Japanese-style international trading companies (sogo-shosha), a general trimming down of tariff rates to an average level of 20 per cent (from current ceilings of up to 150 per cent), reduction of protective tariffs for infant Thai industries and the creation of export-processing (i.e. free-trade) zones, 10 of which are now on the drawing boards. The bank has made it clear that failure to adopt any part of the plan will jeopardize the loan program itself.

There is, then, a great deal more to Boonchu's New Deal for foreign capital than meets the eye; the fit between the World Bank plan and Boonchu's open door policy is too close for coincidence. Indeed, there is solid evidence that the bank's comprehensive loan is being integrated into Thailand's fifth five-year plan now being drawn up. If the loan and investment scheme both go through, they will spell the virtual takeover of the Thai economy by the MNCs and international finance capital.

However, the retooling of the national economy implicit in the program is sure to meet stiff resistance from several quarters including entrenched vested interests at the center of power. First, the scrapping of the country's import-substitution policy and the elimination of the public sector strike at the heart of the State-military coalition that runs not only the government enterprises comprising the public sector but the country. Second, the decentralization of Thailand's manufacturing bases, now clustered around Bangkok, and their reintegration into an export-oriented foreign-dominated coastal zone is bound to create serious dissent in the ranks of nationalistic Thai entrepreneurs who depend largely on the Bangkok market for their profits. Third, the unequal development implicit in an investment program heavily weighted in favor of big industry despite its lip-service to the primary sector will almost certainly lead to the further destruction of Thai agriculture and increased peasant unrest. This will be exacerbated by the fact that, with profits and resources leaving the country, new jobs will not be created quickly or on a large scale: (export-processing zones are notorious for creating only a small number of positions for a relatively skilled work-force — see AMPO's 1977 Free Trade Zones and Industrialization in Asia). Finally one has only to recall the massive student demonstrations against foreign enterprises of a few years back to realize that a blatant takeover of the economy by foreign capital and the loss of national independence that it implies will never be tolerated. Such a move would in the long run unite the broad masses of the people far more effectively than any new atrocity Thai rulers are likely to perpetrate. It is improbable the military men and State functionaries now calling the shots will allow that to happen.
Why the Modern State is Strengthened by Revolution

by Michael Morrow

Bakunin, I believe, once said that “a revolutionary state is a contradiction in terms.” Marx and his followers have of course taken continual issue with this view. More than half a century after the Bolshevik revolution (and the brutal suppression of the Anarchists which followed from it) they have yet to prevail. Events in Indochina since the defeat of American aggression there do not raise the score for the Communist side and good people everywhere are calling for a re-examination of revolutionary theory.

Muto Ichizo, in his fine article which opened this debate, asks why “socialist revolutions intended to overcome the state and ensure peace among working classes of different countries on the basis of internationalism have resulted in the perpetuation of historic bourgeois (modern) states?” I do not have the answer to that question and if I did it would take more pages than even the kind editors of AMPQ would allow for me to properly formulate and defend. Nonetheless, I welcome this opportunity to make some tentative comments toward an answer.

The Technological Character of the Modern State

First of all, I prefer “modern” to “bourgeois” as the appropriate adjective for our “historic” state. I say this because both in form and function the historic state is more a product of technology than of class. A political revolution does not in itself change the nature of the state. An ambushed train is not transubstantiated into a rocket ship by the success of the ambush. It is still a train; it can still only go up or down its track. A successful revolution has only the tools of government which it captures. In our century, those tools belong to a technoculture that is large-scale and centralist. From that technoculture emanates autocracy, hierarchy, alienation and violence, all modulated for better and for worse by relatively low levels of operating efficiency. The historic state of our reference is a product of such technological hegemony, brought into being by the 19th century industrial revolution and raised to a higher stage by technological developments in this century. It is a “hard-core” state, concentrating wealth, power and status at its center. A change in the class composition of the core of the state can have only limited impact on the structure and activity of government until the relationship between the core and periphery — in both the social and geographical sense — changes. That can happen only with the implementation of technological change of a broad and pervasive nature in the realms of communication, control and production. To the extent that the state is a product of the production forces at its society’s command, this new relationship can develop only within a trend to modify the scale and degree of centralization of the means of production.

I am not, as I can already hear my critics muttering, a technological determinist. Man makes his tools. Man can change his tools. But to the extent that man uses a particular tool, he (she) must submit to the logic of the tool. That logic does not formulate a precise command but it does carry an imperative. For example, a stamp press on an assemblyline functions better under the direction of a worker with turned-on hands and turned-off brain than vice versa. To de-composte the brain of the stamp-press worker is to jeopardize the productivity of the assemblyline. The apparatus of the modern state takes its technological form from tools of information-processing and terror that are approaching Orwellian design and, subordinate to this form, its organizational shape is ubiquitous bureaucracy. It has a logic which is, to be brief, repressive. It is unrealistic to expect a “change of power” — even a revolutionary change of power — to radically affect the mode of operation of the modern state so long as the technological character of the state remains intact. A revolutionary change of power can change the character of the state, but only by displacing the hegemony of large-scale, centralist technoculture.

How Socialist Revolutions Have Re-legitimized the State

This brings me to my second point. “Socialist revolution” has become all but synonymous in the contemporary lexicon of the Left with revolutions like those that have transpired in Asia during the past 30 years, revolutions led by Marxist-Leninist parties and borne by peasants. It isn’t my intention to dispute whether these revolutions are in fact socialist, to invoke the “superhistorical dodge” which Douglas Lummis described in his contribution to the debate. These revolutions were taken to heart and supported by the vast majority of people around the world who think of themselves as socialists. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that these are particular-socialist revolutions, ones led by parties whose guiding principles, as they relate to the historicity of both technology and organization, are centralist. Whatever their other strengths or weaknesses might be, they are...
of the same technoculture that has given us the modern state. They are incapable of “overcoming” the state. These are, moreover, revolutions in keeping with the pattern of Marxist-Leninist revolutions historically, revolutions made by people with relatively primitive technological skills in countries that have strong feelings of insecurity about their technological backwardness. The characteristic of these Asian revolutions, as with Marxist-Leninist revolutions elsewhere, has been for both the theory and pre-disposition of the revolution not only to legitimize but also to lead to the modern state. The revolutionary state has become a vanguard of the centralist technoculture. The revolutionary class, from a position of ignorance and awe, has acquiesced to this development. Where it has not acquiesced, it has been carried into doing so. In this way, the shortcomings of the modern state have been if anything accentuated within situations of Marxist-Leninist socialism. Marx, it should be remembered, was a 19th century man. For him, there was only one technological revolution that mattered, the one going on about him, a technological revolution that accepted as a guiding principle the economies of centralized, large-scale production. For Marx, that technological revolution was, through the medium of dialectics, a liberating event. The central problem as he saw it was ownership of the means of production. The crises of capitalism, he believed, would permit the proletariat to collectively seize the means of production and manage them under the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Marx did not accept that these “modern” means of production and the centralist technoculture which they implied were themselves a limiting factor to the proletariat’s liberation.

Marx did not accurately foresee how the worker’s function in society would change under the impact of the 19th century technological revolution. With the advent of mass production, capitalism needed the worker not just as a producer who could be progressively impoverished by the exploitation of his labor, but also as a consumer, who must be progressively enriched. Moreover, as the worker’s most basic material wants were satisfied, he (she) began to give scope to the individuality of his own nature, what Kropotkin called his (her) “artistic nature,” what Marcuse called “the realm of the subjective.” The evolution of the worker from producer to producer-consumer plus the emergence of his aesthetic had by Lenin’s time already posed a Social Democratic challenge to revolutionary Marxism in the advanced industrial countries. Rather than confronting this problem head on, Lenin salvaged orthodoxy by developing the Marxian distinction between the “immediate” and “real” interest (and consciousness) of the proletariat into his concept of the vanguard. It became the task of the Leninist party, as Marcuse has pointed out, to rescue the “historical situation” by “subordinating the immediate subjective interest to the real interest of the class.” This revision permitted revolutionary theory to put off dealing with the worker as a consumer of society who held aesthetic as well as material demands, and with the implications of this “nature” for technological and social change. Moreover, with the appointment of the party as a dictatorial agent of the working class with coercive powers, any remaining potential for contradiction between the “revolutionary” and “bourgeois” conceptions of the state was lost. The party, come to power, becomes the core of the revolutionary state. It has a right and obligation to use its repressive prerogative. The large-scale, centralist nature of the bourgeois state and of its technoculture are re-legitimized.

The success of the Russian revolution coupled with the failure of those in Germany and in other advanced countries further promoted the association of revolutionary theory and the “19th century modern” world view, leading Lenin to his theory of imperialism, Stalin to his defense of Socialism in one country, Mao to his preoccupation with peasant revolution, and revolutionary practice away from those societies and those elements in society best prepared to articulate and challenge the adequacy of the modern state and its technological underpinnings. China’s Cultural Revolution did constitute a dramatic effort to take on the implications of this association, but it ignored the logic of tools: You can’t de-comatose the stamp-press worker without giving up the assemblyline. Marx talked vaguely about the “withering away” of the state, but without properly addressing the problem of technoculture. Today, Marxist-Leninist theory is almost unable to address the problem and has all but given up the goal of dissolving the state. Communist governments are behind both Social Democratic and Capitalist govern-
ments in facing these issues; indeed, while the Soviet Union continues to argue that the economies of large-scale, centralized communications, control and production holds the salvation of the working class, the capitalist world is busy making a new technological revolution around microprocessors and new energy systems, which at least hold the potential of an anti-ethical technoculture.

How "Nation" Overpowers "Class" in Marxist Theory

Implicit in Muto's question there is, I believe, another difficulty, which brings me to my third point: Did the particular Socialist revolutions of our experience really intend to "ensure peace among working classes of different countries on the basis of internationalism?" And even if they did, could it ever have been a realistic expectation? I think not. In reaching a modus vivendi with 19th century technoculture, revolutionary theory surrenders, in my opinion, the mantle of proletarian internationalism. I say this because the economies of large-scale, centralized production militate not only modern states but also modern nations, with their reservoirs of capitalists, producers, consumers and soldiers held in a permanent tension. The modern nation has its historical origins less in class than in tribe and territory. Its interests are selfish and they are defined most fundamentally not in class but in geopolitical terms. In embracing both national interest and nationalism, Marxism-Leninism has surrendered its internationalist dimension.

In his time, Marx had no patience with those of the Left who showed a Proudhonian "indifference" to movements of national unity, and he ridiculed as utopian their wish to "reduce everything to small 'groups' or 'communes' and then build up a 'union' but no state." Marx believed that "an international movement of the proletariat is possible among independent nations, between equals." This view went beyond simple de-colonialization to include the task of unifying "great peoples" — most concretely the German principalities into one German state. For me, within this initial Marxian conception of independent nation a problem already exists. War in our century — as in Marx's — has proven only too clearly that independent nations within the milieu of a large-scale, centralized technocracy are in themselves obstacles to proletarian internationalism, with both the "irrationality" of nationalism and "rationality" of national interest giving the modern state a primogenial capacity to divide workers of the world.

Again, the drift of revolutionary theory's focus from overturning the modern state to catching-up with the modern state has accentuated this problem. As Marcuse said in commenting on Stalin's two-camp doctrine, "The conflict between the real and immediate interests of the proletariat, contained from the beginning in Marxian theory, now becomes the conflict between two international groupings... With this change in protagonist, the content and strategy of the class struggle also change. The class struggle becomes a fight for space and populations, and the social issues become a function of political issues. The class interests of the Western proletariat (and for that matter of the entire proletariat) are sustained in Soviet policy only to the degree to which they do not conflict with the political interests of the USSR." Third-world theory is imbued with similar problems, as is the Leninist doctrine of imperialism underpinning Marxist-Leninist-led struggles for national liberation. The concepts of this tribal-territorial Marxism have become so pervasive, in fact, that even a creative thinker like Yamakawa Akio, who in his contribution to this debate is preoccupied with the problems of a world "dominated by the principle of the state to the exclusion of the logic of... classes and internationalism," slips into "the underlying assumption of Japan as a new monster." If Japan is a monster, then Yamakawa is a monster, and it is by that kind of reasoning that Vietnamese troops have pillaged in Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge often execute their prisoners. In short, the geopolitical preoccupation of current revolutionary theory reduces proletarian internationalism to pretension.

Toward a New Technoculture?

Now, to sum-up my comments on the original question of Muto: The historic state is more accurately described as modern than bourgeois because it is more a product of centralized, large-scale technoculture than of capitalist class domination. It is a repressive state and the basis for its repression is most fundamentally in its technoculture. You cannot overcome the modern state without changing its technoculture. Socialist revolutions based on Marxist-Leninist theory are incapable of overcoming the modern state because they not only condone but encourage its technoculture. Similarly, because centralized, large-scale technoculture militates not only the modern state but the modern nation and the dominance of its tribal-territorial values, these revolutions are incapable of ensuring peace among working classes of different countries on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

These propositions point to the limitations of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. They do not in themselves invalidate that theory and practice as a "model" for revolutionary change. One might argue that the prospects of liberating a poor, backward country from colonialism, or of "bringing it into the 19th century" make the price of a repressive modern state worthwhile; moreover, that to surrender the mantle of proletarian internationalism in the process is but a "paper loss," since proletarian internationalism is mere aspiration and not a reality. One might also argue that technoculture is a given; that it is part of the historical condition from which the real and utopian must be sorted out, and the expectations of revolution defined; that a revolutionary cannot fight the logic of tools. I would not contest either of these
arguments except to say three things: First, understand why the model works. Do not mistake the reason it is said to work for the reason it does. For example, Asian revolutions have depended on foreign invaders to create conditions of mass mobilization. What happens if you give a war of national liberation and the foreign troops don’t come? Will a war of national liberation strategy work within the dimensions of civil war? Second, in accepting the limitations of the model, understand the limitations that can be put upon it. Do not expect an essentially 19th century model to provide the insight needed for emancipating the 21st century. Third, in surrendering to the determinism of limitations understand the risk of your own obsolescence. Marx wrote that humanity does not pose problems for which it has no solutions. Pogo discovered on his long march that “the enemy is us.” And Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore have observed that “Man-made environments are always unperceived ... during the period of their innovation.” Within the capitalist world, an antithetical small-scale, decentralizing technoculture has been taking shape stealthily throughout this century. It is becoming reactionary to defend the old technoculture. I personally feel that the limitations can be fought and that — for obvious reasons — recent events in Indochina and Afghanistan (to name but two places) make the fight not only desirable but necessary. The accelerating pace of technological change associated with microprocessors and energy systems is also forcing the issue. Global society is in the process of re-tooling. Do we opt for the super-centralist cybernetic systems or the small-group computers, for the techno-fascism of nuclear power or the Proudhonian anarchism of solar? How do we maximize benefit for the broad masses of the world from this re-tooling process?

“Third World” Regionalism Is a Diversion

Yet another cause is the globalization of capitalism. I don’t accept the East-West, North-South “division-of-labor” matrix of Samir Amin and others. At best it describes a situation in transition. The latter-20th century is not a “white-man’s game.” The “third-world” capitalist is penetrating the boardroom of international capitalism; the workers in some of the poorer countries are developing into producer-consumers; state capital and private capital are in “non-antagonistic contradiction” if not in symbiotic reinforcement of one another in many of the poorer countries, including Socialist ones. It is too simple to say that “Monopoly capital just wants to relocate, under its control, some segments of the productive process towards the Third World, according to the law of value and maximization of profit, and no more.” Third Worldism is, in my opinion, a diversion. The real economic issue in the poorer countries is that many of the poor — particularly rural poor — are getting poorer, are being externalized by the same centralized, large-scale technoculture that is internalizing the bourgeoisie and other classes, including large numbers of the urban proletariat. Centralized socialist government has not been able to stop this process.

What to Do?

But what do we, members of the so-called “international intelligentsia,” do now? An immediate practical advocacy is the de-militarization of international politics to the maximum extent possible. In Kampuchea, for example, I suggest a realistic scenario would involve negotiations between Thailand and Vietnam leading to a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea at the end of Thai support to the Khmer Rouge, broadening of Heng Samrin’s government to include Sihanouk and his backers, Thai recognition of that government, neutralization of Kampuchea under guarantee of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, an end to the American trade embargo against Vietnam and a re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two. The objective of this scenario, and of other like it elsewhere, should be to disentangle domestic and local political development from international geopolitics sufficiently to create political space for the development of transnational contact of workers, farmers, students, intellectuals and others to the point that they themselves become a meaningful part of the political process.

At the theoretical level, the dialogue between Anarchists, Communists and Social Democrats must be deepened with the emphasis on the problem of technoculture. I agree with Yamakawa that a critical analysis of socialist praxis is overdue, but I would say that the French revolution rather than the Russian revolution is the place to start historically. Also, too of much value the analysis must extend beyond the Marxist-Leninist tradition. In addition, the purpose of such analysis should be to project upon the future in a normative as well as an extrapolative way. It is important to ask what kind of society we want. Only by asking this question can we get at what kind of tools we need, and, by extension, what kind of politics.

In making these comments, I have not intended to devalue the theoretical contributions of Marx and his successors, nor to make light of the revolutionary accomplishments bought in blood by the people of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Kampuchea and other countries that have experienced Socialist revolutions. Nor do I mean to start a presumptuous and ultimately futile discussion on how the praxis of revolution might have developed differently. I am also aware that in both theory and practice, revolutions have been the product not just of revolutionaries but of their antagonists and of the historical conditions they have shared. My intention has been merely to lend my voice to the voices of many others who feel, particularly since recent events in Indochina, that something is seriously wrong with the orthodox revolutionary viewpoint.
Toward a Critical Solidarity

by Pierre Rousset

Like the other contributors, I find very positive and very necessary AMPO’s opening (albeit delayed) of a discussion on the Sino-Indochinese crisis and conflicts. I largely agree with the way Muto Ichiyu defined the framework of this debate in AMPO vol. 11, No. 1: while maintaining and broadening anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles or solidarity activities, to draw the lessons of previous socialist revolutions in an attempt to gain perspective on the masses’ fight against oppression and exploitation, both on a national and global scale, and achieve an orientation which can help revolutionists avoid repeating “past mistakes.” But I feel this has not been done systematically enough in most of the contributions that followed these “introductory remarks” by Muto.

The present Sino-Indochinese crisis is complex. In fact, this region of the world continues to reflect, as it did in a different context during the liberation wars, a very tight combination of national, regional and world contradictions. They have no simple, monocausal explanation and to understand them, one has to integrate different levels of problems and analysis. This is why the present Sino-Indochinese crisis so acutely poses many of the questions the international revolutionary movement has to face today.

Muto stresses the need to “distinguish among three different dimensions”: the existence of meaningful differences in the basic lines of revolution and liberation; the way the context of “global power politics” has distorted these differences; and the theoretical and philosophical problems raised by the whole praxis of socialism. I will try to present an analysis here of recent Indochinese developments, as well as of the tasks we are faced with in relation to them (or to the general questions they raise), by “distinguishing” among the following “dimensions”: the continuation in Indochina of a violent (though not as violent as before) confrontation between revolution and international counter-revolution (imperialism); the new weight in Southeast Asia of the Sino-Soviet conflict as an inter-bureaucratic conflict; the contradictions within the regional process of revolution in Indochina; the nature of the course followed by the Kampuchean CP; and the nature of the reactions of the Vietnamese CP to growing post-victory tensions.

For the sake of this discussion, I shall deal separately with each of these questions. But to understand how the situation turned bad in Indochina so quickly and so brutally after the victories of 1975 — victories of great historical significance — one should stress how these different contradictions combined with one another. It is not merely an accumulation of contradictions with which the Indochinese revolutions have been confronted since 1975, but a new complex of tensions flowing from the victories themselves.

The Continuation of a Confrontation between International Counter-Revolution and Revolution

Everybody agrees to take an anti-imperialist stand in general. But very few contributors have asked what this implies in relation to our attitude toward the present situation in Indochina. However, one key to the Sino-Indochinese crisis is the active role played by imperialism (mainly, but not only, US imperialism). Washington reacted to its military difficulties in Indochina in the late sixties and in the seventies by reversing its “China policy” and by launching a terrible aerial war of destruction. It largely succeeded in destroying the basic potential for the rebuilding of these countries after the US defeat. Since 1975 it has continued this policy, albeit with fewer means of doing so: refusal of diplomatic recognition, economic blockade, provocations launched from Thailand, aid to counter-revolutionary guerillas (especially in Laos), etc. Some imperialist powers have been “softer” than the United States, but overall, the Western world has refused to recognize the “accomplished fact” of revolution.

This policy was effective because of the extreme poverty of the Indochinese countries and the consequences in the region of the Sino-Soviet conflict. It took on new amplitude when relations between Vietnam, Kampuchea and China openly broke down. Imperialist powers made a quick choice: Vietnam was the main enemy (as Peggy Duff wrote in AMPO Vol. 11 No.4). The campaign against Democratic Kampuchea was stopped for the most part, the Pol Pot government recognized internationally, and its forces backed through Thailand. This of course had nothing to do with “international laws,” as the counter-example of the concurrent Uganda-Tanzania affair shows. It was a political choice by the mainstream of imperialist governments.

The continuing confrontation between imperialism and revolution over Indochina is of course not the only “dimension” of the present crisis — far from it. But, as soon as we recognize that this level of conflict exists, and is certainly an important one for under-
standing the regional setting, it must have implications for the attitude of the international anti-imperialist movement! Isn't it the responsibility of western revolutionary forces to denounce the criminal stoppage of aid to Vietnam or the economic blockade to which the Indochinese countries are being submitted? Isn't it the responsibility of Thai revolutionaries to fight against the utilization of their country by imperialism (and local reactionaries) as a platform for pressure and provocation against the Indochinese revolutions? Because the Western world is not fighting over Indochina for the defense of Human Rights, but against the development and stabilization of the first revolutions to defeat a direct and massive intervention by the USA in its role as world cop.

This question is much more than just a regional one. There is a dangerous trend, in some far left milieus, to begin to analyze the world situation more and more in terms of "power" confrontations, somehow forgetting class confrontations. In itself, USSR-USA tension is not simply a "power" confrontation, precisely because the USSR was born of the victory of the first socialist revolution and was never afterward reintegrated into the world capitalist market and imperialist order in spite of the deep bureaucratization process this country underwent. But more important perhaps is the fact that Washington has tried to overcome, on the occasion of events in Indochina, Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, the crisis of international leadership in the capitalist world which arose in the mid-seventies. The United States is still the main world power, in terms of economic and political control of Third World countries as well as in terms of military capacity. Even militarily, if one takes into account the quality of armaments, the USSR is far behind the USA (not to speak of the imperialist bloc as a whole). But Washington has been relatively unable to use its strength because of the political crisis provoked in the USA by the Vietnam War. So Washington is trying today to again create a climate which will allow it to intervene directly against revolutionary movements. In the same framework, other imperialist powers are taking on more responsibility in direct regional interventions, like France in Africa (and this question is one element of the discussion going on about further reinforcement of Japanese military capacity: Japan should be capable of fighting in the future against East Asian revolutionary movements).

It is of vital importance for revolutionary forces not to help such a move succeed. This is why the Chinese call for strengthening of the military presence and capacities of the USA, Japan and West Europe is so serious — in the long run it is dangerous for the Chinese revolution itself.

The New Weight of The Sino-Soviet Conflict

Several contributors stressed how much the Sino-Soviet conflict played an aggravating role in the ten-
In discussing what our attitude should be in the face of this type of conflict, we must avoid a circumstantial or regional point of view. Today, Peking clearly appears as the driving force calling for collaboration with the imperialist powers; but yesterday the same driving force calling for peaceable coexistence was Moscow. It is the Soviet bureaucracy that bears historical responsibility for the opening of the Sino-Soviet conflict. But today it is the Chinese bureaucracy that bears the same historical responsibility for the opening of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (which dates back long before the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea: the Kissing-Nixon trips to Peking played the same role in the Vietnamese revolution as the Khrushchev visit to Camp David did in the Chinese one). The way Moscow acted toward Peking and Peking toward Hanoi are nearly identical and pose the essential question: what are the roots of these policies? It is here that a discussion of the nature of those societies is important. They are not capitalist (but there is no space here to criticize the “state-capitalist” or “social-imperialist” theory) and they were built from the victory of socialist revolutions. But they are not (fully developed) socialist societies either, and to say this is not to play a word game or to escape responsibilities, as Kun Nong or Douglas Lummis think. We are faced with specific societies in transition to socialism, which are confronted with quite specific types of internal contradictions. And this is all the more true because these transitional societies developed in a world where the revolutions in advanced capitalist countries failed and were then delayed for a long time, where imperialism is still dominant on a world scale. Again, there is no space here to try to develop an analysis of the specific contradictions of these societies, but we can make three points directly related to the present discussion:

- The acuteness of the danger of bureaucratization of the revolution; i.e. of the emergence of a privileged social layer which gains a monopoly on political decisions and uses it to increase its social privileges. The rise of Stalinism in the USSR was the first sign of the gravity of the consequences of a victory of bureaucratic tendencies for both the internal and international policies of a worker state. Since then, the existence of the problem has been confirmed in each revolution, even if the forms and amplitude of the bureaucratic deformations of the state still vary from country to country. And the failure of Maoism to answer this danger (shown by the fact that the Maoist faction itself was instrumental in the rebuilding of a bureaucratic state and party apparatus after the upsurges of the Cultural Revolution) confirms one lesson already present in the Russian revolution: without the direct intervention of the masses in state affairs through their own organs (the workers’ and peasants’ councils), it is impossible in the long run to avoid the victory of bureaucratic tendencies. 

- The rise of bureaucracy crystallizes inequalities in a given country, gives birth to a very repressive state and revives old nationalisms and old bourgeois-style “power diplomacy.” This is normal insofar as the constitutional framework of such bureaucracies is the “national state” (as well as the one-party state). The consolidation of their political power and social privileges involves the reinforcement (nationally and internationally) of “their” states and the monolithic control of the communist movement inside as well as outside. Under different conditions, the rise of Grand Russian, Grand Han, Grand Viet and Grand Khmer nationalisms reflects this problem. The history of civilizations explains why such nationalism can be revived, but it is the history of contemporary revolutionary movements which explains why it did indeed revive. 

- The development of the revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial world has been and still is of tremendous importance for the world revolution: it contributed decisively to the favorable evolution of the relationship of forces between classes on the international level. But at the same time, these revolutions, when victorious, have been faced with terrible difficulties in their attempt to overcome underdevelopment in the absence of any victorious revolution in the imperialist countries. In spite of quite amazing successes in existing transitional societies, none has yet been able to solve the problem of development.

These considerations must help us give a positive content to the search for an independent position for the revolutionary forces of the world, faced today with the growth of power Realpolitik: against bureaucratic development, the defense of a program of socialist democracy; against the rise of nationalism in the international workers’ movement, the defense of a new internationalism; against the still relative isolation of transitional societies, the fight to further extend the victorious revolutions, even and especially in developed capitalist countries; active solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles in the neo-colonial
world and with anti-bureaucratic struggles in the “socialist world.”

Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and The Indochinese Federation

There has never been a regional revolutionary process in which three different revolutions were objectively more interdependent than those of Indochina. At the same time, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia share wider differences than most other neighboring countries (in terms of levels of socio-economic development as well as in terms of culture). This has been one of the basic contradictions of the revolutions in this area since French colonization created the Indochinese regional setting.

Today, nobody seems to be ready to defend the perspective of an Indochinese federation, two words which have become “taboo.” To open this part of the debate, I would say that this perspective nevertheless seems the best answer to the dual character of the uneven and combined development of revolutions in Indochina, because it answers both the need to maintain effective solidarity between the three countries and to give major importance to the national question.

It is strange, somehow, to have to argue on the absolute need to maintain active solidarity between the three revolutions after victory, since it seems such an obvious need to present a common front to imperialist pressures, to escape the pressures of the Sino-Soviet conflict, to consider possible economic perspectives in a broader framework than the very limited one of each nation, to concentrate resources on some major common project (like finding a social answer to the utilization of the potential of the Mekong Basin), and so on.

At the same time, simple “special relations” between “equal” states — as between Laos and Vietnam — cannot but in the long run favor the bigger state (or rather, favor its strengthening bureaucracy) because they lack all the specific structures of a federation that aim at protecting the rights of smaller nations. The perspective of the federation of Indochinese socialist states could try to combine the struggle to secure maximum solidarity between the three revolutions, fully recognize the right of self-determination and establish institutional structures that would be democratic and protect the smaller countries. What other perspectives can answer these needs? Certainly not the policy followed by the Kampuchean Communist Party leadership.

The Case of Democratic Kampuchea

While reading David Boggett, I was wondering how to discuss this question of the KCP’s policies. We have all denounced the imperialist campaigns against Kampuchea, we are all aware of the way refugee stories can be used to give a distorted vision of reality, and I think we are all aware of the fact that Vietnamese allegations can also be propaganda. But we also know much too much now to state only this and then give place to Ieng Sary’s or Pol Pot’s words as if they could express the truth of what happened.

Kampuchea has been and still is a difficult problem to study because of the lack of certain information. But as early as the evacuation of Phnom Penh, we knew (or we could have known) that something was turning quite bad in Democratic Kampuchea. It is apparently true that the evacuation occurred with little physical violence; but it was nevertheless a forced deportation achieved by lies (“you’ll come back in two weeks’ time”) or by the strength of the dictates of those in power. This deportation policy touched all the newly liberated zones, which means around half of the total population. As it continued, the conditions of the so-called “New People” became extremely difficult. The very existence of this vocabulary (“New People, “Old People”) — without an equivalent as far as I know in any previous socialist revolution — was a dramatic warning that an especially repressive regime was undergoing formation. Is it necessary to point out that these “categories” have nothing to do with class differentiations, and that the first to die in the work camps (of malnutrition and disease more than executions) were the poorest: they had no gold, radios, or clothes to exchange at the flourishing black market for food or medicine. How could a regime granting no rights and deporting so much of the population under such conditions really be popular?

For a while, the regime seems to have retained a real mass base in at least several of the previously liberated areas. It came out of a genuine revolutionary struggle; the repression (executions) concentrated mainly on people formerly linked to the old puppet regime (and even here with big differences between zones); some important (but temporary) successes were registered in food production. In fact,
the policy of the KCP was not homogeneous; apparently there were several factions with somewhat different orientations and the implementation of the line was quite variable from place to place (even considering the way the “new people” were treated). But at the end of 1976 or in 1977, the Pol Pot faction seems to have decisively taken the lead and, in the wake of big factional fights, huge purges and massive executions occurred (I think there is now no more doubt about this) in the ranks of the party, of the army, and in “old people” villages, to an extent never seen before in any revolution so soon after victory. We could say that a class terror policy was implemented against the former elite and a mass terror policy against the “new people” in the aftermath of the victory, and that this mass terror policy was extended in 1977 to the “old people” villages. In the process, the Pol Pot regime lost all the legitimacy it had gained from the revolutionary victory.

The official political orientation of the KCP reflected this type of process. The degree of nationalist ideology reached peaks never known either in Vietnam or in China. The economic line of development was not only astonishingly simplistic but also obviously repressive. It is not a simple “economic” choice to decide not to built a postal system. It means that the population (which cannot move freely) is unable to communicate while the regime of course has the benefit of civil administration and military communication networks. And the forced collectivization of social life (banning of familial cooking and individual food gathering etc., since 1977) implies very tight social control of the population. As a whole, we could try to summarize the policy on these matters of the Pol Pot faction as an attempt to consolidate a weak power base (weak in its social implantation as well as politically and organizationally) through a combination of internal purges and destruction of the social milieu in which an opposition could have rooted itself (a bourgeois, for example Sihanoukist, opposition, or a “Vietnamese type” of communist opposition).

This is why I do not agree with the way Muto, and even more Kitazawa Yoko (AMPO, vol. 11 No. 1), tend to pose the question of the “Red Khmer” orientation. Of course, the KCP line reflects some realities of the Kampuchian revolution and of Kampuchea as a country. But this course is more than a simple (even if mistaken) attempt to answer these realities. And, if it is true that the Sino-Soviet power confrontation contributed very heavily to the deterioration of the situation, it is also true that the KCP leadership’s policies played a dynamic role in the maturation of the present Indochinese crisis.

Internally, this policy created a deep crisis illustrated by the wide range of purges of 1977-1978 which could not but have implications in relation to Vietnam; any opposition was suspected of having (or potentially having) links with the “hereditary enemy.” Hyper-anti-Vietnamese nationalism became the main ideological cement of the army — the backbone and finally apparently the main remaining social base of the Red Khmer regime, which certainly had something to do with the heightening of the border situation. The isolation of the country meant the cutting of previously existing links between the three Indo-Chinese revolutions. The autarchic policies of the regime could not of course be absolute, and they finally led to a deep objective dependence upon China on all fields: military, economic, technical (with the presence of many advisers), as well as on the international diplomatic and commercial fronts. All this of course greatly facilitated the integration of Democratic Kampuchea into the Chinese power game in Southeast Asia.

So, from an analysis independent of Western or Vietnamese propaganda, we are still forced to draw an extremely harsh balance sheet on the implications of the KCP orientation. And if there is one general conclusion, it is that this more autarchic or supposedly “nationally independent” way of development is not necessary the best, and that one has to integrate active regional and international policies in one’s economic perspective from the start after a victory.

The Vietnamese Reactions

In my view, the Vietnamese leadership reacted to rather than initiated these regional developments. A study of the evolution of its policies shows that they took a sharp turn in 1978 because of the changing national and regional situation. Hanoi tried not to depend only on the Soviet bloc in terms of aid and exchanges; it failed. It tried to avoid or postpone a full confrontation with the big merchant Sino-Vietnamese bourgeoisie of Cholon; it failed (and indeed would have done better to break the very strong and reactionary power of this capitalist bastion immediately after the victory). Hanoi rejected the adoption of a “military solution” to the conflict with the Khmer regime, and the 5th of February, 1978 peace proposals were probably genuine ones, but with no success.

1978 appears as a turning point with the adoption of a new orientation in the hope of solving various problems: the worsening of the national situation and the class conflict with the southern merchant bourgeoisie; the final break of relations with Phnom Penh and the spreading border conflict; growing Chinese pressure and its possible confluence with new imperialist pressures, as indicated by the signing of the Sino-Japanese and Sino-American treaties; the fear of a military pinch on its southwest and northern borders; and the disintegration of Indochinese regional unity. It was in this framework that the invasion of Kampuchea was decided upon.

I was against, and I am still against, the policy that led to this invasion, in spite of the explanation I have just given, but not because of the abstract principle of “non-interference.” I was in favor of any popular fight launched in Democratic Kampuchea against the very repressive (and extremely bureaucratic) policies
of the Pol Pot faction. I cannot understand why, as soon as the realities of the Kampuchean situation were clearly known, the duty of solidarity was not applied in this case. We do not accept the argument of "non-interference" in other countries' affairs in the case of solidarity with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles; why should we accept it in the case of solidarity with vital anti-bureaucratic struggles? If the analysis of what was happening in Democratic Kampuchea is wrong, then the problem would of course be different. But if it is true that a mass terror policy, accompanied by wide-spread purges, was implemented since 1977, then we should have expressed our solidarity (which indeed I did a bit, but certainly too mildly!).

But the function of such solidarity should have been to help the development of a genuine Khmer popular anti-bureaucratic movement, or, to put it another way, to help the Kampuchean people exercise their right of self-determination against the Pol Pot regime while strengthening the position of the Kampuchean nation in relation to Vietnam. The problem is that this is exactly what the Vietnamese leadership did not do. Until 1978, Hanoi kept silent on what was happening in Democratic Kampuchea. The Vietnamese leadership probably maneuvered on the diplomatic (secret) front and perhaps had contacts in the higher ranks of the KCP. It reacted to the border tension with counter-military pressures. But it did not do the only thing which could have really helped a popular Khmer struggle: publicize what was happening and launch a political call to the Vietnamese and Khmer people as well as to the international workers' and national liberation movements, stressing the gravity of the situation. She totally left the public initiative first to Phnom Penh and then to Peking.

In fact, we can say that Hanoi really decided to move on the Kampuchean question only when it feared grave consequences for the Vietnamese state itself (due to the military pressure of Peking), and not at the time it was already a vital question for the Khmer people (which it was by 1977). And, by doing this, the Vietnamese leadership lost the effective possibility of helping the development of a Kampuchean popular movement capable of toppling the Pol Pot government through its own struggle. In late 1978, the purges had been so wide spread that the FUNSK was only a thin shadow of what it probably could have been. The absence of early political support for the formation of a Khmer anti-bureaucratic opposition led later to military intervention. And the consequences of this policy are long-range: the present Phnom Penh regime is much more dependent upon massive Vietnamese presence in the country than might have otherwise been the case. This could well make the national question a time-bomb in relations between Vietnam and Kampuchea. If conditions for withdrawal of the bulk of Vietnamese troops are not realized, this time-bomb could explode, and this means the need for massive armament of the Khmer people. In essence, the Vietnamese leadership's Kampuchean and Chinese policy has been extremely bureaucratic and this element certainly contributed to the worsening of regional tensions.

Today, both Peking and Washington officially state that they are ready to initiate convergent "pressures" against Vietnam. We cannot be passive in the face of such a terrible new Unholy Alliance, and I am in favor of defending Vietnam against these pressures, as I was for defending China when the Soviet bureaucracy stabbed the Chinese revolution in the back just when imperialism was taking the "containment" line in Asia. But at the same time I believe we must try to draw through collective discussion all possible lessons from the failure of Hanoi's Kampuchean and Chinese policies. Secret diplomacy, political silence, monopoly of information and discussions among the top one-party leaders cannot work when what is needed is public political solidarity, a public call to the masses. The acuteness of the problem is confirmed today; the tensions with Peking provoked in Vietnam the rise of a very dangerous wave of nationalistic and chauvinistic anti-Chinese feeling that the regime is using more than it is fighting.

Vietnam needs the help of the Soviet bloc. But the Vietnamese leadership is also politically integrating itself in the "power game" by the way it is denouncing China.

For a long time, a part of the international anti-imperialist movement gave unconditional and uncritical support to revolutionary movements at the head of ongoing struggles. At the time of the Indochinese liberation wars, it was already possible to discuss many (but not all) of the questions with which we are now confronted. Nevertheless, this was rejected by many currents and activists in the name of solidarity. In its own way, AMPO reflected this position: it concentrated only on the presentation of mass anti-imperialist struggles and on basic studies related to this field.

The anti-imperialist movement is now divided. The state of the world socialist movement needs more than ever to be fully discussed. Solidarity must be unconditional, but at the same time the right to critically discuss and assess the lines of anti-imperialist movements and to confront emerging political problems must be preserved. The best way to restore and broaden the unity of the anti-imperialist solidarity movement is, I feel, both to insist on the absolute need to engage in unconditional support activities and to favor broad and in-depth discussion as well as collaboration among anti-imperialist and revolutionary activists, currents and organizations. If AMPO can help to do both, it will be for the best.

(photos by Morieda Takashi)
The Poisoning of Cagayan de Oro: Kawasaki Steel in the Philippines

by Noel Yamada

On September 20, 1979, I revisited the Kawasaki Steel Corporation (KSC) sintering plant near Cagayan de Oro in Mindanao. With me were Mr. Aoyagi from Japan and a Filipino Catholic father and his assistant. Mr. Aoyagi is a leader of a citizens' movement against KSC's pollution export to the Philippines. His group is based in Fukuoka, in the southern part of Japan. When we arrived at the plant, we saw huge amounts of sintered ore being loaded onto a large vessel just arrived from Japan. All of this sintered ore was to be transferred to the KSC plant in Chiba, Japan. Iron ore imported from Australia and Brazil is sintered here, using limestone and coke, to get rid of impurities here in Mindanao before being used in furnaces in Japan.

The 144 hectare site of the Kawasaki plant was once called Nabacan and inhabited by 136 families of around 2,000 people who were engaged in growing coconut trees for copra, farming and fishing. But all of them were forcibly relocated up to a hill named Kalinggan, eight kilometers away from their home village, when KSC decided to bring its sintering plant there to escape growing protest against pollution in Japan.

The road to Kalinggan from the plant was as rough as when I visited four years ago. In contrast, the road from Cagayan de Oro to the plant, which used to be also very rough, had changed completely and was now a fine highway. The contrast is sharp enough to indicate clearly what “industrial development” means to the local people. On the way to Kalinggan, we saw a couple of girls carrying plastic containers. Whenever their families cannot afford to pay the water bill, the supply is stopped and they have to draw water from a well seven kilometers away. Electricity will also be stopped immediately if the bill isn’t paid on time. On arriving in Kalinggan, I noticed more vacant houses with boards nailed to their doors than before. As soon as I entered this relocated village, I felt deeply grieved. I remembered when I was here in August, 1976. It was my fourth visit to conduct research on people’s living conditions. I found that one family with small children whom I had interviewed six months before had disappeared. Their house was shut up with boards, and nobody was there. This time, I again went to the house, but found no one there. Seeing the vacant house I was reminded the gaunt face of the head of the family, who once told me in a weak voice, “. . . Before coming here, by the sea, I could support my family fishing. Here I have nothing to do. I sell some soap and candy like this but I can’t make any money this way. Kawasaki promised to give me a job, but then they refused to hire me saying I was too weak physically. Even those who live here and work for Kawasaki now as construction workers will lose their jobs when the plant is completed. What can we who used to live on fishing do far up the mountain like this? I cannot provide for my children any longer. We may be forced out of this house, as we haven’t paid our rent for a long time.”

And within less than six months, they were in fact kicked out and had disappeared. In September, 1979, I went to a slum area in Cagayan de Oro looking for them. But I couldn’t find the family.

Around fifteen villagers gathered to see us at one house. They at once started to complain; “Among 136 families who were forcibly relocated from the old village to this place, 36 have already been evicted because they couldn’t keep up their rent payments. Some of them now live in the slums in Cagayan de Oro, and others have returned to places near our old village. They cannot make a living unless they live by the sea.

“In addition, 96 families out of 100 who have remained are now being asked to leave their houses if they don’t pay their rent. It is likely that the other four families will face the same situation soon. Then our community will be completely destroyed.

“Then rich people living in other places will buy these houses. We know that negotiation already has started.” I was surprised to hear that. When I came here four years ago, one ex-captain (village leader) told me that he was afraid this kind of thing would happen. It seemed rather doubtful to me then, but what he said has happened. At that time the ex-captain gave me this important information. “Although PHIVDEC promised the evacuees that housing would be provided,” it was decided that the new housing area with amenities was inappropriate for the villagers and better suited for privileged people such as engineers and skilled workers. And because the villagers were seen as only temporarily located there, the six cottage industry projects for the relocated people promised by the government haven’t even been started. Villagers who are not employed by
Kawasaki and who now have no means to get income are unable to continue living at the place and are being driven to slum areas. They will be forced to leave the place within three or five years at best.”

The Kalingangan people’s story goes on: “KSC is to be blamed for having driven us into such a severe situation. Even PHIVIDECS and other government agencies are caught between us and KSC.

“The average wage of workers employed by KSC is 418 pesos (US$53) a month, while the average cost of living for one family is 650 pesos ($83). The income is not sufficient to support a family. We at least want KSC to pay enough wages to support our families. We want you to understand that for us who have known only fishing and farming, there is no others means left to us for earning a living.

“We demand that the company implement what its president, Mr. Sakaki promised us firmly. At that time, he came to see us along with influential people here like Perea and some officials from PHIVIDECS to have a meeting with us. President Sakaki assured us on three points: (1) the new houses in Kalingangan would be rent free, (2) electricity and water would also be supplied free of charge; and (3) the company would do its best to promote the welfare and for the benefit of the relocated people. Despite this, look at our present situation. Isn’t this a fraud?” “Now the monthly rent is around 35 pesos ($4.70), and the interest on back rent buries us further in debt.”

Viterbo Fabula, a 42 year old relocatee (farmer) and head of a family of 12, including his wife, 8 children and his parents, told of his experience. “On the morning of July 28, 1977, I lost my eyesight when iron scraps hit my left eye while I was working at the Kawasaki plant. Although the Japanese supervisor wanted to know about the accident in detail, a Filipino manager, Mr. Edovald, interfered. Consequently, I didn’t get any medical care from the company. Generally in the Philippines, a company pays compensation in cases like this. I was in the hospital for four months, and all the expenses during that period were paid by the government-sponsored life insurance agency. Compensation during the lay-off, which was 9 pesos ($1.20) a day, (also paid by that agency) was equivalent to the amount I used to get working at Kawasaki.

“Even the procedures for applying for the welfare money were not conducted by the company. Everything was done by another organization — a labor union. Three members of the union came to see me one day and asked about the accident. They sent in an application for me to the Ministry of Labor. It was fortunate for me.

“I still don’t understand why the company didn’t offer any compensation at all. They knew what happened to me. I can’t understand why they haven’t sent a word.”

By May 1977, two a half years after the start of operations at PSC, it was confirmed that some workers were suffering from asthma. Another villager explained, “Pollution will get worse and worse. Mr. L…., one of the Kalingangan residents who used to work at Kawasaki, suffered from asthma and was put in the hospital for more than a month. Even after receiving medical treatment, he didn’t recover, and
after a while he was fired. Soon he died. The post-mortem examination showed that he died of asthma. His lungs were full of iron dust.”

Out of 15 villagers gathered to talk to me, 5 were employed by PSC and they didn’t conceal their anger; “H. eventually died after the operation. But Kawasaki wouldn’t take any responsibility for his death.”

“One of the other workers, Mr. N., is also being treated for asthma.”

“Although we have been submitting petitions for the past two years, we have never received a response. Taking the opportunity of meeting you, we submit another petition along with copies of the past ones addressed to the headquarters of KSC. We want you, Japanese groups who support the Filipino people, also to make an appeal to KSC in Japan.”

At present, PSC operates 24 hours a day. While we talked with people, a company bus brought home the day-shift workers and picked up night-shift workers to take them to the plant. Those who had just come back from the day’s long heavy work joined us immediately and started talking. All the workers stressed that all they wanted was to let Japanese friends know the reality of their situation.

It was nine o’clock when we finished the interview and left. As we went down the pitch-dark rough road, we saw the whole area of the PSC plant brightly lit with electricity, though the houses nearby were not supplied with any electricity at all. The lights at the plant made clearly visible the volumes of murky smoke from the plant’s 70-meters high smoke stacks over-spreading the sky for several kilometers. In the daytime, we only noticed the colorless smoke as it was being emitted.

I was deeply impressed with the faces and voices of the people at Kalinggan who presented a very basic question: “... We have beautiful land and sea, coconut trees, and rivers which are used for water-power generation. Why are these affluent resources and nature not used to improve our own life? Instead, everything is offered to foreign capitalists, and it is we that have to be evacuated and exploited. We don’t understand the system at all. Why can the Japanese obtain everything? How long will this kind of thing last? Why are we not able to build our own society for our own future and for our children?”

The people of Kalinggan are not the only ones whose lives are affected by Kawasaki. In fact, there are nearly 30,000 people living in the area near the KSC plant site who are now faced with the same fate as the Kalinggan people: relocation.

In November, 1978, I conducted a two week survey of the several villages in the area. I met with several barrio captains, whose barrios (villages) were assigned by PHIVDEC under a Presidential Decree to be confiscated for development into a planned industrial estate. While the situation has been getting worse for the last one and a half years, the people themselves have become more closely united. In fact, the number of villages presenting appeals directly to President Marcos had increased from one to 18 barrios. All of them expressed determination “not to leave our land.”

According to these barrio captains, their struggle has three aims: (1) to hold onto their land, (2) to fight against pollution, and (3) to cooperate with the Kalinggan people. Under martial law, people are deprived of their fundamental human rights, such as the right to live on the land inherited from their ancestors. The struggle for human rights is not possible without unity among people and villages. Thus conscientization and organizing efforts have been intensified in at least these 18 villages.

In some villages where most of the peasants are tenants, absentee landowners have finally agreed “not to sell the land without consulting the tenants.” But in those barrios whose captains are in favor of PHIVDEC and ready to sell the land, there is no way to persuade them to join the fight.

Regarding pollution, people are rather frustrated because they don’t have any way to measure it, neither instruments nor data. They feel it is too easily explained away by company spokesmen who can talk a lot of nonsense elaborated with detailed figures and statistics.

“Everyone here knows that the plant emits volumes of poisonous smoke at night even if it is not clearly seen in the daytime. Also noise and ground rumblings have gotten so bad that villagers within a couple of kilometers from the plant cannot sleep well at night. At first, we used to wake up thinking there had been an earthquake.”

By May, 1977, at least four workers were suffering from asthma out of the 350 employed during one-and-a-half years of operation. While they were employed, the company demanded strict health checks. However, once these healthy, strong workers got sick, PHIVDEC* — Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation — was created soon after the country was placed under martial law, being inaugurated in 1972 by Presidential Decree 243 (amended by P.D. 353). Its expressed purpose is to engage “in any commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural and other enterprises which may be necessary or contributes to the economic development of the country, or important to the public interests, or which will promote the well-being of the veterans and retirees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
the company fired them instead of assuming responsibility.

I met one of these fired workers. It seemed clear to me that he was suffering from severe asthma, as he coughed painfully throughout our meeting. The doctor’s diagnosis also showed this to be so.

According to him, he first went to a hospital designated by the company. The doctors there declared, “nothing is wrong.” But he was in such pain that he went to another hospital, where he was hospitalized.

Once I had the opportunity to talk to about 20 pollution victims in Chiba, Japan. This worker’s coughing reminded me of those other victims of KSC. Also I remembered the secret agreement between KSC and its company hospital to bury pollution victims. KSC does exactly the same covering up of its pollution-producing activities in Mindanao. Since I was there, one of the four fired workers has died.

On my visit in November, 1978, I had a chance to talk with a member of National Pollution Control Committee. He said they are instructed by the government not to publicize any findings from their pollution survey. And also, committee members are not allowed to participate in the monitoring project inside the plant, which both the government and KSC claim is being conducted. He didn’t even know whether such a project actually was being carried out or not. He believed that the so-called “pollution monitoring project,” if it existed at all, was just a token, nominal one. What committee members do is just order people to submit any dead fish or shellfish they find at the canal near the plant, or tell people not to publicize what they find until a thorough survey and analysis of the cause could be made using facilities at the plant.

At first, the government appointed 34 spots near Macalajay Bay for long-range water pollution surveys. However, the sites were suddenly changed, and particularly those closest to the plant, including drainage areas for sewage from the plant, were ordered “off-limits.” The explanation was that the place had to be cleared for the loading and unloading of departing and arriving ships.

As for the water pollution, an analysis of the dead fish found near the sintering plant, indicates that wind has blown quantities of the iron ore transported from Australia and stored in piles outside the plant into the nearby canal and from there it has flowed into the sea. Even the naked eye can easily see the difference in the color of the water. The researcher I talked to said that in the ten years he had been engaged in doing water surveys, he had never seen anything like it.

Another recent development is the case of one Catholic father who had been working with people in the area. Several years ago he managed to come to Japan with an invitation from the Justice and Peace Committee there to learn more about pollution and make contact with various Japanese groups who have worked against pollution export by Kawasaki. On returning to Cagayan de Oro, he was called by a KSC manager who eagerly questioned him about who he went with to Japan and who he met during his three-week stay there. He was also asked what he found out in Chiba. He replied he had found out that what the KSC people had told him about pollution was completely false. He saw the terrible pollution of the area near KSC in Chiba which is responsible for more than 700 presently officially recognized pollution victims, and 60 deaths. “Although KSC has insisted that the pollution in Chiba is caused by other pollution producing plants and cars, I saw for myself that the only big plant in that area is KSC.”

In January, 1979 this father was relieved of his post by the Church authorities and instructed to go to France to study. Soon after that, around 10 staff members who had been working with him were discharged and the projects at the Social Action Center came to end. At least, I felt relieved to hear that three of these staff members have started a new project to produce slides that tell the true story of the people in the area and are continuing to work with them.

During my stay in September, 1979, I also went to a town called Na Awan located between Cagayan de Oro and Iligan. The town is around 100 kilometers from the KSC plant. There we met a manager of the Na Wan Office of the Mabhay Agricultural Cooperative which plants ipil-ipil trees there. He said, “We started planting here at the strong request of Kawasaki two years ago. Kawasaki invested 50 per cent of the capital.

“So far, we’ve planted ipil-ipil on 300 hectares of land, 50 per cent of which is national forest land. The other 50 per cent is leased from private landowners. 9 per cent of the leased land used to be planted in coconut trees. Our contract with landowners allows us to plant ipil-ipil on the land for 5 to 10 years. At the moment, ipil-ipil trees are co-planted along with the coconut, but eventually all the coconut trees will be replaced with ipil-ipil. In four years, the ipil-ipil will be harvested and used to make charcoal.” The manager wouldn’t say what the charcoal would be used for.

Ipinil is a tree that Kawasaki has found particularly useful for making charcoal which can be used as substitute for coke in the sintering process. The plan is for a total of 10,000 hectares to be planted with ipil-ipil in the future.

Now it has been more than five years since I first visited Cagayan de Oro and was shocked to learn what had occurred there. What the company has done to the people there has been publicized and international protests have continued. The company, however, has never in these five years bothered to reflect upon its policy. It has completely ignored appeals and public surveys issued by the Catholic Justice and Peace Committee and other movements and groups. Instead, the company has continued to spend a lot of money to publish propaganda to justify its economic invasion. If the company had used that money to compensate the people it injured, the people of Kalinggan might not have suffered quite as much. While neglecting the local people, the company tries to cover up its criminal conduct by inviting Japanese visitors to Mindanao, showing them a film entitled “Clean Industry,” and distributing colorful booklets. Exploitation of the Filipino people by KSC, one of the largest Japanese MNCs, is not an old issue. It still challenges us, both Filipino and Japanese people, to find a way to transform the whole system.
Mariveles:
Servitude in the Free Trade Zone

by Sasahara Kyoko

The day starts early for the workers at Mariveles. They get up at five thirty to shower, but not the kind of shower where you turn on a faucet and water comes out. Water drawn from a well is kept in a drum and is used by the bucket-full for showering. The shower room and toilet are outside the house, which is really not much more than a hut. Those who can board at a house with a well are lucky. Then only drinking water must be purchased, but if not, water for all purposes must be bought. There are always vendors on the streets of Mariveles, selling water in drum cans on a wagon. The water per fifty-gallon drum can costs 3 to 3.5 pesos. (3 pesos is about US$0.40).

In the kitchen there are big wooden shelves where each person stores her food supplies. For cooking, everyone has a gas burner with a portable gas cylinder, the kind often used by mountain climbers. With curls in their hair, the young women shower and then hastily make their own breakfasts. Breakfast is either leftovers from the night before or a simple dish of eggs and vegetables.

The four boarders at the house I visited are employed by Encore, a British-Filipino joint venture, manufacturing nylon and wool jackets. Since they were on their way to work, the workers wore their T-shirt uniforms with Encore marks. ID cards, complete with photos were on their chests, so they could be checked at the gate of the industrial zone.

Working hours are supposed to be from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., but workers can seldom get off by 4:30; they have to work overtime every day and don’t get home until 10 or 10:30 in the evening. Since they eat supper after they get home, it is almost midnight before they can go to bed. Saturday is the only day when there is no overtime work. Thus when work finishes at 4:30, the workers can go shopping or do their laundry at home. I said, “It must be hard for you to work overtime everyday.” The workers, however, answered, “Yes, but we have no choice but to do it, since we are scolded if we don’t. Also, we can get 2 pesos ($0.27) per hour for overtime work, then we can sometimes buy a pair of jeans or send some money home.”

After taking the curlers out of their hair, and putting on make-up, the workers left for work slightly after 6:30 a.m. In Mariveles in the early morning traffic flows in one direction only; the road is filled with people walking or riding buses to the industrial zone. The workers in T-shirts and jeans, some chatting with friends and others quiet and impassive, move toward the factories.

The number of workers at the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) was 3,366 in 1973, but increased to 24,586, nearly eight-fold by 1978. The number of workers in 1979 was estimated to be about 25,000, eighty per cent of whom are women. Where do all these workers come from?

David (24 years old), a tall and waggish worker whose front tooth is missing, came from Bulacan province, directly north of Rizal province in which Manila is located. He told me of the advertisements he had seen in his village about the BEPZ. “I found out how false the ads for Mariveles that I had seen at home were after I came here. But if one doesn’t know anything, he would believe what it says. I was one of them. ‘Mariveles is a workers’ paradise!’ ‘The life in Mariveles is so wonderful, it can not even be compared with your life in the village.’ ‘Lots of job opportunities and high wages.’ ‘Beautiful buildings and well-paved roads,’ and ‘the company respects human rights.’ If you see these words printed in pamphlets or in the newspaper with pictures of beautiful buildings and workers working happily, you tend to believe that it is true. When I go home once a year at Christmas no one believes me when I talk about how bad conditions are at Mariveles.”

Thus young people who cannot find a job in their home village but need to work for a living came to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>3,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,801</td>
<td>3,768</td>
<td>9,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7,846</td>
<td>7,062</td>
<td>14,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7,225</td>
<td>12,547</td>
<td>19,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>6,299</td>
<td>15,054</td>
<td>21,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5,686</td>
<td>18,890</td>
<td>24,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EPZA 1978 Annual Report
Mariveles having been deceived by the government’s propaganda. The number of these young people is increasing annually as shown in Table 1. David was one of these statistics. Having no relatives in Mariveles, he stayed at a cheap hotel for the first few days while he looked for a boarding house. He said it took him almost one month before he found his present job at Man Power. Some young people are lucky enough to be able to call on someone from their village for help upon arrival in Mariveles. Others, however, have to go home after spending all their money, time and energy, because they have not been able to find a job even after trying for three months.

**Japanese Firms**

The newly built BEPZ has an artificial atmosphere. Green grass and newly planted trees are scattered around. Benches also dot the landscape here and there. Young people, who are apparently looking for jobs, can be seen in a group. Just 10 minutes out of Mariveles by bus, Manila Bay can be seen on the right. On the left, the white concrete wall continues.

The BEPZ covers an area of 345 hectares. As of 1979, 49 firms were in operation and 9 firms were under construction. Of these, 12 firms are owned by Filipino nationals; 8 are joint ventures with Japanese or other foreign firms. Ricoh Watch is the only firm which is solely Japanese owned. The firms vary from Bataan Shipbuilding Co., which repairs ships, to Mattel Philippines, a doll and toy maker. However it is clothing firms which are overwhelming in number.

I visited two Japanese-based firms in the BEPZ. One, Mariveles Apparel Corp., has the largest number of workers in the BEPZ (3,000) and the other, Ricoh Watch increased the number of its employees three-fold in one year (300 in 1978 to 900 in 1979).

Mariveles Apparel Corporation (MAC) is a Japanese-Filipino joint venture. The ratio of investment is 15 per cent Japanese, 85, Filipino. The Japanese firm, Senga Mens Wear, has its head office in Osaka. When I visited, the Japanese manager had gone back to Japan for the New Year holidays.

MAC, equipped with a 7 acre, two-storied plant, makes mens wear on the first floor and jeans on the second. Row after row of sewing machines fill the huge room and workers are busily running the machines. The work is all divided. A Filipino manager proudly told me, “Since the work is divided, not much training is required, and the work is efficiently done. We plan to build a new factory adjacent to this one within this year.” The factory produces 60,000 pieces of mens wear per month. These are exported mainly to Japan and Australia and sell for 370 pesos ($48) per piece. Jeans are produced at the rate of 25,000 pairs per month and sold mainly in the Philippines for 140 pesos ($18) per pair. MAC’s head office

Workers on their way to lunch at the company dining hall where a meal costs about 3 pesos.
[right] Four young women workers sleep here—two in the top bunk and two below.
[top left] Those who can't find other work after end up as hostesses.
[center] Factory recruiting poster
[below] In BEPZ, these jeep buses transport workers from the city.
is in Manila, where it manufactures mainly women’s clothes.

After touring the Mariveles Apparel Corp. plant, I found myself in front of the Ricoh Watch factory. The area in front of the factory was crowded with thirty to forty young people. Wondering what was going on, I found a help wanted sign by the factory entrance.

Type of Work: Watch Assembly
Qualifications: Female, Single, 16-20 years old. Highschool Graduate, Morality.
Urgently Needed: Female, Single, 20-23 years old. Bachelor’s Degree from a Commercial School, Morality

Entering the factory, I immediately noticed a gold-lettered sign, “SAN AI SEISHIN”
1. Love your country.
2. Love your fellowman.
3. Love your work.

In the reception room was a huge couch on a soft rug, and a huge portrait of the president hung on the wall. A Japanese manager said happily that when Imelda Marcos visited the factory last year, she praised the company as the cleanest one in the BEPZ.

Ricoh Watch moved into Mariveles three years ago. Until then it had a plant in Pusan, south Korea, but withdrew from there due to rising wages and came to the Philippines where wages are cheaper. The manager nonchalantly mentioned, “Though the wages are said to be cheap in the Philippines, they are gradually rising, since we have to meet presidential decrees to a certain extent.” Presidential decree No. 928 issued in 1978 only raised the minimum wage from 10 pesos ($1.34) to 11 pesos ($1.48) with an additional 1 peso per year for the three years following 1978. However, since prices have gone up enormously, a raise of 1 peso per year cannot cope with the rise in the cost of living. Presidential decree No. 1,614 was issued in 1979 to raise the basic wage from 11 pesos to 13 pesos ($1.74).

However, the only workers who are paid the minimum wage of 13 pesos are those with many years of experience, and most of those who have only 2 or 3 years experience are paid less than 13 pesos.

When I asked for a tour of the plant, I was given a white nurses’ type coat and a pair of white slippers, the uniform of the watch assembly workers. Female clerical workers were wearing blue blouses with a flower design, navy-blue vests and skirts. Inside the plant was very quiet. Each worker, wearing a white triangular scarf on her head, was silently arranging parts with tweezers. The parts of a watch are only about 2 mm in diameter. The workers were using tweezers to count the parts. I was told that many workers not only hurt their eyes but get stomach ulcers from doing such detailed work all day long. While taking me around the plant, the Ricoh manager emphasized the efficiency of the division of labor and said that there was hardly any need for training.

Ricoh Watch produces 15,000 watches every month. Though I could not find out the actual cost, the watches are sold at the plant for 200 pesos ($27) per watch. The watches exported to Japan are sold for around 12,000 to 13,000 yen ($48-552). Between January and October 1979, Ricoh’s exports totaled $8,989,861, the second highest in the BEPZ next to Ford. The following table shows a list of five top companies in terms of export amount during the period between January and October 1979. (See Table 2)

Making Ends Meet

Workers at Mariveles rent rooms for a minimum of 25 pesos ($3.36) per month. A typical room arrangement may include a set of bunk beds in a 4 meters by 4 meters room. Here four people coming from different provinces and working at different companies might live together. Another common situation is when several people working at the same company share a room. I saw another arrangement with a TV set and a wooden bench in the living room, and the bedroom had a straw mat draped with a mosquito net where 5 or 6 persons sleep. The rent of a house with two small rooms costs at least 50 pesos ($6.7).

Emma, who works at Soltron packing camera flashes, came from Bicol province in Luzon. She has worked for the company for 6 years and receives 23.81 pesos ($3) a day (15.81 pesos in basic pay plus an allowance of 8 pesos). She lives with her husband, who works for a construction company, and an 18-year-old cousin, who recently came to Mariveles, in two rooms each about 3 meters by 3 meters. The rooms were very clean and photos of movie stars hung on the walls. I asked her how she found life in Mariveles compared with the life in her home village. Although quite shy, she slowly began to talk; “I came to Mariveles hoping to have various experiences while I was young, but even with both my husband and I working, we can barely make ends meet.”

Why do young people come to Mariveles? In the Philippines families are generally quite large, and many workers come to Mariveles partly to support their parents. Few job opportunities in their home village is another reason why so many come to Mariveles. However, there are only a very few who can actually send money back home. On the contrary, some parents send money because they are worried about their children. Whenever I asked the question, “Why did you come to Mariveles?” the answer was always “to help my parents.” Then when I asked, “How much money do you send home?” the workers would look at each other and start giggling. In the
beginning I couldn’t understand why they laughed. After experiencing the same situation twice, someone took me aside and said, “Do you think they are earning enough money to send any to their parents?” I was ashamed of my ignorance.

A woman worker generally earns an average of 400 to 500 pesos ($54-$67) a month. Living expenses average 14 pesos ($1.8) a day (2.5 pesos for breakfast; 1 peso for transportation, 3 pesos for lunch, 3 for coffee during coffee breaks once in the morning and the other in the afternoon, and 2.5 pesos for supper). Just the minimum expenses for food and transportation comes to 420 pesos ($57) per month. If you add rent, there is hardly any money left. Going to a movie or to a disco for dancing on a day off is a real luxury. The reason the workers don’t go out on their day off but rather stay home and do their laundry or rest is because they don’t have enough money to go out for fun.

Mercy, 28 years old, began working at Mariveles Apparel Corp. in 1974 and is now a skilled product inspector. She and her family lived in the area before the BEPZ was built. Mercy, her parents, 7 younger brothers and 3 younger sisters live in a house with a kitchen and 6 m x 8 m living room on the first floor and small living room and two 2 m x 3 m bedrooms on the second floor. Mercy earns 770 pesos ($103) a month including overtime pay, about 270 pesos ($35) more than other workers; however, her 50 year-old father only makes 350 pesos ($46) a month as a cleaning man, so she is the main support of her family.

The management thus takes advantage of the young workforce, and of the fact that the workers cannot resist for fear of dismissal.

Marina, 21 years old, has been working for Shubleem Tug Co., a dolls’ dress maker, for two years. Her basic wage is 12.5 pesos ($1.6) plus an allowance of 6 pesos ($0.8), a lower than average wage. She lives in a shanty area where several small houses stand next to each other in a row. Right inside the door are the kitchen utensils and a small bench. Here, too, four people share a bunk bed for sleeping.

When I asked if she had any complaints about the company, she immediately answered, “Of course I have. We call it T.Y. Time (Thank You Time), meaning that the clock we punch our time cards on is fixed 15 minutes fast in the morning and 15 minutes slow in the evening. Furthermore, even when we get sick and have a fever or a headache, the management usually does not listen or care.”

If one claims one’s rights she will be harassed, and if she persists, she will be fired.

Joanna, who used to work for Masterx, a Chinese-run sandal maker, comes from Tarlac province in central Luzon. She is beautiful with clear features. She was very happy when I met her, because she had just found a new job. She had been out of work since December 1979 when she was fired by Masterx.

Her trouble started one day in May, 1979. While getting ready to go home after finishing an 8 hour day, she was told to stay and work overtime. The company had a deadline to make. However, she refused. The manager then began harassing her. He made her stand on a platform in front of others; then he had her transferred to the packing department where the work is very hard. The harassment continued, and in October she alone had to work overtime. Finally the management sent a letter to her parents telling them to take her back home. Because Joanna had not received all her wages, she brought a complaint to the Labor Department in the BEPZ. After negotiations between the department and the company, she was dismissed with a month’s wages or 400 pesos ($54).

---

Table 3. Mass Lay-offs and Shutdowns (full or partial) in B.E.P.Z.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>No. of workers affected</th>
<th>Reason given by company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCO</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>lack of order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>no sufficient job orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat. Knit.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>delay import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>lack of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEI</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCO</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>lack of orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat. Knit.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>lack of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Antai</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>delayed deliveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montilla</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>lack of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotus</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil. Antai</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>delayed deliveries of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotus*</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>late arrival of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICI</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>shortage of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masterx</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>delayed shipment of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>lack of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotus</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>late arrival of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>lack of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montilla</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>non availability of job orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCO</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>delayed shipment of raw materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masterx</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* extension of lay-off

Source: Bataan Provincial Labor Office (BPLO), Ministry of Labor, Mariveles, Bataan.
Table 4. Japanese Enterprises Affiliated with B.E.P.Z.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of company</th>
<th>Joint venture</th>
<th>Project activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accessories Specialists, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan [Hashimoto Co.]=Philippines</td>
<td>Ladies' glass beaded bag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitachi Cable, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan [Hitachi Cable Ltd.]=Philippines</td>
<td>Aluminum steel cables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-Asia Container Industries, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan [Mitsubishi Corp.]=Philippines</td>
<td>Polypropylene bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariveles Apparel Corp. (MAC)</td>
<td>Japan [Senga Men's Wear Co. Ltd.]=Philippines</td>
<td>Men's suits, sports coat and vests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasig Textile Industries, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan [Kanematsu-Gosho]=Philippines=Canada</td>
<td>Ladies' shirt and men's sports shirts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soltron Electronics, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan [Fujima Koki Mfg.] =Philippines</td>
<td>Electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiyo Giken, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan = U.S.</td>
<td>Power amplifier, mobile radio and hand-held VHF radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Electronics, Inc.</td>
<td>Japan = U.S.</td>
<td>Power amplifier, mobile radio and hand-held VPH radio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EPZA 1978 Annual Report

If the workers claim their rights, they are dismissed. The management does not have to listen to what the workers say. Dismissals are arbitrarily handled out at the management’s discretion. For example a young woman worker at Ricoh Watch Company had a cold and did not go to work for two weeks. The company then sent a telegram to her parents telling them to come and take her home. She returned to work after getting well, but she was dismissed a week later.

Companies also use material shortages and delayed delivery of materials as reasons for dismissal. A company will dismiss workers when materials are short, and increase the payroll when there are a lot of orders. The manager of Ricoh Watch told me that they would increase the number of employees to 1,000 by April this year (1980) because they intend to increase monthly production from the present 150,000 watches to 160,000.

Table 3 shows the reasons for dismissals and the number of those dismissed for the months of September and October, 1979.

Mariveles is a town of young people. Being away from home, dating between men and women is quite free. I was told that the most popular place for dates is the beach facing the Bay of Mariveles. It is also said that managers and supervisors of companies force women workers to have sexual relations with them, abusing their position. The same was true of women textile workers in Japan in the past. Since the BEPZ was built, the number of cases of babies thrown into the sea after birth or found in trash cans under bridges amounts to 16.

In the slums where the women workers live, there are always young people around who are looking for jobs. They say they want to start work no matter what the job is. An activist who took me around teased one of the young job seekers saying, “How about becoming a hostess?” They giggled, making a face, but there are actually some women working as hostesses since they could not find any other job or the job they did find did not pay enough for them to send money home to their parents.

Palm-leaf thatched beer houses (selling only beer) are along the road a little ways from the town. I went into a beer house with colorful miniature bulbs that blinked on and off, and loud rock music. The hostesses there wear T-shirts and jeans, and they look like other girls living in Mariveles except their make-up may be slightly heavier.

I talked to an innocent looking girl with long beautifully curled hair. She was only 16 years old. She said she had started working two years ago which means she began working there when she was 14. A bottle of beer costs 2.75 pesos ($0.36). Since her earnings depend on the number of bottles served, she usually serves several different customers a total of 20 to 30 bottles of beer. “Do you have a boy friend?” I asked her. I thought “boy friend” was not the right word, but I could not think of a better one. “Oh, yeah, I do. He is a Japanese, working for Ricoh.” “Is he nice?” “Yes, very nice. He comes here once a week, and takes me to the Hilltop Hotel, and gives me 250 pesos ($3.4) each time. So, I can send 400 to 500 pesos ($54–$68) to my parents.” I was told that a hostess earns an average of 30 pesos ($4.00) a day, which is 10 pesos ($1.34) more than a factory worker. There are very few customers like her boy friend who would take one to the Hilltop Hotel and give 250 pesos a time.

Hostesses usually stay on the second floor of the beer houses, which are often used for making love. There is also a thatched “hotel” in the same row as the beer houses, which is also used for making love. It wasn’t until after the BEPZ was built that beer houses began appearing on both sides of the road.
I asked workers about their living conditions and if they had complaints about their companies. Whenever I asked them, “Then, how about forming your own union, not a company-union?” they became restless and closed their mouths.

The same thing happened when I met some Ricoh workers. When I asked them if they had any complaints about the management, the words began pouring out.

Liza, 18 years old, has been assembling watches for two years. She receives a basic daily wage of 12 pesos ($1.56) plus an allowance of 10.40 pesos ($1.40). “First of all, there are only five minutes for recess in the morning and afternoon. Other companies have 15 minutes, so workers can have coffee and bread. But at Ricoh, you are not allowed to even have a cup of coffee. A doctor hired by Ricoh proposed that the company have a longer recess, but his proposal has not been accepted. The number of watches required everyday is fixed at 4,600, and we have to work overtime until we finish the quota. Other companies have janitors so workers do not need to clean bathrooms, but we are divided into groups to clean the bathrooms in the morning. When your turn comes, you have to be at the factory by 5 in the morning. If we complain a little, we are shouted at and told that ‘all the Japanese are doing it in Japan.’ They are very harsh. If you make even a minor mistake, they will shout at you, ‘What’s this? It’s no good.’ If a single part is missing, they call us ‘thieves.’ ”

If a part is missing in a certain section, it becomes the responsibility of the whole section. In September 1979, 20 parts disappeared. It is said that all 30 workers in the section were forced to pay a total of 1,000 pesos ($134) in spite of the fact that it is still not known what happened to the parts.

Japanese Arrogance

Japanese managers and engineers of Ricoh lead comfortable lives, renting fancy apartments where tap water is always available. They are said to have three Filipino maids who they teach to cook Japanese dishes. It is also said that they don’t eat locally produced rice but import it from the U.S.

Japanese managers and foremen treat Filipino workers with contempt, using disrespectful Japanese. At parties welcoming Japanese staff, there are comments like “There is nothing to eat in the Philippines. It’s not like Japan where we have lots of good food.” They tell Filipino workers, “You are only allowed to drink cokes here.” Ricky, who went to Japan for six months for training, mimics the Japanese staff in his broken Japanese. “No good, the Filipinos are no good.” “No, you, stupid. What shall I do?” . . . He continued for quite a while with such remarks until he said, “Poor things, the Filipinos make such low wages.”

It reminded me of what had happened when I visited a Catholic church in Mariveles. I introduced myself there and explained that I was investigating Japanese firms in the BEPZ. Then someone said in subdued tone, “It’s the second invasion.” I didn’t know what to say, and I felt very uncomfortable and out of place. While listening to Ricky’s flow of broken Japanese, I was reminded of the situation I had experienced then.

However, whenever I asked if people planned to form a union, everyone became very nervous. “Someone said, “If anyone finds out that we are talking about this, we will be summoned and harshly scolded, and harassed. It is not an easy thing to form a union. You have to be very cautious, otherwise management will find out, and no one wants to lose his/her job.” The workers want to form a union, but they are not yet totally committed. At this stage they are trying to recruit as many workers as possible.

But there is a move, however slow, to rebel against some of the management’s regulations. Five engineers and two workers ate bread during a 5-minute recess one morning in November, 1979. According to the rule, they are not allowed to eat anything during break. Japanese staff, however, eat whenever they want and sometimes they even take a nap by their desks. Managers tried to force the workers who broke the rule to resign, but they firmly refused.

It may seem to be a very minor thing compared to the strike the Ford workers waged demanding a wage hike of 1 peso ($0.14) per hour. But everything starts from the resistance of one individual.

While I was talking with them, someone else came into the room. Since he was introduced to me as a Ricoh worker, I tried to continue the discussion we were having. The others, however, completely changed, and they were very reluctant to talk. I was told later that he is a spy for a Filipino manager. After he was gone, they were dispirited, suspecting that he would report the matter to the manager. The next morning, one of the workers I had talked with was summoned and his grade lowered. He said he had persistently asked the reason, but no reason was given to him. If the reason was that he had talked to me, what should I do? As someone who went to investigate the BEPZ from the standpoint of the workers, and to learn the situation of the Filipinos, I feel very foolish and can only say “I’m sorry.”

The same evening, I met a union leader who works for Soltron, a Japanese-Filipino jointly owned company (Japanese – 90 per cent, Filipino – 10 per cent). The company manufactures camera flashes. He told me his experiences in union organizing.

“When I began organizing a union, I was harassed a lot. My position was lowered and my job was changed so that I had to carry heavy things. But I accepted them without saying anything. The company in conspiracy with the police even had me put in jail for several days on charges I didn’t know anything about. However, in 1977, 70 per cent of the workers signed a petition forcing the company to finally recognize our union in 1978.”

The morning after I talked with the union leader from Soltron, I returned to Manila. During the four and a half hour bus ride, I found myself thinking about the Ricoh Watch workers who want to make a union despite harrassment and threats from the company. The workers at Soltron have proven that their struggle is not futile.
protesters swelled to 20,000. They shouted, "Down with martial law: we demand Human Rights! Democracy!" and continued to repeat these and other slogans. As the rally was gathering momentum, 7,000 security troops arrived on the scene backed up by 30 armored cars. The soldiers fired tear gas and tried to disperse the crowd by force. However, the people made no move to disband. Some collapsed because of difficulty in breathing; with tears flowing and noses running, they retorted, "Washing our eyes with tear gas, we can see the real Taiwan more clearly!"

The KMT’s New Reign of Terror

The pandemonium created by this police riot lasted until past midnight. The following day, on December 11, the police commissioner announced, that 183 security police had been injured - but no demonstrators. The authorities proceeded to launch a defamation campaign accusing the Formosa group of attempting to overthrow the government and of intentionally inciting the population to riot. On December 13, 14 people connected with Formosa were apprehended, and a search was begun for Shih Ming-teh. A reward of 500,000 NT dollars (later raised to one million) was offered for his arrest. Shih was caught on January 8, 1980 in Taipei, and his American wife, Linda Arrigo, was deported from Taiwan on January 15.

The detainees were tried by courts martial, and on February 20, 1980, Huang Hsin-chiieh (publisher of Formosa), Hsu Hsin-liang (president), Lu Hsiu-lien (vice-president), Chang Chun-hung (managing editor), Chen Ch’u (editor, human rights activist), Shih Ming-teh (general manager), Yao Chia-chen (legal advisor and editor) and Lin Yi-shuang (editor and lawyer) were sentenced from 12 years to life for sedition. The only major piece of evidence presented against them was their "voluntary" confessions. At the February 20 court hearing, all the victims claimed that they had been forced into signing confessions drawn up by the interrogating authorities after standing up under 60 hours of relentless questioning with no sleep, after being sexually abused and after being intimidated by threats against the safety of their families.

Shortly after one of the editors of Formosa, the lawyer Lin Yi-shuang, recounted these facts to his mother, the mother and her five-year old twin daughters were knifed to death by several assailants; the remaining daughter, a nine-year old, suffered heavy wounds. The murderers have yet to be apprehended.

The authorities realized that they could not put off the elections indefinitely, and the Kaohsiung incident served as a perfect excuse to arrest the leaders of the democratic reform movement before campaigning could begin anew. The resulting repression led to a fresh call for national elections by a KMT now confident that the campaign of state terror it had unleashed against reform-minded citizens had silenced for the time being any serious opposition.

Only 21 nations in the world presently maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and south Korea is the only country in Asia to do so. Due to such circumstances, the mass media have turned a blind eye to the systematic suppression of human rights on the island.

Shortly after the Formosa incident, on December 18, 1979, Watarida Masahiro, a Japanese national and member of the Japan Committee for the Release of Taiwanese Political Prisoners, visited Taiwan to survey the situation. When it came time to leave the country, he was arrested by the authorities and detained for three months. The Japan Committee for the Release of Taiwanese Political Prisoners appealed to the Japanese government for his quick release but was told his case had "nothing to do with the Foreign Ministry," which refused to intervene in the affair. After being tortured, Watarida was deported to Japan on March 3, 1980 on condition that he "spy on Japanese human rights organizations and their Taiwanese associates to determine their motives."

The Japanese government’s irresponsible attitude translates into increased oppression for the people of Taiwan. Japan sends 600,000 tourists to Taiwan each year while big business steps up its invasion of the island to capitalize on the cheap labor available in free-trade zones such as Kaohsiung.

Shih Ming-teh, who was sentenced to life for his part in the Kaohsiung incident, stated prior to beginning his work with Formosa that: "It cannot be denied that the Taiwanese people are ethnically Chinese. However, a nation is not created on the basis of one’s race; it should be established according to the desires of the people. Whether Taiwan ought to be independent or should unify with the mainland is a question to be decided by the people living here. And in order to make such a choice, democratic elections must be held."

Many leaders advocating democratic rights were imprisoned in the aftermath of the Kaohsiung incident. But there are 17 million people living on the island, and they will continue to fight for the democratic reform of the KMT dictatorship. Should we choose to ignore this struggle, we only strengthen the hand of the nationalist government in its harsh denial of fundamental freedoms to the Taiwanese people.

1. This article is based on information obtained from the Amnesty International Briefing on Taiwan (Republic of China), October 1976, London. Facts pertaining to recent events were secured through the cooperation of the Japan Committee for the Release of Taiwanese Political Prisoners, c/o Formosa Kikaku, Imori bldg. 5F, 2-16-9 Honjo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113.

2. On June 2, a Taipei court jailed all but one of 33 people accused of "taking part in anti-government "riots" in the southern industrial city of Kaohsiung during a human rights rally last December (See New Asia News Jan. 1980).

Sentences ranged from 10 months to more than six years. The longest terms were handed out to two persons associated with Mellitao (Formosa), a magazine, now banned, whose purpose was to promote democracy in Taiwan. Chen Po-sen, a member of Mellitao, was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison, and novelist Yang Ching-chu and Wang Tuo, also Mellitao staffs, each received six-year terms. (New Asia News Jun. 1980)
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